Space Weapons Ban - How Can It Be Achieved?
Report on a Workshop held in Berlin on June 10-11, 2002
Regina Hagen 
Participants of the workshop "Space Weapons Ban - How Can it be achieved?": Jürgen Scheffran, André Rothkirch, Carol Rosin, Ian Kenyon, Christopher Coenen, Götz Neuneck, Fu Zhigang, Ivan Safranchuk, Clifford Singer, Regina Hagen (from left to right) |
On June 10-11, 2002, fifteen experts gathered in Berlin, Germany, to examine in some detail the three officially released space weapons ban proposals. Under the title "Space Weapons Ban - How Can It Be Achieved?", the initiators of the proposals or their representatives, respectively, met with scientists, diplomats, and scholars to discuss the pros and cons of the various documents. Additional information and suggestions were introduced in the course of the meeting.
The workshop was convened by INESAP in cooperation with the Federation of German Scientists (Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, VDW) and the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. It was held at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Science and saw participants from science groups, peace research organizations, and universities in Bochum, Berlin, Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Hamburg (all Germany), Moscow (Russia), Southampton (UK), Champaign and Ventura (both USA). The scholars were joined by representatives from the German Space Agency in Cologne, the Office of Technology Assessment at the German Parliament, the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin, and by a diplomat from the Chinese mission to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
The participants were welcomed by Regina Hagen from INESAP and Götz Neuneck from VDW who gave a brief overview of the work that has so far been done in the Space Weapons Ban Study Group of the project "Moving Beyond Missile Defense".
Security in Space - Obstacles and Challenges
In the first presentation of the day, Detlev Wolter from Berlin gave an outline of Peaceful Use and Common Security in Outer Space. He started off with a few questions: What are the legal consequences of space as a terroritory beyond national jurisdiction (Weltraum als hoheitsfreier Raum)? And how should the "peaceful uses" postulated in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 be interpreted? Regardless of all differences over these questions, PAROS, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, is unanimously accepted by the world community, with no "no" vetos registered against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions. The standard is that common interests should be placed above particular interests. This means that no indiviual state can decide how an arms race in space can be prevented. Rather, all uses of outer space with implications for a possible space arms race must be decided on multilaterally. Consequently, all space uses should strenghen peace and international security.
Often, a parallel between space and the "freedom of the high seas" is drawn. Detlev Wolter believes this as not applicable. International law has changed over the past 500 years. De-colonization and the formation of the United Nations introduced an element of cooperation which brought about a structural change in international law. Consequently, there is a need for a "Treaty on the Cooperative Use of Outer Space" in the security field that would go beyond the mere prohibition of weapons in space and lay the foundation for Common Security in Outer Space ("CSO Treaty").
A recurring question in this context is where such a treaty could be negotiated. One solution might be to convene a special conference for the treaty negotiations. Canada has already put forward the suggestion, and Germany should follow suit.
The definition of a "space weapon" stood at the beginning of Wulf von Kries' talk on Peaceful Use of Outer Space - Obstacles and Challenges. A long-time employee of the German Space Agency (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V., DLR), he pointed out that the discussion on space weapons should not be limited to deployment in space but include those weapons on earth that can be directed into space. The existing legal space regime is almost 40 years old, and no efforts have been undertaken to adjust it to reality, namely to the increasing military use of space. International law, e.g., allows the military use of space for (self-) defense, for intercontinental ballistic missiles, for missile defense tests and a host of other activities. The further development of military space uses makes space "attractive" as a battlefield, so that military confrontation in space is very likely. The speaker expressed conviction that nothing can, might, and will stop routine use of space for military activites.
Ivan Safranchuk from the Moscow Office of the Center for Defense Information described space weapons projects as generally going beyond missile defense (MD) and being mostly funded outside the MD budget. According to him only about 10% of the US MD buget promotes space weaponization. In the discussion of his presentation, however, it was pointed out that midcourse interceptors might also be used as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.
Treaty Proposals New and Old
The next series of presentations brought three proposed space weapons treaties up for discussion.
Much to the surprise of the workshop participants, Fu Zhigang did not as planned give background information on the Working Paper on possible treaty elements that had been introduced into the CD by China in June 2001. Instead he presented the new Joint Working Paper of China and Russia on Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instruments on PAROS, which was officially introduced into the CD two weeks after the workshop. (See pp. 34ff for the treaty text and Fu Zhigang's commentaries.)
Bernd Kubbig from the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute undertook to comment on the working paper. He critized the omission of an important treaty obligation. In particular, Article 3 does not prohibit research, development, and testing of space weapons. Despite the fact that no new space treaty is likely to enter into force unless the five permanent members of the UN Security Council ratified it, he also suggested not focusing too much on US willingness to negotiate. States would be better served by the motto "let them race against themselves", concentrating instead on coalition building to find allies to promote the proposal - among them allies with commercial interests.
The task would not be easy, but an international, legally binding space weapons ban could be achieved before the end of this year, asserted Carol Rosin in her talk on the Space Preservation Act of 2002, introduced at the US HOuse Of Congress by Democrat Dennis Kucinich in January 2002. The bill would oblige the US President to immediately ban all space weapons and terminate all related activities. The national scope of the Space Preservation act is complemented by the international perspective of the companion Space Preservation Treaty.
The comment to this proposal was delivered by Ian Kenyon. He believes that the language of the treaty is not legally sound enough to encourage head of states to seriously consider its negoation. (See pp. 41ff. for the treaty and comment.)
At last, the oldest of the treaty proposals was introduced by Jürgen Scheffran. The draft Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space was written in 1984 when the US "Star Wars" programs were approaching their peak. Although some technical and political considerations are no longer up-to-date, most articles are still worth consideration.
In his commentary, Jürgen Altmann suggested several issues for addition. It became clear that it is difficult to deal with space the way we did in the 1980s. Or, as Wulf von Kries menioned, "Space is becoming a very normal place". (See pp. 48ff. for the treaty and some explanations.)
The workshop was rounded off with thoughts on PAROS Impasse at Geneva - Is there a solution?, in which Clifford Singer suggested beginning with what is most feasible. A ban on military use of outer space beyond geosynchronous orbit might establish a norm which could be expanded step by step.
An unexpected note entered the discussion at the very end when a participant pointed out that every major arms control treaty in the 20th century was achieved when the military decided they no longer needed a particular weapons. Well then, lets's go for it!
