Space Weapons and the Conference on Disarmament
Clifford Singer 
Here two questions will be addressed. First, can progress on prevention of the further militarization of space take place more easily within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or outside of it? Second, what are potentially realizable goals?
The argument for working outside of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is that it is stuck. The CD agenda can only be approved as a whole. Since the completion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty text, there have been three parts to this whole. One part is the formation of an ad hoc committee for discussions on the future of nuclear disarmament. Until recently Russia and the United States blocked this, but then each somewhat tentatively agreed to allow this on the agenda. The second part is negotiation of a cut-off of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons programs. This was briefly initiated until an impasse developed over the third part of the agenda. This is on the problem of prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). China insists that there should be negotiations on PAROS. The United States has been agreeable only to discussions.
FMCT, PAROS, and CD Impasse
The impasse on the CD agenda is not just a procedural problem. It is hardly surprising that China is reluctant to put a cap on its own strategic nuclear capabilities until the United States is willing to put a cap on its national missile defense plans. And space-based assets like infra-red detectors are essential to US national missile defense plans.
Nevertheless, China has recently agreed with Russia on a joint proposal on PAROS negotiations that could help move the agenda on the CD forward. The essential obligations under this proposal would be to avoid placing weapons in space or resorting to "the threat or use of force against outer space objects".
Compared to previous Chinese proposals for PAROS that would have been clearly incompatible with US national missile defense plans, this new joint proposal could in principle allow the development and even deployment of missile defense systems that also have anti-satellite capabilities, so long as these capabilities were not used to explicitly threaten or destroy objects in orbit around the Earth. It still seems unlikely that China would completely decouple other issues from missile defense if the United States looked intent on an unlimited national missile defense build-up or transfer of significant theater missile defense capabilities to Taiwan. On the Chinese and Russian sides there nevertheless now seems to be a possibility of making progress in the CD. This is perhaps with the expectation that technical and financial difficulties and political developments will ultimately provide acceptable limits on US missile defense plans in any case.
The fissile materials production cut-off is widely recognized as being a logical and necessary step on the path towards cooperation on comprehensive global nuclear management that would much more reliably secure nuclear weapons materials from possible diversion to non-state actors. Much of the needed progress can be made on a bilateral basis. But it is hard to imagine all of the states with nuclear weapons potential developing the transparency and cooperation needed for truly comprehensive global nuclear management while several of them still maintain a shroud of secrecy over new fissile materials production for additional nuclear weapons. As long as the CD is meant to deal with such questions at all, it will remain the focal point for finalizing an understanding on the cut-off of production of fissile materials for weapons programs.
There is nevertheless much to be said for the idea that attempts to make progress on this nexus of issues should not be confined to the CD alone. One reason for this is that the current US administration seems to have difficulty with putting enough emphasis on furthering formal multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations to successfully unblock the CD. This situation is likely to last from two to six years, and perhaps longer. Even if a future US administration does put a priority on a broader fissile materials production cut-off, however, there is still a powerful reason for taking part of the discussion on outer space outside of the CD.
The basic problem is that there is a tension between a broader goal of restricting the military use of space and the narrower range of possibilities that can be entertained within the CD without getting in the way of fissile material production cut-off negotiations. Thus what is needed is a consensus that these broader goals will be pursued outside of the CD. Then only what is mutually acceptable to the essential players will be addressed under the PAROS topic within the CD. For this to occur in a timely manner, the approach within the CD will need largely to stay away from the most central components of US Air Force plans for use of space over the next twenty years or so.
Overcoming the Impasse
One approach that might be practicable is to split discussions on military uses of outer space into two parts. Within the CD, it might even be possible to come to an agreement on banning all military activities beyond geo-synchronous orbit, along with promoting related confidence-building measures. Previously this could have been difficult, because detection of energetic particles in the earth's magnetosphere from nuclear explosions was considered to be of potential military importance. Now such activities in that part of the earth's magnetosphere that extends beyond geosynchronous orbit can safely be considered a peaceful verification activity rather than a military activity. Indeed, no military activities are currently foreseen in the region beyond geosynchronous orbit. Nevertheless, banning military activities in this realm could still be of fundamental long-term importance. It would extend the concept of the de-militarization of Antarctica to the whole of the solar system and beyond, except in the tiny region of it to which we currently pay the most attention.
Discussions in one or more coordinated projects outside of the CD could then get deeper into thornier problems on definition of terms of reference and transparency and verification than is likely to be possible within the CD context over the next few years. With respect to stationing weapons in space, there may in fact be only one type of weapon on the conceptual drawing board that can't better be launched from the ground when needed, rather than stationed in orbit. This is the Space-Based Laser. Other missions can better be carried out by standard or high velocity cruise missiles, or perhaps with ballistic kinetic energy weapons that are launched when needed. If conventional or even nuclear weapons are stationed in space, they are generally in the wrong place in orbit to get to a target faster than their ground, air, or sea-launched counterparts. So it is overly expensive and inefficient to place them in orbit ahead of time.
In principle the Space-Based Laser could be an exception to this rule. A large number of these devices would still be needed in orbit for continuous global coverage. However, they could in principle strike almost instantly. Nevertheless, there are many problems. They will only work, if at all, under ideal atmospheric conditions. They are comparatively easy to harden against except for a limited class of targets. They would also have limited target coverage. They would be large, expensive, tricky to maintain, and vulnerable to counterattack. Their emplacement could easily cause more security problems than it solves. They are likely to be extremely politically unpopular around the globe. They could even be viewed as a potential interference with national sovereignty and thus be viewed legitimate targets for deactivation by another country or consortium. With careful attention to technical detail and the relevant international and domestic politics, setting up a politically attractive mechanism for stopping the development of space-based lasers might save the US Air Force from a great deal of needless and unproductive expenditure.
So far, only discussions and negotiations in a multilateral context have been covered here. For any of what is proposed here to bear fruit, there is one set of bilateral negotiations that must move forward. The United States and China will have to put a higher priority in their strategic discussions on developing an understanding on how to manage differing views of missile defense and military use of outer space while still moving forward towards a broader-based halt on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.
There is one possibly hopeful sign on this. President Bush recently enunciated the view that dealing with terrorism will require a new global concert, not just an enduring arrangement between Russia and NATO. It's a big "if," but if Bush is capable of getting his bureaucracy to follow through on the logical consequences of this, it may finally become possible to engage in a really serious and productive strategic dialogue with China on the issues discussed above. This would entail not just continuing to walk the tightrope between the one China policy and the Taiwan Defense Act. It would also require engaging in a serious dialog on how weapons of mass destruction are to be handled in the relationship between the United States and China. This need not mean that China and the United States share the same view about how much missile defense preparation is needed to deal with the theoretical possibility of more states acquiring intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. It should be sufficient to come to an understanding that this possibility will not be used as a cover for undermining what China views to be fundamental strategic security without effective consultation.
In this context, taking part of the discussion on PAROS outside the CD could be quite helpful. This could provide another avenue for discussions on the military role of space that do not have to be officially supported by Washington. If properly constructed, this could provide a forum for various countries to express their broader concerns. Then they could no longer insist that these be engaged within the CD before any discussions on other critical issues can proceed. In practical terms, discussions starting outside the CD could even lead to an understanding on Space-Based Lasers, and perhaps some other issues as well. In any case they could play a useful role in unblocking the CD.
Finally, it is necessary to make some comments on timing. Even after last September 11, before the recent attack on the Indian parliament there seemed to be little or no possibility of the CD delivering a fissile materials production cut-off treaty text before the end of this decade. The fundamental reason was that it seemed that Pakistan would insist on having at least this long to build its nuclear arsenal up to what it sees as a minimum deterrence level vis—vis India. That Pakistan does not yet have effective minimum deterrence is evident from the fact that India is willing to threaten war even following Pakistan's explicit demonstration in 1998 of the ability to make a nuclear explosion.
However, what may be coming clear from current events is that it doesn't really matter how many nuclear bombs Pakistan has. Pakistan's ruling elite maintains its current way of life only through external financial support, and the outside world has made it clear that India will be allowed to demand a halt to support for incursions into Kashmir, whether Pakistan has nuclear weapons or not. While it still seems unlikely, it is thus possible that a moratorium on fissile materials production for weapons programs that includes South Asia may now even become possible within the next few years. With careful attention to the appropriate division and pursuit of issues to be addressed outside of the CD, it could thus be possible to have such a moratorium years earlier than might otherwise be achieved.
