FMCT and PAROS: A Chinese Perspective
Hui Zhang 
A universal Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of fissile material (separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and uranium-233) for nuclear weapons, has long been seen as a key building block in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) decided to adopt Ambassador Shannon's report and to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to begin negotiations on an FMCT. After several years delay caused by debates over the scope of the discussion and the linkage to nuclear disarmament measures, the CD agreed in August 1998 to convene an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an FMCT. However, the negotiations quickly ended when the CD failed to agree on renewing the committee's mandate. The 2000 Review Conference for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) called for FMCT negotiations to start immediately and to be completed in five years. However, until now, the CD remains deadlocked over the resumption of negotiations, due to recent US plans on missile defense and space weaponization.
A primary goal of an FMCT will be to attain the signatures of the five declared nuclear weapon states and the three de facto nuclear weapon states (India, Pakistan, and Israel). In practice, an FMCT has little impact on the US and Russian stockpiles. Both countries' stockpiles are so huge, that they do not need additional fissile material. China's participation in an FMCT will be critical to its success, however. Without China's participation in the FMCT, India will not sign it, and Pakistan will not sign unless India does. Both South Asian countries and Israel are believed to be continuing to produce fissile materials for their stockpiles.
China is believed to have stopped the production of both HEU and plutonium for weapons since the early 1990s,[1] and China has consistently supported the FMCT negotiations. On October 4, 1994, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian and US Secretary of State Christopher issued a joint statement in which they promoted the "earliest possible achievement" of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. In March 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin appealed in his address to the CD that "negotiations should be conducted as soon as possible for the conclusion of a universal and verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty".[2]
However, because of its concerns about US missile defense and "space control" plans, which would lead to the weaponization of outer space and stimulate a costly and destabilizing arms race, China recently clearly expressed that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a realistic and urgent issue. As Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stated in March at the Plenary of the 2002 Session of the CD, "PAROS is just as important as fissile material cut-off, if not more".[3] China has held that the CD should start concurrently negotiating both FMCT and PAROS.
Recently it has been reported that China privately informed CD members on June 12, 2002, that it would no longer insist on immediate space negotiations and would accept less formal discussions under the condition that the talks be held toward concluding a treaty on the outer space issue.[4] However, the US staunchly opposes any negotiations on the outer space issue while pressing for the immediate negotiation of an FMCT. This disagreement between China and the US over FMCT and PAROS negotiations has already prevented the CD from continuing any arms control negotiations. In the face of this stalemate, it is therefore necessary to explore the rational of the parallel negotiations on both FMCT and PAROS, and discuss some solutions overcoming the impasse in Geneva.
The Rationale of Parallel Negotiations
China has numerous serious security concerns about US space weaponization proposals and missile defense plans. These concerns would directly affect China's attitude toward the FMCT negotiations. Chinese officials are sensitive to US statements envisioning the control of space. US military planning documents issued in recent years explicitly reveal that the US wants to "control space " and to establish superiority over the world.
The US Space Command's Vision for 2020, for example, proposes "U.S. Space Command - dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment. Integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict". These ideas were developed in detail in the Long Range Plan issued by the Space Command in 1998,[5] which conceptualized the "control of space" by means of "global engagement". The control of space is aimed at assuring US access to space, freedom of operation within the space medium, and denying others the use of space if required.
The plan is to be fully implemented by 2020 and envisages warfighting in and from space, and a fully effective space-based missile defense system able to intercept ballistic missiles in different phases of their flight course as well as cruise missiles at most altitudes.
The January 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization[6] (the commission was originally chaired by the current Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) further confirms those statements from the Long Range Plan and Vision for 2020 and states: "The Commissioners believe the U.S. government should vigorously pursue the capabilities called for in the National Space Policy to ensure that the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and, if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests".
The "space control" plan would require the development, testing, and deployment of antisatellite weapons (ASATs) based in space or on earth. The US space control plan would inevetably lead to an arms race in outer space and raise the risk of turning outer space into a battlefield. There is no evidence of threats to US space assets from other countries. The purpose of the plan is to pursue space domination. Thus it will offer the US absolute military and strategic superiority and be used to intervene in China's affairs, such as the Taiwan issue. Indeed, the Taiwan issue is taken as one threat in the 2001 commission report.
Also, in January 2001, the first US "space war gaming exercise" simulated the use of anti-satellite weapons, strategic missile defense systems, and land-based laser weapons to attack space targets. And China was taken as the assumed enemy in the exercise - which lead to strong reactions from China.
China is further concerned about United States missile defense plans, which would be one part of the pursuit of space control. The Bush administration has proposed to develop a layered missile defense. The deployment of a missile defense system will inevitably intensify competition in outer space. To develop strategic missile defense systems, the US would have to develop and use its military assets in outer space and deploy space-based missile defense components that would function as a space weapons system.
US missile defense could possibly include space-based weapons such as the Space Based Laser, and Brilliant Pebbles - space-based kinetic kill vehicles. Such a system could of course include ASAT capabilities. It is reasonable to expect that a missile defense system will encourage other countries to deploy ASAT weapons.
Furthermore, China is concerned that it would be one target of US missile defense: even the limited system would neutralize the two dozen single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are capable of reaching the United States and that China now possesses. From the perspective of Chinese leaders, China's own small strategic arsenal appears to be a most plausible target of the proposed system. Thus, China worries that a US missile defense system could politically or strategically subject China to nuclear blackmail. Such a system would give the United States much more freedom to intervene in China's affairs including undermining China's efforts at reunification with Taiwan.
This concern is enhanced by US cooperative research and development of advanced Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with Japan and potentially Taiwan, and agreements with Japan to cooperate in defending areas surrounding Japan, possibly including Taiwan.
The US Nuclear Posture Review, released early in 2002 in parts and leaked to the public in more detail in March 2002, in which the Bush administration has reportedly directed the military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries including China, further increased China's concerns.
China is also concerned that US missile defense and space weaponization plans would degrade China's security environment. US missile defense plans and the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will rather end further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia than otherwise. Thus, the huge gap between China's nuclear arsenal and those of the United States and Russia will remain. China is not willing to see the huge "strategic missile gap" between its arsenal and those of both leading nuclear powers, which pose a major threat to China's small nuclear arsenal, continue to grow.
Furthermore, since space weapons have inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, it would encourage a military and political response from other countries. Thus, US missile defense and space control plans will lead to a new nuclear arms race and a weapons race in space. Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process that the nuclear weapon states have committed to under the NPT would damage the nuclear non-proliferation regime. China wishes to focus on its economic development. It needs a stable international security environment to do so. China is unwilling to be forced into a costly arms race.
The above major security concerns affect China's willingness to participate in FMCT negotiations. Historically, the sole purpose for China to build and develop its nuclear weapons was to guard itself against a nuclear threat and blackmail. China holds that the purposes and objectives of arms control and disarmament "should serve to enhance the security of all countries; it should not become a tool for stronger nations to control weaker ones, still less should it be an instrument for a handful of countries to optimize their armament in order to seek unilateral security superiority".[7] China is against any country seeking its own security at the cost of others.
However, the ending of the ABM Treaty, US missile defense and space weapons plans all run counter the purposes and objectives of arms control and disarmament, and pose a huge threat to China's national security. If its "legitimate security concerns" are ignored, China would develop responses to neutralize such a threat.
To retain its nuclear deterrent capability, China's direct response to the US missile defense and space weaponization plans could be to build up more warheads, and its missiles would be deployed with decoys and other effective countermeasures.
China is already reportedly engaged in a nuclear modernization program to field less vulnerable mobile and solid-fueled missiles. But it has been expected that such a program will be at a slow pace and modest in size. It is estimated that China's stockpile could contain about three tonnes of weapon-grade HEU and one tonne of separated plutonium.[8] Therefore the existing stockpile would be large enough for its modernization program under the condition of non-deployment of US missile defense.
However, while facing a planned U.S missile defense system, China could be driven to expand its ICBM arsenal significantly both in quantity and quality. China would use up its existing fissile material stockpile for the many more missiles needed to penetrate the US missile defense system. Thus, China might find it necessary to produce more fissile material for its stockpile. China might then well keep an option to restart production of fissile materials and be unwilling to join a global fissile material cut-off treaty. Thus, we may conclude that an agreement on PAROS would be a necessary base for China's participation in an FMCT regime. This might explain why China wishes that both FMCT and PAROS negotiations should be conducted simultaneously.
Negotiating a Treaty on PAROS
Without the ABM Treaty and with the development of missile defense, there is a high risk that outer space will be weaponized. The prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is becoming an urgent issue. Furthermore, to break the current stand-still of the arms control and disarmament process, it is necessary that the international community takes effective measures to prevent space weaponization and an arms race in space. The most direct and effective way to achieve this purpose is to negotiate a treaty on PAROS.
There are several treaties limiting certain space-based military activities. These include the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space and on the moon or other celestial bodies. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear explosions in space. The 1972 ABMTtreaty prohibits development, testing, or deployment of space-based missile defense systems. However, the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will weaken the norm on limiting weapons in space, such as the space-based laser and kinetic energy weapons.
In short, these treaties are not able to effectively prevent the weaponization of or an arms race in outer space. In fact, within recent years, most countries have supported efforts to negotiate a new treaty on PAROS. In each of the recent years, for example, the UN General Assembly has adopted resolutions on PAROS with overwhelming majority. The 1999 resolution emphasized that the negotiation and conclusion of an international agreement on PAROS remains the top priority of the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on PAROS. In recent years, the CD has addressed PAROS on several occassions.
Various proposals on PAROS have been presented by China, Russia, Canada, and the Group of 21. China submitted two working papers on PAROS in 2000 and 2001, respectively.[9] On 27 June 2002 China and Russia submitted a new Joint Working Paper on the issue of a space treaty to the CD.[10] China has strongly advocated the CD should reestablish an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS and start to negotiate towards concluding one or more legal instruments on the prohibition of the weaponization of outer space.
Some participants in the CD argue that there is at present no arms race in space and therefore no need to discuss the issue of PAROS. Yet, as Richard Garwin pointed out, "the best time to introduce such treaties and regulations is when there is no active conflict or even an approach to conflict in space".[11] As in the case of nuclear weapons, once these space weapons are developed and deployed, it would be very difficult to roll them back. Thus, prevention of space weaponization is the key to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
It is time to negotiate and conclude early an international legal instrument on PAROS in a controlled and verifiable manner. Countries with major space capabilities should participate in such negotiations. Given the reality that outer space is already militarzed, the primary present objective should be the prevention of space weaponization.
Once negotiations starts, some key issues should be explored in detail. Space weaponization should be defined clearly. The minimum scope of the term "space weaponization" should include research, development, and deployment of space-based weapons (either for missile defense purpose or as ASAT) and all ASATs.
In general, space weaponization should be defined to cover all ABM weapons (because they can be inherently used as ASATs) and all ASATs. However, such a wide scope would prohibit almost all BMD systems, and the US could hardly be persuaded to stop its plans for ground and sea based missile defense. Thus the US are likely to refuse it. On the other hand, a minimum scope (which excludes non-space-based BMD systems) might be less difficult for the US to accept, since present US space-based BMD and space control programs would not come to fruition around 2020, so that the US still has time for serious considerations. Moreover, if US missile defense programs really target only the "states of concerns", space-based BMD might not be necessary.
On the other hand, if US missile defense plans do not exclude China as a potential target, even the minimum scope could not significantly reduce China's major security concerns. China could prefer a wider definition of space weapon systems to include space-based sensors for BMD system.
One resolution for this possible dispute could be the following: if US missile defense plans cannot be stopped, the US policymakers should at least take China's concerns seriously, e.g. by taking measures to ensure China that the system will not target China, as some US official had promised. Also if the US-Japan joint TMD plan excluded Taiwan, it would greatly reduce China's concern on the regional security issue.
Verification of such a treaty on PAROS would be another important issue. The verification would be much more complicated with the development and deployment of any ABM systems.
Finally, it is also necessary to explore other basic issues in the PAROS discussion, such as what is meant by "peaceful" use of outer space, the boundary between the atmosphere and outersSpace, space objects, and the definition of "weapon," "weapons system," "components of a weapons system".
Proceeding With Further Nuclear Disarmament
To advance talks on FMCT at the CD, it is necessary for the US and Russia to proceed further towards nuclear disarmament.
The US and Russia should reduce their huge nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner through legally-binding instruments. Although the US and Russia, as required by their newly signed Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the "Moscow Treaty"), would reduce their deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads over the next 10 years, there is no requirements for each side to eliminate any of the nuclear weapons they remove from deployment.
Moreover, such a proposal limits only the number of deployed strategic warheads, whereas there is no limit on the number of non-deployed or reserve warheads. Accordingly, the US and Russia would still keep huge nuclear arsenals.
Thus, the US and Russia should take a lead and commitment to make further substantial reductions of their respective nuclear arsenals. The reduced nuclear warheads and explosives should be dismantled and disposed of in a verifiable way, and not be used again as weapons in any form.
Finally, to help reduce China's concerns about the large existing military stocks of fissile material for weapons, the US and Russia should make more significant commitments to an irreversible reduction of their fissile material stockpiles including fissile material from warheads withdrawn under the deep cut agreements. In fact, even after the planned elimination of hundreds of tonnes of weapons plutonium and HEU, both countries will retain perhaps 50 tons of plutonium and a few hundreds tons of weapon grade HEU which is enough to make over ten thousand thermonuclear warheads. Thus, without significant reductions of their stockpile, the FMCT would have little impact on the US and Russian nuclear arsenals.
The author would like to acknowledge the support of a grant for Research and Writing from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent any government policy.
Norris et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 1994.- Jiang Zemin's speech at the Conference on Disarmament on 26 March 1999, Geneva; http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/7275.html.
- Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi at the Ple- nary of the 2002 Session of the Conference on Disarmament on March 28, 2002, Geneva; http://un.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/27762.html.
- CD Inches Closer to Starting Negotiations, Arms Control Today, No.6, July/August 2002.
- United States Space Command, Long Range Plan, March 1998.
- Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington DC, Jan.11,2001.
- www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/24967.html.
- David Wright et al., Estimating China's Stockpile of Fissile Materials for Weapons, Draft, Union of Concerned Scientists Technical Working Paper, Washington, D.C., April 1996.
- China's Position on and Suggestions for Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament, Working Paper , CD/1606, 9 Feb.2000; Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the Weaponization of Outer Space, Working Paper, CD/1645, 2001.
- See details: www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc10.htm.
- Richard L. Garwin, Space Weapons or Space Arms Control, American Philosophical Society Annual General Meeting, April 2000.
