The Link Between Missile Defense
and Space Weaponization
Ivan Safranchuk 
The Bush administration pays far more attention to engaging space-basing for missile defenes (MD) assets than the previous administration did. This is hardly surprising if one takes into consideration the fact that Donald Rumsfeld - one of the strongest proponents of engaging space for military purposes and former chairman of the US Space Commission - took office as US Secretary of Defense. The space perspective of US MD programs fits into the broader picture of Bush administration policies with regard to space. The latter was summarized in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review: "A key objective ... is not only to ensure US ability to exploit space for military purposes, but also as required to deny an adversary's ability to do so".
Currently, space is present in the following elements of the MD architecture: space-based sensors and space-based interceptors.
Space-Based Sensors
The bulk of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) work on space-based sensors is the SBIRS project (Space-Based Infrared System, Increment 3). This sensor system is to be used for all ballistic missile defense (BMD) projects and all types of interception: boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal-phase. SBIRS is to provide booster detection, midcourse tracking, and discrimination data to BMD systems. SBIRS Increment 3 is an integrated system composed of Defense Support Program satellites, SBIRS High (a constellation of geosynchronous orbit satellites and highly elliptical orbit payloads), SBIRS Low, and a consolidated ground-processing system.
SBIRS Low is to be launched in 2006, and the full constellation of about 30 satellites is to be in place by 2011.
Besides this project there is a cooperative program between the US and Russia on jointly providing early-warning data and launch detection - Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS). The program, which was initiated in the early 1990s and agreed by Yeltsin and Clinton in 1998, is currently in a stalemate due to the inability of both parties to agree on the architecture and form of the project.
Can the sensor part of BMD projects contribute to space weaponization? The easiest answer is no. There are already infrared sensors in space, so the SBIRS project does not really change the existing situation, it just puts new sensors in place that are more sophisticated and capable to facilitate BMD interception.
However, indirectly SBIRS may promote space weaponization. The US military are more and more concerned with the vulnerability of space-based assets and argue that it is necessary to develop new satellites in order to defend communication and surveillance assets in space. Such satellites must be able to guarantee reliable operation of the critical space-based military infrastructure. Accordingly, they function as space-based assets to defeat anti-satellite efforts of an adversary. Exactly these means are very likely to open the gates of space weaponization. Their mission is stated to be defensive, however they are likely to have strong offensive capabilities to strike targets not only in space, but on earth as well, and consequently they are relatively easy to be politically sold domestically and internationally.
SBIRS assets, which beyond 2010 are supposed to be critical elements of BMD projects, will demand protection from anti-satellite weapons of Russia, China, probably India. So the long-discussed necessity to defend space-based assets will likely materialize under the cover of protecting (offensive character) space-based assets of BMD (defensive program).
Once again, the sensor projects of the MDA do not currently have a direct link to space weaponization. However, under the cover of protecting critically important SBIRS assets, the MDA is likely to be tempted to introduce real weapons in space. Thus, sensors may become the weak chain link and lead to promotion of space weaponization.
But there is also reason to argue against the weaponization of space: the countries wo possess or investigate anti-satellite technologies are not identical with those that are pointed out as targets of a future US BMD system. Russia, China, and India, as well as Europe, who in theory can build anti-satellite weapons, are not the rogue states - and it is the rogue states that serve as justification for the US BMD plans.
Still this argument will not be strong enough to prevent the link between deployment of sensors and space weaponization. It is not strong enough because at least Russia and China are likely to work on anti-satellite weapons in more or less in connection with US BMD plans (maybe this connection will not be declared just like the programs themselves, but still will be detectable), which will justify US endeavors for developing weapons to protect space-based assets from anti-satellite weapons.
Space-Based Interceptors
Currently, the MDA works on three interception options, namely boost-phase, midcourse, and terminal-phase. Only boost-phase interception has options for deploying interceptors in space. The two options under investigation are the Space-based Laser (SBL) and kinetic energy weapons.
The MDA intends to demonstrate SBL technologies in orbit by 2012. The SBL test program will include ground, flight, and space experiments to verify SBL technologies at the component, sub-system, and system levels.
Despite the reduction in the program budget, the MDA remains optimistic on the schedule. Although the program budget has been cut down to zero for this and next year, the MDA is likely to spend money on it from other lines of the budget, for instance from the technology or boost-phase defense lines.
The kinetic energy boost-phase program is not exclusively space-oriented. There are two basing options - at sea and in space. The former is more promising as far as time is concerned. The MDA promises to have an operational sea-based capability as early as 2006. The MDA also intends to demonstrate experimental space-based boost defense capabilities by 2005 (it is, however, likely that this experiment will be postponed by at least two years).
Both SBL and space-based kinetic energy weapons encounter huge technological difficulties. Both programs are likely to go through budget cuts and delays.
It is exactly these programs that cause the major concern from the angle of space weaponization. Once they are implemented, both systems will have highly offensive capabilities.
The Air Force is already discussing other potential missions for the SBL, most of them with an offensive or pre-emptive character. They include:
defensive/offensive counter-space operations (anti-satellite missions);
denial of access to space (knocking out launchers);
denial of information flow to/from satellites;
defensive/offensive counter-air operations;
knocking out high-altitude aircrafts, cruise missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles.
Conclusion
The BMD programs have high priority in the Bush administration's national security policy. On the other side, BMD space elements remain comparatively low on the agendy, although they are advocated by the current US Secretary of Defense.
Most of the attention and money remains to be paid to midcourse interception. Boost-phase interception receives only 10% of the MDA funding, and sensors approx. 7%. Moreover, boost-phase defense and sensor projects are not exclusively about space. Therefore, space-oriented programs do not dominate within the overall BMD program - at least not now. They are, on the contraty, comparatively modest.
BMD, which is popular domestically in the US and already more or less accepted by the international community, is not really the key element for weaponizing space. However, with BMD now being now legitimate, it is easier to "sell" military space projects, while most efforts to actually weaponize space are likely to be undertaken not within but outside the BMD program - not by the MDA, but by the US Air Force and the Space Command. So MD projects themselves are not focused on space weaponization. But they will promote, provoke, and legitimize space weaponization endeavors within other programs and agencies.
