Future Security in Space: Conference Report
Report on a Conference in Southampton on May 28-29, 2002
Jonathan Dean 
This is my report on the conference Future Security in Space, organized jointly by the Monterey Institute, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and the University of Southampton's Mountbatten Centre, held May 28-29 at the New Place Conference Centre near Southampton, UK.
This was an exceptionally well planned and well organized conference, with competent speakers on nearly all aspects of current military and commercial use of space and of space weaponization. This broad coverage made it possible to reach some general conclusions on the issue of weaponization of space.
My main conclusion is that international opposition to weaponization of space is unlikely to bring about a treaty prohibiting weaponization that is accepted by the United States, the main spacefaring nation, but that organized opposition to weaponization can succeed in delaying US moves to weaponize over a prolonged period.
The international backing needed to bring about US agreement to a treaty banning all weapons in space is not forthcoming at this time. A treaty banning all weapons in space without US agreement is not regarded as practical owing to nearly total US dominance of military space (95% of all expenditures on military space in 1999 - Dr. Alain Dupais, University of Paris). However, rapid expansion of already heavy military and commercial use of satellites of all kinds is nearly certain. Even limited weaponization could create enormous damage to these uses of space (e.g., through ground or aircraft-based anti-satellite weapons and through greatly increased debris in low earth orbit from use or testing of ASATs). These factors, plus energetic opposition to the weaponization of space by governments and publics, could cause the United States to delay first steps of weaponization for protracted periods even while it continues to oppose treaties prohibiting weaponization. To achieve this delay should be the objective of those opposed to the weaponization of space. Doing so will require continuing, visible mobilization of opposition interests and promotion of generally useful confidence-building measures. Below are some points made during the New Place conference which support these conclusions.
Low Risks to US Space Assets
Several speakers confirmed that there was at this time no direct military threat to US space assets. Ground-based centers of space activity are more vulnerable and probably would be the first target (John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre).
In reply to a question, David Kiefer of the US Missile Defense Agency said current administration missile defense plans foresaw the use of space only for additional sensors. He said the MDA did not have "anything robust" for the space-based lasers or kinetic kill weapon. There was interest for these weapons in the MDA, but no money for this, so it was not a priority.
Increase in Military and Commercial Use of Space
Among many relevant points, Dr. Bruce DeBlois, Council on Foreign Relations, pointed out that space is critical in facilitating the flow of information. "Information is probably the twenty-first century's most valuable commodity". The US investment in space would be $500 billion by 2010, with annual income of $100 billion. There were now about 500 active satellites (Robert McDougall, Canada). The US has 100 military satellites (David Kretzmann of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey); Commander Kretzmann pointed out that use of precision-guided weapons had been 9% of total munitions in the 1991 Gulf War, but 60% in the Afghanistan campaign. Over half of these Afghanistan-used weapons were guided by GPS satellites. Satellites served a very wide variety of military purposes: (1) navigation, including location for operations, precision weapon guidance, combat search and rescue; (2) communications, including combat support, common operational support and rapid command instructions; (3) remote sensing, including weather, missile early warning, precision targeting, and intelligence collection. Commander Kretzmann pointed out that additional facilities were needed in most of these areas.
Military Use of Commercial Satellites for Communication & Imaging
Charles Peña of the Cato Institute pointed out that the US military was making extensive use of commercial satellites. Richard DalBello (Satellite Industry Association), and Alain Dupais (University of Paris) pointed out that all satellite builders were branches of companies producing military equipment, and that all satellites thus far have been launched from government installations. The US makes 95% of expenditures for military space applications, but less than 65% for commercial uses of space. DalBello commented that satellite builders, which generally believe governments are acting well on their behalf, will not see their interests as separate and contrary to military interests. The same may be true for commercial users, especially given intensive military use of their satellites. This means there may be little open resistance to weaponization from satellite users as well as satellite owners. At the same time, however, both military and civilian satellite users may well join in urging caution in weaponization on the administration.
No All-Out Effort for Treaty Banning Space Weapons
As restated by Ambassador Eric Javits, US representative to the Conference on Disarmament, the US categorically opposes negotiation of a treaty banning the weaponization of space. In my view, only an all-out international effort by China and Russia and the EU with global NGO support has prospect of changing the US position. For this effort to succeed, China, Russia and the EU states would have to conclude that preventing the weaponization of space was a cardinal interest justifying the sacrifice of other important interests in a confrontation with the United States. Russia has already indicated it is not willing to enter such a confrontation by dropping its demand to ban space-based weapons during the negotiations for the May 24 Moscow agreement. Liu Jieyi, the head of the Disarmament Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, indicated to me on two occasions prior to this May meeting that China was not prepared for all-out confrontation over the space weapons issue.
On May 28, China and Russia announced a joint working paper on possible elements of a treaty against weaponization of space to be formally submitted to the CD by the end of June. In the May 28-29 meeting in the UK, Vitali Lukiantsev of the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Russia was not prepared to take the space weapon issue out of the Conference on Disarmament and to launch an independent negotiation on the subject without the US. Cheng Jingye of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said discussion of the space issue outside the CD was a possibility. But at the end of the day, discussion would have to go back to some UN forum for the sake of universality, to include the US. Both officials said they preferred to keep the issue in the Conference on Disarmament, despite the fact, repeated by Ambassador Javits, that the US will not negotiate a treaty on this subject in the CD.
The US Position
Ambassador Javits made clear that the United States would not negotiate on a treaty against weaponization of space but was willing to discuss the issue in Geneva. He said the US would be cautious in acting to protect its space assets. Conflict in space would be a disaster for the world from which it would not recover for a hundred years. It was implicit in all existing agreements that space was for peaceful purposes only. But it was "just not in the cards that the US would be willing to jump from discussion" of non-weaponization "to negotiation" on this subject.
Space Debris
Joel Primack of the University of California, Santa Cruz gave a dramatic talk on the possibility of a chain reaction of space debris in Lower Earth Orbit, making impossible LEO use by communications and other satellites. This could happen if kinetic kill vehicles were tested or used in space or if some other government tried to stop US space programs with loads of rock or metal fragments. (Note: Some scientists claim Primack's findings are exaggerated; they are nonetheless plausible).
Conclusions
There seems to be no immediate threat of US action to weaponize space. At the same time, the military-civilian use of space is large, increasing and thoroughly interwoven.
It is improbable that opposition to US action to weaponize space will bring the US to agree to treaty prohibition of weaponization. However, growing US military use of space assets, under both military and commercial ownership, may bring increasing disinclination to change the status quo by beginning weaponization. Together with this factor, increasing foreign commercial investment in space assets, and continuing opposition to weaponization by nearly all foreign governments, including China, Russia and most of the EU countries, as well as vocal NGOs, may mean that the US will postpone decisive action to weaponize. If forces opposed to weaponization remain active, including intensive NGO work with national legislatures in opposing weaponization, this delay could be prolonged. At the same time, it would appear possible to reach agreement with the US on a range of confidence-building measures to the benefit of all. These might include such measures as (1) non-interference with manned space flight; (2) cooperation in clearing up debris; (3) non-interference with space and weather communications (such agreements could discourage jamming and provide a basis for joint reaction if it occurs) and, perhaps, (4) refraining from ASAT tests that could increase space debris in Lower Earth Orbit. A simplified form for such agreements could be General Assembly resolutions. It should be possible for interested governments to achieve agreement with the US on confidence-building measures like these, and for NGOs to propose them, without first conceding that the weaponization of space is inevitable.
A follow-on meeting in New York, Geneva or Washington of governments and NGO's interested in developing and putting forward confidence-building measures would be very useful.
