Options for Rules in Outer Space
Jürgen Scheffran 
Mankind is close to passing the threshold from the militarization to the weaponization of space. In the 45 years since the first satellite was launched into outer space, numerous attempts have been made to open the high frontier for space warfare, including the introduction of weapons to attack objects in space and from space. Hundreds of military satellites have been used on both sides of the iron curtain for gathering and transmitting military-related information, for supporting deterrence and war on earth, as well as for research, development, and testing of various kinds of space weapons. But with few exceptions no such weapons have as yet been deployed. One of the main causes for this limited "progress" in space weaponization was the lack of effective technologies. Their development is difficult while the security benefits are unclear. Another reason was the strong opposition of almost the whole world community against the transformation of space into a war zone. Keeping space for peace, as a sanctuary that needs to be preserved against an arms race in space, is still a convincing vision for many states and individuals.
The situation may change if programs under development by the current US administration are realized. According to US President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the US needs both to defend against ballistic missiles flying through outer space and also to protect US commercial and military interests in space by use of force. The reports of the two Rumsfeld Commissions and the various strategic concepts of the US Space Command laid the foundation for appropriate development programs which may consume a considerable amount of the US defense budget and may provoke military reactions from other states.
At this stage many of the projects - such as effective kinetic-kill interceptors, antisatellite (ASAT) systems, or laser weapons - are still either in a concept phase or non-operational. As long as this is the case, there is a window of opportunity to study options that the US government as well as other states could pursue. The following analysis briefly refers to some of these scenarios and options. Their evaluation strongly depends on the chosen criteria, such as US dominance in space, national security, international security, prevention of an arms race in space, protection of commercial interests, costs, etc.
Scenario I: Continued weapons development without rules and restrictions
This scenario provides the baseline against which other scenarios can be compared. It would allow the US as well as other states to develop, deploy, and use any weapon that they believe serves their own national interest best. In order to understand the transformation of the strategic situation with such an approach, one has to distinguish the various weapon systems and their potential interactions. In the past, there essentially existed earth-based nuclear ballistic missiles, space launchers, and satellites for information transmission used in conventional (and perhaps nuclear) war on earth. With fully developed space weapons - whether defensive or offensive - the situation could completely change. To depict the new strategic complexity, the interaction between the various kinds of weapons needs to be outlined:
Satellites for reconnaissance, communication, and navigation are the backbones not only of earth wars but would also be key elements of a space war. They might be hardened to a certain extent but at great cost and with a considerable degree of uncertainty.
Destruction of satellites used in conventional war or deterrence by ASAT could substantially alter the strategic balance and require preventive or pre-emptive measures, both passive and active, offensive and defensive. Warning times could substantially shrink to minutes or be non-existent.
ASAT weapons can attack any space object, including space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) components, which could severely effect any missile defense.
BMD systems are vulnerable to various kinds of attack on earth and in space.
BMD systems can attack satellites, space launchers, and ASAT systems in space as well as vulnerable BMD components of other countries.
Space launchers may be converted for use as ballistic missiles and they can deploy all kinds of space weapons.
Offensive space-based weapons can attack ground targets, including ballistic missiles (BMs), space launchers, and tracking systems.
BMs (in particular those equipped with nuclear warheads) might be used to attack any space object or space components on the ground.
This complex web of mutual threats and vulnerabilities could create tremendous risks and uncertainties and would open a new era of strategic warfare which may ultimately not serve the security interests of any country, including the US. The situation is further complicated by the fact that a wide range of technologies (often in an overlapping manner) can be used for space warfare, including maneuverable satellites, space mines, micro-satellites, kinetic-kill vehicles, chemical and nuclear explosives; particle, microwave and laser beams. To some degree, survivability of space objects against some of the potential attacks can be increased (e.g. by hardening against nuclear and laser radiation, sensor shutdown, evasion maneuvers, shoot back), but this is costly and does not provide security against all kinds of attacks and technologies. This is the reason that even in the US military there is concern about the unchecked weaponization of space.
Scenario II: Maintain and extend the current control regime with confidence-building measures and rules of the road
In this scenario, previous achievements of international space law are to be preserved and strengthened by clearly committing to the Outer Space Treaty, by ratification and implementation of the CTBT and START II Treaty, and by re-establishing the ABM Treaty. This would be essential to keep at least a minimum framework of control. It would allow states to negotiate within the existing framework of agreements, and also to discuss confidence-building measures to stabilize the security framewok. Among these are the following:
More detailed information about space launches and space experiments (e.g. with lasers).
Establishment of a crisis hotline between major missile and space powers to resolve problems in a crisis.
A code of conduct (CoC) for responsible space behavior, similar to the on-going ICoC process for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Improved international monitoring system and information exchange.
In addition, rules of the road could be agreed for outer space, e.g.:
Keep-out-zones, minimum flyby distances and speed limits around satellites to increase warning time against attack and reduce efficiency of attack.
Satellite immunity and non-interference with satellites.
Space debris reduction.
Scenario III: Partial arms control measures
A combination of satellite hardening, confidence building and rules of the road may protect satellites against existing residual (non-dedicated) space threats such as attacks with ICBMs and maneuverable satellites, with radio or laser beams not explicitly developed for weapon purposes.
If dedicated space weapons based on new technologies are developed, the existing regime is not sufficient to substantially diminish the emerging threats. Additional risk reduction may be achieved by partial arms control measures which by agreement restrict or ban certain kinds of weapons or weapons uses. For instance these could include:
Ban on testing, deployment and use of weapons above a particular altitude to restrict weaponization to near-earth orbits and keep the remaining outer space a weapon-free zone. Mentioned altitudes range from 500 km to 5000 km to protect space objects beyond that range. All such proposals would protect the web of high-orbit navigation satellites and the geostationary communication and early warning satellites which have great military and commercial importance. On the other hand, allowing weapons development in low-earth orbits opens the door to space weaponization for all weapon functions and technologies and would not preclude that a sophisticated low-earth orbit weapon system is later extended to higher orbits at short warning time.
The legal and physical protection of manned missions and prohibition of manned military space operations would ensure that humans were not involved in space warfare which could threaten their lives. In particular, it would involve protection of manned space stations, fostered by keep-out zones and their shielding against space debris and some forms of attack.
Certain types or deployment modes of space weapon systems and technologies could be banned. In particular, ASAT or BMD systems could be banned from orbit, or weapons with a predominantly offensive role. All kinds of beam weapons could be excluded, either ground-based or space-based. Small satellites below a certain size limit (e.g. 10 centimeter) or weight limit (e.g. 10 kg) could be excluded.
States could agree on restricting any activities beyond a given stage in the life cycle of a weapon, including research, development, testing, production, deployment, or use. A moratorium on testing and deployment of new weapons would correspond to a weapons freeze in space. An ASAT testing moratorium has been maintained in the mid-1980s between the US and the USSR. At the same time a ballistic missile flight test ban was discussed.
Another measure is the reversal of existing capabilities under international control, including the reduction and elimination of existing space weapon capabilities.
Interception speeds and altitudes as well as the size of mirrors and power levels could be limited.
For each of these measures one needs to discuss the verifiability and the security gains compared to both the extension of the current control regime and a comprehensive control regime as outlined in the next section. Where the line is to be drawn between allowed and prohibited activities can be described by a comparative analysis of gains, costs, and losses.
Scenario IV: Comprehensive arms control and disarmament in space
Comprehensive arms control regimes would include complete bans of the various kinds of weapon systems beyond an early stage. This would have the advantage of effectively preventing an arms race in space before these weapons emerge. In particular this would include a global ban on weapons against objects in space and from objects in space against any target, including development, testing, and deployment anywhere. In the past two decades there have been several proposals, both from governments and non-governmental organizations, to name only the Soviet proposal of 1983, a proposal for an ASAT ban by the Union of Concerned Scientists of the same year, the Draft Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space proposed by German scientists in 1984, recent proposals by China and Russia for a space weapons ban, the Space Preservation Act of 2002 proposed by US Congressman Dennis Kucinich and the companion Space Preservation Treaty.
The phrasing of a comprehensive agreement, the timing of implementing steps, and the rules for enforcement and conflict resolution need to be carefully designed in a negotiation process involving the major players. Partial agreements could be integrated into a step-by-step approach to comprehensive goals. Verification requirement and capabilities need to be balanced with the security requirements to avoid unacceptable risks from cheating. If this is taken into account comprehensive control regimes have the advantage of being politically comprehensible and attractive to gain political support. On the other hand, under current political circumstances that would require an unprecedented degree of cooperation and the need to gain support from existing governing circles in at least one major power (the US).
Monitoring and Verification
Monitoring of space activities is a key element in all scenarios and control options. However, in the first unrestricted scenario monitoring will have a clear warfighting role which makes it undesirable for other states. In scenario II monitoring and information exchange will be a confidence-building measure in itself. The degree of cooperation increases with the partial arms control measures and above all the comprehensive arms control agreements. In both scenarios some form of sharing and internationalization of monitoring systems will be required.
Outer space is permeable for all parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and thus well suited for various kinds of monitoring at long distances, with systems looking from earth into space (tracking) and systems in space (satellites) looking towards earth. Accuracy is close to 10 cm in both directions. Especially testing is often visible.
The more capable the systems are, the more costly they become which speaks in favor of cost sharing. Since remote sensing sometimes can only provide an indication of suspected treaty violations but not absolute certainty, some form of on-site inspections is required, largely on the ground (e.g. at production and space launch facilities) but also in space by use of inspection satellites. These however should be maintained by international bodies to prevent their use in an ASAT role.
In this regard one can refer to previous proposals for international monitoring organizations such as the International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA), a Regional Satellite Monitoring System (RSMA) or a UNITRACE system for space tracking.
Another concept is the creation of an agency to control space activities and organize cooperation in space (such as the old idea of a World Space Organization). Whether both tasks are to be merged or kept separate needs to be assessed in light of the experience with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some form of institutionalization is probably indispensable to build a cooperative international security and control regime that makes outer space or part of it a sanctuary against warfare.
This paper summarizes the main conclusions of the author presented at: Reconsidering the Rules of Space: Project Planning Meeting and Workshop on Chinese Perceptions of US Space Plans, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 2-3, 2002, Cambridge MA. Other speakers were John Steinbrunner, Hui Zhang, Robert Bedeski, Keneth Lieberthal, Lisbeth Gronlund, Eugene Skolnikoff, John Rhinelander, Carl Kaysen.
