International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 19 - News

Dangers, Doctrines and Deterrence

The Challenges Of Missile Defence, Militarisation Of Space And Nuclear Disarmament

Geneva NGO Committee on Disarmament

Report of an international conference organised by the NGO Committee for DisarmamentCentre International de Conferences, Geneva, 15-16 November, 2001

This Conference in Geneva brought together over 60 NGOs, diplomats, researchers and journalists. Its goal was to contribute to the international debate on the obstacles to progress in nuclear disarmament. A principal theme was the US Government's controversial Missile Defense (MD) programme - sometimes described as "Son of Star Wars". Many speakers and participants (but not all) criticised MD for posing grave dangers to world peace and undermining arms control. The same critics added that MD threatens to lead to militarisation of outer space and a new arms race.

Another theme was the terror attack of 11 September in the US, which heightens these dangers. It has been used inside and outside the US as an added reason for going ahead with MD, even though MD would not have prevented this or similar attacks. More generally, the 11 September incidents, and the retaliation that has flowed from them, have sharply increased international tensions, especially in the Middle East. They have increased the threat of possible uses of weapons of mass destruction, and may put in question disarmament initiatives. These were themes taken up frequently during the Conference.

Session 1: Challenges facing the disarmament community

Prof. Paul Rogers (Peace Studies Program, Bradford University, UK): The steadily widening economic disparities between the "elite" rich countries, representing only a sixth of the world's population, and the remainder of the world is the underlying threat to the richer countries' security. Increasing frustration amongst the poor is producing "antielite" insurgency. The rich countries' reaction has been mainly a short-sighted attempt to retain control, notably through military means - "keeping the lid" on the situation, or "liddism". There is a danger that, post 11 September, the US will not see the need to take a more multilateral approach, but continue with its unilateralism. Not enough is being done by the rich countries to address the economic injustices and environmental degradation that are the root causes of insecurity.

Mr Enrique Roman-Morey (Deputy Director, UN Dept of Environment Affairs, Geneva): The title of this Conference did not include disarmament; yet a key goal - enshrined in the UN Charter and embodied in some post war treaties - is to go beyond deterrence and eliminate weapons. The 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion emphasised the need for nuclear disarmament. The 11 September events highlighted the urgency of disarmament: there is a clear danger of terrorists resorting to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. This urgency is not being translated into action, through lack of political will. For example, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs is under-funded. NGOs can help to generate the needed political will.

Discussion

The speakers were asked whether they saw hopeful signs, given these dangers. The response was mixed. Prof Rogers said that civil society is showing unease over, and in some cases opposition to, the response to the 11 September attacks, but this is not being reflected enough in the media. There is some new thinking in the developing world, among groups such as "Focus on the Global South". But military spending has risen sharply after 11 September, especially in the US. There is little sign of readiness in the "elite" countries to recognise that the growing wealth gap is unsustainable, and that there is a need for some wealth redistribution to the poor countries of the sort long advocated by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (compensatory finance, commodity agreements, trade preferences, etc.). There is a danger of intensified struggle for access to scarce resources such as oil, water, cobalt, phosphates etc leading to conflict. Mr Roman-Morey said that it is too early to say whether the relative rapprochement between the US, Russia and China over the need to reinforce counter-terrorism after 11 September will produce a breakthrough in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

Session 2: Non-proliferation, multilateral processes,iIncluding the NPT and missile regimes

Mr Paul Dahan (Counsellor, French Mission, Geneva): There is little current progress in the disarmament and non-proliferation scene. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force; universalisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has not been achieved; and there has been little follow-up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Agreement on a Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Verification Protocol looks doubtful. There is now a preoccupation with terrorism following the 11 September attacks in the US. Could this be a spur to progress in multilateral arms control and disarmament? Pessimism seems more warranted. The US seems likely to continue to favour counter-proliferation (rather than non-proliferation) relying on bilateral approaches, e.g. with Russia, in reducing nuclear arsenals outside treaty frameworks. The US desire to abandon the thinking that lies behind the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty goes hand in hand with the end of the era of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The US seems unlikely to move to multilateralism and "law based approaches".

Mr Mohamed Tawfik (Counsellor, Egyptian Mission): Egypt and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition decided at the General Assembly 1st Committee this year not to re-table a Resolution on the NPT. The danger would have been to risk an unravelling of the commitments (13 steps) made by the nuclear weapon states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Instead, the New Agenda countries will be pressing the nuclear weapon states hard on their accountability on these commitments, at the April 2002 Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference. New Agenda countries welcome the US and Russian reductions in nuclear arsenals announced at the recent Bush/Putin Summit, but would prefer such measures reinforced in a legal framework ensuring irreversibility and international verification. The 11 September events highlight the urgency for further progress in nuclear disarmament.

Professor Jozef Goldblat (Geneva International Peace Research Institute - GIPRI - and UN Institute for Disarmament Research - UNIDIR, Geneva): Prospects for missile non-proliferation are uncertain; one has to hope there will be progress. The best way forward is to extend the scope of the restricted membership Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established by the G7 countries to limit the proliferation of longer-range missiles and related technology. The longer term goal should be to eliminate all ballistic missiles, as these encourage the acquisition of nuclear weapons and as delivery mechanisms are much more difficult to intercept than aircraft. The UN Group of Experts on missile proliferation should keep this in mind. The MTCR's draft International Code of Conduct should be adhered to by all missile-producing countries and be legally binding, with an international control body. Transparency (contrasting with MTCR secrecy) is also essential. Russian proposals in this area, extending the US/Russian arrangements for launch notification, should be pursued. As important as banning ballistic missiles is the objective of strict adherence to the CTBT, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and BTWC since preventing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological agents will diminish the utility of missile delivery systems.

Dr Patricia Lewis (Director, UNIDIR, Geneva): There is little ground for optimism on nuclear disarmament. Sometimes it seems that a bigger and bigger hole is being dug, and nobody knows how to get out of it! A survey of nuclear weapons states' performance on their 13 steps commitments at the 2000 NPT Review Conference gives the following picture. CTBT entry into force: US attempts to keep the subject off the 2002 1st Committee agenda bodes ill. There is a real danger that some country will resume testing. Fissile Material CutOff Treaty (FMCT): no progress on starting negotiations, but meanwhile there is a likelihood that some fissile material is falling into the hands of non-state actors. The threat of "dirty" bombs is real. (On bio-weapons, the need is urgent for BTWC parties to tighten national legislation on transfer of pathogens/industrial inspections, if the verification protocol is a non-starter). It is urgent to tighten the controls on physical security of fissile material, including through the US/Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme. Reduction of nuclear arsenals: the latest Bush/Putin announcement is welcome, but does not go nearly far enough: at 1,700-2,000 warheads each, the two countries can still blow themselves up several times over! Reductions to a few hundred each would start to be serious. Transparency and reporting: nothing much has been done, with a poor record by China. Regular reports should indicate future intentions.

Discussion

It was agreed that there are few signs that the US will relinquish its attachment to Missile Defense, even though it appears to many that MD would be useless in meeting terrorist threats. The US Government appears committed to a "belt and braces" approach to deterrence - nuclear arsenals keeping "strategic stability" between the nuclear weapons states, and MD for use against "rogue states". It also seems to regard treaties with anathema. Meanwhile there is little sign that the nuclear weapons states generally are yet ready to start reappraising their addiction to nuclear "deterrence". Moreover, the limited dismantlement of nuclear arsenals achieved so far seems to apply only to delivery vehicles, not warheads which can be stocked undetected. In summary, a hard road lies ahead for proponents of nuclear disarmament and they need to find new, creative, ways to advance their cause.

Session 3: Missile defense and dangers of proliferation

Sheerwood McGinnis (Counsellor, US Mission, Geneva): The events of 11 September have not altered the US Government's commitment to Missile Defense. They have highlighted the terrorist threat to the US, and the danger of terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Non-proliferation of WMD is a more important goal than ever, and MD should reduce the incentives to acquire WMD. It is recognised that MD would not be effective against a large missile attack; it is aimed rather at a limited quantity of missiles, from rogue states, non-state actors, or accidental launches. It could be extended to regions outside the US, to protect allies. The US is aiming at agreement with Russia on MD and the future of the ABM Treaty. It is noteworthy that the existence of the ABM Treaty has not in itself prevented nuclear proliferation.

Mr Alexander Petrachkov (Counsellor, Russian Mission, Geneva): Russia attaches great importance to increased international security and non-proliferation efforts. It continues to have strong reservations about the US Missile Defense programme. Its main concern is that MD will undermine the strategic stability which the ABM Treaty has preserved, for the benefit of not just its signatories (the US and Russia) but the wider international community. The ABM Treaty was the foundation for the START Agreements. MD threatens to enhance one country's military superiority, and lead to an arms race in outer space. It is likely to encourage the development of offensive nuclear weapons, and could itself be the target of terrorist groups. Russia believes the 11 September incidents highlight the dangers of terrorists' use of WMD, but believes that international security is best served by strengthening the international legal architecture and by non-weaponisation of space. This idea was further clarified in the Russian Foreign Minister's initiative aired at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly concerning a moratorium on placing any weapons in outer space. Russia remains committed however to close dialogue with the US, and to pursuing in an irreversible and verifiable manner the two-thirds reduction in nuclear arsenals announced at the recent Bush/Putin meeting.

Ms Regina Hagen (International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation - INESAP, Germany): The US Missile Defense programme is extremely dangerous. It could not have prevented the 11 September terrorist attacks. It would however gravely undermine world security. It would very probably lead to "vertical proliferation" in some countries' arsenals, and enhanced targeting/range of missiles. China would probably increase its arsenal to retain its deterrent capability. India and Pakistan would have to respond. It could lead to "horizontal proliferation", with some countries acquiring nuclear weapons as they would feel threatened by a US first strike related to its invulnerability to attack. It would encourage the proliferation of missile defense systems, e.g. amongst NATO countries, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. New technologies to get around MD would be encouraged. If the US sought - as US Space Command have avowed - to be "Masters of Space", an arms race would ensue in space, with new weapons such as infrared systems, radars and space-based lasers.

INESAP have therefore initiated a project - "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" - in cooperation with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. This will promote the following actions:

An immediate moratorium on ballistic missile testing (easily verifiable from space);

Establishment of ballistic missile free zones (to supplement the existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in Latin America, Africa etc). This would prevent further ballistic missile proliferation, and establish a norm.

A moratorium on further development of ballistic missiles, both offensive and defensive/dual purpose ones;

Strengthening the ABM Treaty, extending it beyond the US and Russia and covering new technologies;

Eventual complete disarmament of ballistic missiles ("Zero Ballistic Missile Regime");

Ban on space weapons. The objective would not be to hinder the commercial use of space. Draft legislation has been put to the US Congress to support these measures. Several draft treaties aim at banning space weapons. One such bill has recently been introduced to the US Congress, while another one has been tabled at the Conference on Disarmament. NGOs can contribute their support and ideas.

Discussion

Mr McGinnis rebutted assertions that MD would lead to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. The US Government did not believe that. The US was committed to eventual nuclear disarmament. While the US aimed to reduce its offensive nuclear capability, MD was aimed to compensate by strengthening defensive capacity. Congress was still debating the MD programme; but it was likely to be a limited one. Money would not be "thrown down the drain". On proliferation dangers, there are a variety of reasons why countries want to acquire ballistic missiles. Non-proliferation efforts should address both demand and supply factors. One participant suggested that the MD programme was founded in the laudable objective of moving from the suicidal basis of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to MAS (Mutually Assured Survival). Others however saw the commercial interests of US defence contractors behind MD. They doubted the conformity of MD with the ABMTreaty (e.g. use of facilities outside the US, such as Fylingdales) and were sceptical that a limited programme was what was really intended, given the US Space Command's goal of mastering space. The best way of ensuring ballistic missile (and nuclear) non-proliferation remained disarmament.

Session 4: Missile defense and outer space

Mr Fu Zhigang (First Secretary, Chinese Mission, Geneva): China remains wholly opposed to US MD, including Theatre Missile Defense (TMD). The programme is clearly designed to secure US military domination in space. The Rumsfeld Report and the US Space Command's space battlefield simulations confirm this. The ABM Treaty clearly prohibits the deployment of such components in space. Now is the time to prevent a costly arms race in space, avoiding the need for disarmament in space later. General Assembly Resolutions call for this. China therefore tabled in June this year at the CD a proposed legal instrument which could be the basis for a Treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Russia is giving China its full support.

Mr Thetallil Seetharam (Minister-Counsellor, Indian Mission, Geneva): India does not support the US MD programme. The idea that MD can provide protection against threats from rogue states or accidental launches is illusory. It is ironical that the world's most powerful country, "victor" of the Cold War, feels vulnerable enough to put a big wall around itself - like the Great Wall of China or the Maginot Line in France. MD is no defense against terrorist attacks such as the recent anthrax ones. The US however seems intent on MD regardless of other countries' views, and MD would probably have to be lived with. The priority is to curtail an arms race in space. India is therefore a co-sponsor of General Assembly Resolutions supporting negotiation of a PAROS Treaty at the CD. India would not wish to be drawn into an arms race in outer space, to defend its satellites etc. India welcomes meanwhile the recent Bush/Putin announcements of intended cuts in their nuclear arsenals. India is a "reluctant" nuclear power, being obliged to follow after other nuclear weapon states.

Dr Gert Harigel (Former senior physicist with CERN; currently with GIPRI/INES, Geneva): MD is the latest in a long line of attempts throughout history to erect an impregnable wall against external attack. The Chinese Great Wall, the French Maginot Line and (the forerunner of MD) the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) are instances. They have proved illusory. Most scientists agree that MD's objective is technically unattainable. Hitting an incoming missile travelling at great speeds is hard enough; but there are an array of effective counter measures open to attackers (decoys, destruction of early warning systems etc) capable of launching a nuclear missile. By the time MD is put in place at vast cost, it would be outdated. The FAS (Federation of American Scientists) has recently added that MD is useless against most likely terrorist threats to the US. More importantly, it would undermine US strategic relationships with Russia and China.

Discussion

Mr Seetharam was asked whether India had shifted its position on MD, given earlier reports that it leant towards the US on this. Mr Seetharam denied this: India has remained opposed to MD, while welcoming intended US/Russian cuts in arsenals. MD was not an option for India: Pakistani nuclear missiles were far too near India to be intercepted in time. Mr Seetharam and Mr Fu commented that their countries would be most reluctant to go down the path of an arms race in space, which they could ill afford.

Session 5: Civil society responses and actions

Mr Dave Knight (former Chairman, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament - CND, UK): CND's campaign against MD has been gaining momentum, but has recently been somewhat overshadowed by "post 11 September" developments. The campaign runs the risk of being portrayed as favouring the discredited doctrine of MAD (eg the recent comment to Dave Knight by the British Defense Minister in this sense). CND's position is therefore to favour "no nuclear weapons" doctrine - neither MAD nor MAS - but to promote further arms control, retaining the ABM Treaty, to work for nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile there is a need for more emphasis on direct action, such as at Faslane (and at Fylingdales if construction goes ahead in support of MD), and more emphasis on youth involvement. While the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, seems ready to give way to the US on MD, many in the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats will resist. There is too much readiness to accept TMD, and not enough awareness that the security aspects of the European Space Agency (ESA) programme could also be leading to militarisation of space. The outer space aspects of MD need to be stressed and the case for early conclusion of a PAROS Treaty. Starting PAROS negotiations outside the CD should now be considered, on the lines of the Ottawa Convention, but bringing it back to the CD for conclusion. The CD should not be mortally undermined, as (unlike with the NPT) India, Pakistan and Israel are also players there.

Mr Daniel Durand (Mouvement de la Paix, France): There is little welcome for MD in France, where anti-American sentiment is latent, but an air of resignation on MD is setting in, given greater disposition elsewhere in Europe to accept US MD. This is not helped by widespread acceptance of TMD for protection of French troops, with French missile contribution and modernisation (eg Parliamentary proposals 2000-2008). There is some attention being given to the danger of outer space militarisation, with upcoming conferences in conjunction with the Global Network . Opposition to the post 11 September war in Afghanistan has increased the interest in French civil society in the values of a peace culture. An increased role for NGOs at the CD could be pursued as part of this.

Mr Hiroshi Taka (GENSUIKYO - Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs): Recent developments in Japan on MD and TMD are very worrying. There is major Japanese participation in joint research with the US, and the Japanese Parliament has recently passed legislation tying Japan more closely to participation with US forces in war, despite the post war Japanese constitution legitimising self-defense only. TMD and MD are further instances of US military domination outside international treaty frameworks and need to be firmly resisted by peace movements. TMD and MD are built upon nuclear deterrence doctrine ("fewer but newer" weapons), extending this to outer space. Recent US moves to portray peace movements' opposition to the Afghanistan war as favouring terrorism are insidious: terrorism must be fought through international law, not military action outside the UN framework. Peace movements must stand by their commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Ms Hyun Sook Lee (Women Making Peace, Republic of Korea): US and Japanese promotion of TMD and MD will endanger the rapprochement between the two Koreas. The confrontational approach of TMD/MD risks undermining negotiations between the two Koreas. It would also antagonise China and encourage an East Asian arms race.

Discussion

Mr Colin Archer (Secretary General, International Peace Bureau, Geneva) noted that the four previous speakers each represented very important civil society organisations with large memberships. They and many previous speakers had agreed on the dangers that TMD and NMD involve in damaging the prospects for disarmament and strategic stability. These were salutary reminders to all participants. Mr David Atwood (Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva and Chairman NGO Committee on Disarmament, Geneva) concurred and added that these discussions had shown that diplomats and NGO representatives need not be seen as adversaries but as striving in different ways for the same objective - international peace and security.