International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 19 - Missile Defense and North-East Asia

Diplomacy First in North-East Asia

Timothy Savage , Wade Huntley

Since the title I was given to speak on is "diplomacy first in North-East Asia," I thought I would examine the potential threats to peace in the region to see whether they are amenable to diplomatic solutions, or whether a more militarized solution is justified.

North Korea

North Korea, and particularly its attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction, is the most oft-cited threat to justify the need for missile defense. North Korea is often described as "unpredictable", a "rogue state," and "hell-bent" on acquisition of nuclear-tipped Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Critics maintain that engaging in diplomacy with such an "untrustworthy" regime is naive and unrealistic.

The evidence, however, shows that diplomacy has in fact reduced the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development in North Korea. The 1994 Agreed Framework, despite complaints about its implementation on both sides, effectively froze North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Allegations of cheating have occasionally arisen, but none have been proven. A subsequent trip by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to North Korea yielded a moratorium on long-range missile tests, which Kim Jong-Il reaffirmed in May 2001 during his meeting with an EU delegation headed by Goran Persson. North Korea has also frequently indicated its willingness to move beyond a temporary freeze to a complete halt of its long-range missile development program in exchange for economic benefits from the US or other countries.

Indeed, the WMD threat may be the easiest problem to solve on the Korean Peninsula. The larger question - how to end the 50-year standoff and accomplish peaceful reunification - is much more intractable. The always up-and-down process of North-South reconciliation is now in a distinctly down phase for a number of reasons - the reluctance of the Bush Administration to engage North Korea; the lame duck status of the Kim Dae-Jung government in South Korea; the preoccupation with other issues after Sept. 11; and the global economic downturn reducing the willingness of governments or private groups to aid the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) economically.

Currently, North Korea appears unwilling to move forward in its relations with South Korea until some progress has been shown in bilateral relations with the US There is some basis for movement on this front. North Korea appears to be still willing to discuss a deal to end its long-range missile program, as shown in its call for the Bush Administration to return to the policies pursued under Clinton. The US, for its part, has at least obliquely dangled the carrot of DPRK removal from the State Department list of terrorist-sponsoring states, an important concession as it would allow North Korea to seek aid from international financial institutions. But instead of resuming talks, both sides are engaged in a spitting match over whose "court" the "ball" is in. In this instance, the US looks at least as reluctant as North Korea to lose face by appearing to be the one to concede. During his recent trip here to Shanghai, President Bush called for reopening talks but in the same breath insulted Kim Jong-Il personally by calling him "secretive and suspicious" and implying that he was not committed to Korean reunification. While such statements may play well with the House International Relations Committee, they do nothing to promote dialogue with North Korea. If things remain stalled, it remains possible that North Korea will react the way it has done in the past, by taking some belligerent action to get Washington's attention. The fact that it has refrained from doing so since the August 1998 rocket launch, however, shows that it is interested in moving the diplomatic process forward.

At the same time, North Korea is clearly concerned about the implications of Sept. 11. The US has repeatedly stated its position that it is ready to expand the "war against terrorism" to any countries that harbor or support terrorism, making North Korea's position on the State Department list that much more dangerous. The US also recently implicated North Korea as one of the countries developing biological weapons and strongly implied that the war on terrorism could include action on this front.

North Korea also has reasons to be alarmed at the changes in Japan's military posture in response to Sept. 11. The precedent being set of Japanese military support for US actions has clear implications for a contingency on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the latest North-South talks broke down largely due to North Korean anger over South Korea's enhanced security measures in the wake of September 11. Reinvigorating the peace process is going to require addressing these new security concerns.

Taiwan Straits

The Taiwan question is actually a more difficult one than the Korean problem. In the Korean case, all sides at least agree on the ultimate outcome - reunification - even if they may disagree with the means to get there. In the case of Taiwan, however, different people have radically different ideas of the future of the island, and it is easy to envision scenarios that result in war despite efforts to stop it. Were Taiwan to drift toward independence, it is likely that China would feel compelled to respond for the sake of national cohesion, even if their chances of victory seemed slim. As it would be political suicide for any US president to ignore a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the US would feel compelled to intervene, and the result would likely be a Sino-US war, although perhaps one limited in scope.

But if diplomacy cannot fully guarantee peace in the Taiwan Straits, neither can missile defense. If we accept the premise that China would feel compelled to respond to any attempt by Taiwan to permanently break from the mainland regardless of the consequences, then clearly China would not be deterred by a missile defense. Instead, their likely response would be to build up their missile force in the hopes of overwhelming any such defense, as indeed they already have shown signs of doing. On the contrary, greater diplomacy, particularly on the economic front, can help reduce tensions in the straits and tie the two nations closer together. Already this is happening, as the increasing presence of Taiwanese businessmen on the mainland is helping to promote greater economic integration between the two nations. Whether or not this results in political integration, it does increase the disincentives for either side to seek a military solution.

Regional arms race

Proponents of a strong US military posture in East Asia frequently warn that any kind of US pullback would push the countries in the region to expand their militaries in response to the resulting uncertainties. This argument, however, ignores the degree to which the US contributes to arms races in the region. The US is by far the largest seller of weapons worldwide, and continues to sell larges stores of weapons to Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and several ASEAN (Association of Sout-Eeast Asian Nations) states. Indeed, in many cases US officials have acted as arms salesmen, using official trips to push allies like South Korea to purchase US-manufactured weaponry over alternatives made in Russia or the EU. The United States is encouraging Japan to take a more aggressive military posture, and authorized South Korea to increase the range of its missiles. Ironically, on the same day that the Joongang Ilbo reported that the US was investigating allegations that North Korea had sold Egypt 24 Rodong missiles - based on decades-old Soviet technology - the Washington Post reported that the US was planning to sell Egypt 53 state-of-the-art Harpoon missiles.

Development of theater missile defense would only accelerate current trends toward missile proliferation in the region. North Korea and China would almost certainly respond by beefing up their missile forces, which in turn would push South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to respond in kind. In contrast, a diplomatic approach that included confidence building measures and security guarantees for all the countries in the region could result in reduced tensions and a lowering of arms buildups, especially if the United States were willing to include its own military deployments in the region as part of these discussions.

Currently, however, the only forum for regional security discussions in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While ASEAN has had some success in resolving disputes among its members and between them and China, the ARF has yet to record any noteworthy accomplishments. North Korea's decision to take part in the last ARF meeting was an encouraging sign, although for reasons that are not entirely clear it decided to downgrade the level of its participation at the last minute. Still, many pundits in the US denounced the meeting as a "failure" and called for replacing it with a grouping of like-minded states along the lines of NATO. An alliance structure such as this would be more amenable to US control, but would do less to promote dialogue between states in the region.

Ultimately, building peace - not just preventing war - in North-East Asia will be impossible as long as the US refuses to give up its right to unilateral action. Proponents of relying on US military might for peace in the region are ignoring the bloody history of the 20th century, when the emphasis on military alliances between great and small powers resulted in four major wars and numerous smaller conflicts. It's high time for some innovative thinking of new ways to ensure peace in the region free from domination by any power or group of powers.

This paper was written for the conference "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" in Shanghai on Nov. 30/Dec. 1 2001.

Timothy Savage & Wade Huntley , Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Global Peace and Security Program, 125 University Ave., Berkely, CA 94710-1616, USA; tel. +1-510-295 61 00; E-mail tsavage@nautilus.org and huntley@nautilus.org.

The Nautilus Institute hosts the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, a transnational information network that aims to provide a forum to exchange analyses, explore ideas and promote dialogue on regional issues.