International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 19 - Missile Defense and North-East Asia

Missile Defense, Missile Control, and North-East Asian Security

Summary of Second MBMD Conference in Shanghai, Nov. 30 to Dec. 2, 2001

Carah Ong

Moving Beyond Missile Defense, a joint project of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), joined with the Center for American Studies at Fudan University at Shanghai from 30 November to 2 December 2001 to hold its second international workshop in Shanghai, China. For three days, more than 30 experts in the science, technology, military and security policy fields reviewed and assessed plans to develop and deploy missile defense and space weapons programs. Experts from China, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the US provided perspectives on the technological and geopolitical problems as well as the negative impacts posed by missile defenses on regional and international security. Participants also offered alternatives to the arms race that would most likely result from deployment of ballistic missile defenses and space weapons.

The workshop focussed on the implications of missile defense for North-East Asian security. As a non-indigenous player in North-East Asia, the US dominates the region through bilateral military relationships of more than fifty years based on the US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The deployment of missile defenses will increase the US strategic advantage and war-fighting capabilities in the region. It will undermine security and could spark a new round of arms races, which would be detrimental to the economic and social development of the countries and people of North-East Asia. No one in North-East Asia nor the US will benefit from missile defense.

In the post-11 September world, a new version of the Cold War era dichotomy now divides states - the states for terror and the states against terror. On the surface, the anti-terrorism campaign initially offered a chance for realignment among nations, including China and North Korea, to be on more friendly terms with the US. However, the campaign has already changed priorities in the policies of nations in East Asia in a manner that leaves little possibility for multilateral diplomacy and arms control in the region. On the Korean Peninsula, the issue of missile defense is exacerbated by the possibility of the US expanding its military antiterror campaign into other nations, including North Korea and Iraq, despite the North Korean pledge to join the anti-terror convention. North Korea has not tested missiles since 1998 but it is actively seeking to sell off its missile program.

Japan has chosen to pursue a cautious "understanding" of the US missile defense plans because it believes that joint research on missile defense enhances the credibility of the US-Japan security relationship. However, with the many uncertainties surrounding missile defense, including technological feasibility, international security and costs of deployment, Japan will have an increasingly difficult time justifying its position to the public, especially in light of its longstanding nuclear disarmament policy. A much better option is for Japan to pursue cooperative approaches in addressing regional missile threats, including regional missile control and other means of threat reduction.

In general, China is concerned with missile defense deployment because it is related to global strategic stability. While China accepts that the US and Russia still play the main roles in balancing global strategic stability, if the US proceeds with its missile defense plans, China believes it should offset the effect of missile defense deployment because its own nuclear arsenal may be devaluated. In particular, China has decried US plans to jointly develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with Japan because it implies that the shield could be extended over Taiwan. By providing a defense, TMD systems would offensively empower Taiwan's pro-independent forces and therefore contradict the mainland government's policy of a unified China. China also fears that if the US abandons the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, it will be threatened by the US.

There is the extreme asymmetry between the US and Chinese nuclear and conventional forces and strategy. While China is already planning to modernize its nuclear forces, how it proceeds is largely dependent on US missile defense plans. In the context of current plans, China will proceed based on the worst-case scenario. China may greatly build up its arsenal, abandon its nuclear doctrine and eliminate its No First Use policy. If China feels forced to increase its nuclear arsenal, there would be negative impacts on India, Pakistan and Russia that could result in new arms races. Although developing its economy is currently China's principle priority and it does not want confrontation with the US, China would be hostage to a potentially high-cost nuclear arms race. The problem would be further aggravated in the case of an extension of the arms race into space if the US implement their plans to deploy weapons that could be used for both missile defense and space warfare.

The inherent link between space weapons and missile defense was a key recurring topic at the workshop. One particular question raised was the usability of missile defense technology for space weapons and warfare. The MBMD Space Weapons Ban Study Group should address this question and also develop a definition of what space is and space weapons are.

Missile proliferation does pose a legitimate threat not only to US security, but also to international security. However, missile defense is not the answer to address this threat and, in fact, missile defenses will provoke rather than prevent missile proliferation. The best alternative to missile defense is missile and nuclear disarmament. There is currently no multilateral treaty dealing with missile disarmament, although disarmament is a goal of international law as set out in the Preamble of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article VI of the NPT and numerous UN General Assembly resolutions. Therefore, a new model for disarmament is needed, and it should include global legally binding obligations to destroy existing nuclear and missile stockpiles and infrastructure.

In order to achieve missile disarmament, the various stages of the missile life cycle, the asymmetries among missile owners, and the increasing threat of missile development must be addressed. Measures include, but are not limited to: creating test restrictions; creating missile free zones; banning and eliminating all existing ballistic missiles; a moratorium on further development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles; and regional security initiatives to address concerns about asymmetries and discrimination, including other delivery systems.

Finally, a missile control and disarmament regime - which should also set verifiable limits for anti-ballistic missile system components - must be complemented to prevent an arms race in outer space. A space weapons ban would prohibit the deployment and testing of space weapons. It would also halt all research and development of space weapons.

At the end of the workshop, four parallel sessions were held to discuss and brainstorm future tasks of the MBMD Project and International Study Groups and to draft workshop conclusions. The conclusions and recommendations from the Shanghai workshop (on page 47 of this Bulletin) will be utilized by the International Study Groups to further explore alternatives to missile defenses and space weapons and come up with concrete proposals and technical background information. The findings will be made available to government policy makers, media and non-governmental organizations working in the arena of global security by way of briefing papers, reports, other publications and target-audience oriented workshops.

Carah Ong is Research and Publications Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at research@napf.org.