International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 19 - Terror, Counterterror and Nuclear Disarmament

Non-Proliferation and WMD Terrorism

Addressing Terrorist Threats through Cooperation

Shen Dingli

The Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) has posed a serious threat to international security and stability. It has been a near universal consensus that the community of nations should curb the spread of such weaponry and associated delivery means.

Despite their various differences, China and the US share vast common interests in the area of WMD nonproliferation. Both of them would benefit significantly from an international environment where the WMD spread is viewed as illegal and hence prohibited. It is also their common responsibility, as major countries of the world, to build, strengthen and implement regimes that disallow WMD proliferation in order to sustain a secure and stable world.

The emergence of WMD terrorism

Terrorism seems to be a perennial theme in human history. For over two thousand years, terrorism has been employed as a tool for various purposes - often to retaliate, deter and bluff.

While inheriting this, modern terrorism has presented an even more serious threat than ever in terms of fashion and intensity it now employs. Currently, many countries are unsettled by terrorism, China and the US being no exception. The climax of modern terrorism, reached on September 11, 2001, has exerted great impact upon the two countries and their relations.

Contemporary terrorism has its own roots. Social injustices, imbalance of power (domestic or international), are often invoked to explain. Nevertheless, terrorism is inhumane and therefore intolerable when it is directed against innocent lives. The event of September 11 is certainly such a case that has resulted in condemnation worldwide.

This tragic event has shocked the world in many ways. In particular, it is shocking that a non-state actor could have launched an attack with extremely unconventional means against innocent civilians. This inevitably leads to a question of whether terrorist attack would employ other unconventional weaponry in the future. Especially, whether terrorist attack might use WMDs delivered by ballistic missiles at a future time?

Non-state actors

What is at stake, at the moment, is the likelihood of non-state actors to employ WMDs for terrorism purposes. This bears particular relevance in the wake of September 11.

Overall, acquiring know-how of WMDs is no longer impossible beyond the P-5 club [the five permanent members to the UN security council]. In regard to resources, certain non-state groups have had the wherewithal to initiate and run a WMD program. Dual-use technology with application to WMDs is quite accessible in the market. Fissile materials, even at weapons grade level, were reportedly smuggled out of the former Soviet states. Apparently, chemical precursors are also apparently widely available.

On the nuclear front, the physical principle of simple design of a primary fission device is no longer a secret. Prior to September 11, some such information was even readily available on the Internet. Given the availability of modern enrichment technologies like ultra-fast centrifuge or laser isotope, one may enrich uranium to weapons-grade more easily, and with a lower probability to be detected as compared to the time when the P-5 developed their programs. At present, what deters a non-state actor to secure an atomic bomb is no longer the lacking ability to design and assemble the weapon, but the difficulty to secure fissile material.

Chemical and biological weapons, the so-called "nukes of the poor", have already been used by non-state groups and individuals. Members of Aum Thinri Kyo astounded the world by spreading sarin on March 20, 1995 in the subway station in Tokyo. In fact it is not particularly difficult to make sarin with a few simple chemicals, for instance with the oil of one's ball pen. Also, the threat of anthrax letters last fall in America has created a just as scary impact as the collapse of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. The anthrax terrorism even forced the US Congress to close down for some time. Should this agent be sprayed over Manhattan - a not unlikely threat scenario - social order in New York City would be seriously jeopardized.

Issues concerning WMD terrorism

When dealing with proliferation threats from non-state actors, it is important to note that this is an issue that unites various countries, rather than splits them. No sovereign state is immune from terrorist threats by non-state actors. No single state authority can defeat cross-border terrorism on its own. All countries meet the same challenge and consequently share a common interest in defeating the threat.

However, several questions arise. What approach might non-state actors approach to acquire weapons of mass destruction? How might non-state actors carry out a WMD attack? And could such attempts be defeated through international collaboration?

WMD proliferation at source

There are a couple of ways of WMD acquisition that non-state actors could opt for. Theoretically speaking, a non-state actor could get hold of WMD through: i) securing a whole piece by transfer; ii) exercising illegal control of state-owned WMD arsenals; iii) making a piece through its own effort. It is important to check all these possibilities of WMD proliferation to terrorist groups from the outset.

The first two options apparently are not very likely. None of the P-5 would transfer its national assets to a terrorist group and thus hurt its national interest. As far as state control is concerned, the situation of a nascent WMD arsenal might be different. At a time of crisis, the effective central control of that arsenal may not always be guaranteed. There is a risk that unauthorized personnel, terrorist groups or foreign rivals may plot to take over central control.

The most plausible approach of non-state actors is to build their own weapon. The sarin case of 1995 obviously renders credit to this theory. Under this circumstance, it is predictable that a terrorist group would also seek external input. It is known that al Qaeda was interested in obtaining a nuclear weapon. If al Qaeda could access highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, possibly through smuggling, the risk of mankind facing an "illegal" WMD bomb would increase dramatically. Recent research also indicates that a nuclear device of low enriched uranium could still lead to a blast. This may offer a more realistic alternative to terrorist groups. Such groups may be also interested in obtaining radioactive material for its terrorist acts.

Possible scenarios of WMD terrorism

There are basically two scenarios how a terrorist non-state actor might launch a WMD strike. First, a direct attack might be launched if the terrorists were able to acquire a WMD directly. Second, an attack could be launched against specific targets with conventional munitions or through electronic sabotage in order to create WMD-equivalent contamination. The delivery means could include missiles, but for a non-state terrorist group it is unlikely to be a long-range vehicle.

In the second scenario, targets may include nuclear plants, research reactors, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, nuclear waste sites, and storage with radioactive or toxic materials. Therefore, for safety reasons it is vital to uncover any attack plot early on.

Defeating WMD terrorism

Accordingly, to defeat WMD terrorism one must deny technology access to WMD by terrorist non-state actors. This would entail export control of WMD technology and items between states, and domestic regulations for WMD technology management.

On the international level, there exists a web of export control systems already, regarding nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and dual-use technologies. The control regimes have been designed to prevent WMD proliferation among states, though their fairness remains debated. Currently, these export control regimes also serve as barriers for terrorist groups to acquire sensitive technologies.

The latest issue is how to prevent non-state terrorist actors from accessing WMD technology even if the state government has no intention to proliferate. Obviously, inter-state cooperation in this regard, bilateral or multilateral (on the basis of a control regime), will play a major role. But on the domestic level, nations need to develop regulation on the transaction of WMD-related dualuse items and monitor their use within the countries.

For international cooperation, existing control regimes need to be strengthened and improved, so as to maximize volunteer participation of states. This will become more likely when a balance of export promotion and control is achieved. Certainly intelligence sharing and collaboration among states to check the flow of financial resources for WMD terrorism are much needed for the anti-terror effort.

It is even more fundamental to tackle the intention of WMD terrorism. Then one may ask why terrorism resorts to WMDs and how social roots of terrorism can be removed. These questions are, however, beyond the scope of this article.

China-US cooperation

As leading countries in the world, China and the US have a special responsibility to maintain a peaceful international environment and a just world order. In a broad sense, they have carried out and will deepen cooperation in the anti-terror campaign, as committed by the two Presidents in their recent summit in Beijing on February 21, 2002. They shall and can also cooperate in combating WMD terrorism.

Export control for technical denial

As mentioned before, to successfully deny the use of the technology, it is crucial to prevent access of non-state actors to WMD technology and items for terrorist purposes. Beijing and Washington can attain deeper trust through cooperation.

On a bilateral level, the two countries may make combating terrorist access to WMD technology a critical component in their strategic talk. Such cooperation may involve respective domestic export control and relevant intelligence sharing. One may also envisage a joint working group on governmental level to exchange information, help law enforcement, and resolve disputes in this regard.

On the multilateral level, China and the US have much to gain by cooperating to strengthen international export control regimes, so as to deny access to WMD technology by both state and non-state actors that aspire to acquire WMDs. To be honest, there exist divergent views in Beijing and Washington concerning the fairness of existing, West-dominated export control regimes. With the backdrop of anti-terrorism, this would add importance to improving the non-proliferation export control regimes through participation and cooperation.

Mutual understanding for political support

Anti-terrorism is a unique business. Until it takes place it might be impossible to identify terrorists and foretell the time and target of terrorism attack. That is why international cooperation is especially important to track and crack down terrorism.

As noted, both China and US are unsettled by terrorism of various sorts. Internationally there exist over one hundred definitions of terrorism as terrorism indeed takes so many different forms of presentation. (Thus far, there has been no single unified definition of terrorism that was unanimously accepted.) While Beijing has delivered its support to the US effort to strike international terrorism, it would be sensible of Washington to also consider Beijing's security concern over terrorism that undermines China's stability and integrity. Support shall be a two-way process.

Proper response for strategic cooperation

Various measures may be taken vis—vis terrorism. Counterattack, retaliation, international cooperation, and proper homeland defense are within the range of action choices.

The terrorist threat shall be properly estimated and responded to. It is clear that for the foreseeable future any non-state actors will not be able to manufacture a complete advanced nuclear weapon completely independently. Also, it is beyond terrorist groups' ability to produce a long-range missile without being detected.

In this connection, homeland defense shall be prepared accordingly. China and the US have different perspectives concerning the US ballistic missile defense. National Missile Defense, as it was called until recently, is viewed by Beijing as an over-response to a not-yet-existing threat from state players, let along non-state actors.

Despite this, the US is still entitled to defend its territory with a certain kind of missile defense just for security assurance. But, the defense shall be commensurate with the nature and size of the threat, and shall not intend to deny nuclear deterrence to a cooperative partner. Beijing needs to be sure that Washington's action meets its words - America won't build an ability that will deny China's limited deterrence. This shall be another vital element in China-US strategic talks. Washington should know-how to better secure strategic cooperation from China in fighting BMD terrorism.

Shen Dingli is Director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai and can be contacted at dlshen@fudan.ac.cn.