International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 19 - Bioterror and Bioweapons Control

Implications of the Terror Attacks for the Biological Weapons Convention

Jacqueline Simon

Biological weapons have long been viewed as particularly repugnant, their use reprehensible. These characteristics, in addition to the perceived lack of military utility of biological weapons, limited their use for many years and paved the way for the realization of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972. The BTWC is an international treaty which prohibits research, evelopment, production, stockpiling and use of biological or toxin agents for hostile purposes. For 30 years, the BTWC has been the first and primary line of collective defense against biological warfare. The treaty reinforces the norm prohibiting he use of biological agents for hostile purposes. This norm was recently violated with the anthrax attacks perpetrated via the US postal system. How do these attacks fit into the larger picture of the threat posed by biological weapons? Has the threat of biological weapons increased since these attacks? What effect will these attacks have on the future of the BTWC and the norm against biological warfare? These are some of the many questions facing analysts and policymakers today and will be addressed in this article.

Threat assessment

The threat posed by chemical and biological weapons has often been misrepresented. While manufacturing chemical agents or obtaining biological agents is not particularly difficult, it is not easy, and using these agents to cause mass casualty is extremely difficult. In order to cause mass casualty it is necessary to take into account the lethality of an agent, its concentration, environmental factors, and resistance of the population. Even more difficult is to combine all of these factors with an effective method of dispersal. All of the elements of this equation must be mastered in order to achieve significant results. That would require extensive resources and scientific knowledge inaccessible to most terrorists. An oft-cited example of the failure of a terrorist group to achieve success with its biological warfare projects is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which, despite vast funds and experienced scientists, was unable to wage a successful biological attack. This example also illustrates the unpredictability of biological weapons which has made them unattractive to many militaries and terrorist organizations.

The events of September 11 and the anthrax incidents that followed have led to a sea change in public perception and policy response with regard to biological weapons. The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington and the anthrax letters have become irrevocably linked in the public psyche. This linkage has led to the expansion of America's defensive goals and the marriage of two previously distinct security threats, terrorism and attack by nuclear, chemical or particularly biological weapon. The progeny of this marriage, 'bio-terrorism', has vaulted to the top of the list of threats to international security, within the United States most obviously, but in many other states as well. This focus on bio-terrorism as the scourge of the new millennium will have a serious impact on proliferation policies worldwide.

As the Cold War with its foundation of nuclear deterrence faded into the background of public consciousness, chemical and biological weapons had begun to move to the forefront and gained increasing prominence in policy circles and the media as the "greatest threat to international security". Nuclear weapons were not forgotten, but lumped in with chemical and biological weapons under the misnomer and catch phrase 'weapons of mass destruction'. While the likelihood of the use of chemical and biological weapons was viewed as increasing, their use on Western soil was still regarded by most analysts as a distant threat. Many of the assumptions behind this view have been shattered and reconstructed since the events of the autumn of 2001.

For persons living in North America (and many others worldwide) it undeniably 'feels' like the threat of attack by terrorists or weapons of mass casualty has increased. However, this is a feeling based in a newfound sense of vulnerability rather than an actual increase in the threat itself. Analysts, intelligence agencies, and policymakers have been aware of the threat posed by these weapons for many years and this threat has not increased exponentially since September 11. Attack by biological weapons causing mass casualty is largely regarded as a low-probability, high consequence event. In other words, if such an event did occur the results would be devastating, but the likelihood of occurrence is very small. Most analysis conducted on potential biological weapons attack has focussed on attack by a state actor whose motivations, if not capabilities, are generally known. In the case of a terrorist attack however, it is very difficult to gain any information about the motivations, capabilities and intent of the enemy. This has resulted in a situation where vulnerability assessments are widely substituted for threat assessments and policy is based on worst-case scenario projections with little grounding in reality.

Recent wide dissemination of these vulnerability assessments and worst-case scenarios has compounded the sense of insecurity felt by the American and international public. Within the United States, funding to protect against germ warfare increased under President Clinton who considered it one of the greatest threats to the nation, but various of his requests were cut by skeptics in the Office of Management and Budget or Congress. Today, while it is clearly evident that the United States faces a terrorist enemy with unparalleled resources and determination, there is no concrete evidence of a terrorist enemy that possesses nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Nor is it apparent that the threat posed by those states possessing or pursuing these weapons (states that may also be sponsors of terrorism) has increased or that they have provided such weapons to terrorist groups. According to US intelligence reports, diagrams of US nuclear power plans and water facilities were found along with rudimentary instructions on the manufacture of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. These discoveries have been portrayed as a clear signal of the imminence of a terrorist attack utilizing chemical or biological attack and have served to prepare the American public for the continuation of a war they thought had already been won.^[1]

Policy response

While the threats posed by biological weapons and by terrorism should not be taken lightly, we also amplify the threat at our own peril. Studies show that the mass sociogenic illness which results can have long-term effects as damaging as the acute effects.^[2] In addition to the preservation of our own mental fitness, we must avoid the distortions which amplifying a threat creates. By unifying biological weapons attack and terrorism, the danger is that efforts will be aimed at some unlikely 'super-enemy' while the distinct and real threats of terrorism and biological weapons attack are inadequately addressed. It is essential that a distinction be made between the threat of terrorism, the threat of biological warfare and the potential use of biological agents by terrorists. Each of these is a distinct threat scenario which entails a specific policy response. Similarly, grouping potential enemies into catch-all categories has always made for ineffective policy as it fails to address disparate motivations.^[3]

The United States has been proven vulnerable to attack by both terrorists and biological agents. The realization of this vulnerability has been a wake-up call to the already existing dangers posed by these threats to American and international security. Thus far, the American response to this alert has been to attempt to stave off future attacks before they occur by waging war on all suspected enemies while striving dramatically to defend and protect against future attacks. A focus on American vulnerability and the government's preference for military response were clear in a speech by US Vice President Cheney with regard to the September 11 attacks. He stated, "When you marry up that vulnerability with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, of a nuclear or a biological or a chemical weapon of some kind, then you have the kind of impact on the United States that clearly is going to require military involvement to deal with the consequences of that sort of an attack."^[4]

In keeping with this sentiment, President Bush's proposed budget for 2003 contains a $48 billion increase in military spending,^[5] including an additional $5.9 billion (a 300% increase) to finance improvements in the public health system that would help in defense and response to biological attack.^[6] Bioterrorism has been included as one of the top four threats to homeland security by Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge. The stated American response to bioterrorism will be to attack those believed to aid and abet those it believes promote and perpetrate acts of terrorism and those who it accuses of pursuing weapons of mass destruction programs. In a further solidification of the bond between terrorism and biological weapons, John Bolton remarked on the overlap between the lists.^[7]

At the top of the list of suspects are the three "rogue states" now dubbed "an axis of evil" by President Bush: Iran, Iraq and North Korea. While his advisors insist that this rhetoric is not meant to signal an imminent attack on these countries, it is widely believed that Iraq will be the next target of Bush's war on terrorism despite objections from many allies. Bush stated on 29 January 2002, "We will be deliberate yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather", and vowed that the US will not permit the world's most destructive regimes to threaten it with the world's most destructive weapons.

Many analysts argue that this military-driven and largely unilateral response to the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass casualty is misguided. They believe that the best response to these threats is one which, while recognizing the linkages between terrorism and proliferation, notes that they are distinct and must therefore be addressed differently. Although the motivations behind terrorism and proliferation may differ, however, they are threats which transcend boundaries. Thus, many argue that the most effective solution to these problems is also a collective one. With regard to the threat of the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons, collective response is embodied in the principles of the BTWC.

Whereas current American policy response is reactive and thus limited in the results it can achieve, the BTWC addresses the proliferation problem proactively, by addressing the motivations of potential proliferants. The BTWC also embodies the vital norm which exists against the use of these abhorrent weapons. It offers collective security to States Parties who exchange their right to develop such weapons for the benefits membership in the treaty provides including security, but also technological cooperation and assistance in case of an attack. The major weakness of the BTWC however, has been the lack of verification or enforcement mechanisms.

The future of the BTWC

Efforts to strengthen the BTWC took center stage at the Fifth Review Conference (5RC) to the BTWC in November 2001. This meeting took place against the backdrop of the attacks in America and also followed upon the suspension in August 2001 of over six years of diplomatic efforts to develop measures to strengthen the BTWC. The majority of the negotiation of these measures took place within the forum known as the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to the BTWC. The suspension of AHG activities has been widely attributed to the American refusal to support the compromise text compiled by the Chairman of the AHG. Delegates and policy analysts left the suspended AHG negotiations discouraged and with lowered expectations of progress at the 5RC.

The tragic events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks thereafter had the unintended positive effect of raising awareness about the biological weapons threat and the need to prevent future use and acquisition by state and non-state actors. It was hoped by many that this increased awareness and outpouring of international concern could be the impetus needed to produce a successful review conference and concrete measures to strengthen the treaty.

Most delegates included expressions of solidarity against the terrorist threat and vows to strengthen the BTWC in their opening statements to the review conference. However, the United States used its opening statement to point fingers at fellow States Parties it accused of violating the treaty in addition to introducing what it categorized as new and innovative proposals intended as an alternative to the proposed protocol. Although taken aback by these serious accusations of treaty violation, participants largely left rhetoric outside of the negotiating room as they worked to draft a final declaration. Unfortunately the most contentious issues (particularly future work and the AHG) were also left outside the main negotiating room. These issues were not resolved, and in the end made the agreements reached on the other issues and proposals, as embodied in the draft final declaration, largely irrelevant. The conference was besieged by the same difficult issues (verification, investigations, technical assistance/cooperation) that led to the suspension of the AHG, compounded by stark disagreement about the future of the AHG and its mandate.

The conference was adjourned at the 11th hour in order to avert total failure after the surprise introduction of a US proposal calling for the termination of the AHG and its mandate. While the majority of States Parties had accepted that the AHG would not continue in its previous form, it was widely believed that all States Parties had a vested interest in, and supported, the continuation of its mandate by other means. As a result, the US proposal to "terminate" the mandate of the group as well as the group itself led to widespread outcry and disappointment. The adjournment of the conference means that States Parties will have a year to review all of the proposals made and to formulate possible alternative measures in the hopes of successfully concluding the conference in November 2002. The interim will also give States Parties and policymakers time to confer and possibly pave the way for compromises when the conference resumes.

The attacks in America seem to have had the opposite effect to that hoped for by proponents of a strengthened BTWC. Rather than pushing it towards greater cooperation and support for international agreements in the interests of security, the US has chosen to pursue a largely militaristic response while giving short shrift to treaties and international agreements. Believing that it can stand alone due to its unique status as superpower militarily and economically it is choosing to do so while threatening allies to tow the line with the maxim "if you're not with us, you're against us". This reaction is surprising in that the attacks upon America illustrated to many that even a superpower cannot alone ensure its security.

A 'go-it-alone' American approach was evident at the 5RC and reflected in many of the United States' proposals, most of which fell into the category of measures under the purview of individual States Parties and were voluntary. American proposals included legal measures such as criminalization of certain activities and extradition procedures; tightened export controls; international investigation of suspicious outbreaks possibly by UN inspectors; promotion of ethical codes; enhanced biodefense counter-terrorism capabilities; and voluntary cooperative mechanisms for clarification of concerns. Many of the US proposals were regarded as attempts to use the 5RC to push a national agenda, and as unilateral rather than collective action. Undersecretary of State John Bolton rejected accusations of unilateralism, stating "In fact, trying to characterize our policy as unilateralist or multilateralist is a futile exercise. Our policy is, quite simply, pro-American as you would expect."^[8] In explaining its proposals, the US indicated that it believes that the threat it faces is such that it cannot wait for the achievement of an agreement on strengthening the BTWC or even for consensus agreement on specific measures. What remained unspoken, although close to the surface, was American distrust of international agreements, of the ability of the BTWC to ensure its security, and of its fellow States Parties.

American representatives have repeatedly stated that they continue to support the BTWC while objecting to the measures suggested for its reinforcement. They have argued that the proposed protocol was not strong enough to protect against violation, yet they rejected even the most modest measures to strengthen it. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton has argued that what the US opposes are "...flawed diplomatic arrangements which purport to strengthen the BTWC but actually increase the specter of biological warfare by not effectively confronting the serious problem of BWC noncompliance."^[9] Yet despite these stated fears and accusations of non-compliance, it has rejected proposed verification measures on the basis that inspections might reveal prized commercial proprietary information or biodefense secrets. Moreover, while it rejected the draft protocol, the US has provided little in the way of an integrated alternative or strategy for preventing the erosion of norms against the use of biological weapons. In fact, some observers in Geneva speculated that the US forced the adjournment of the 5RC in order to gain more time to develop and integrate strategy under the new administration.

Another argument used by the United States in opposition to the proposed protocol to the BTWC has been that it would create a false sense of security. It is ironic then that the Bush administration is doing the same thing by different means. Sensors and detectors do not currently exist for detecting all BTW agents; protective clothing and masks might work but only if one has some indication in advance of when to wear them; vaccines and prophylactics do not exist for many of the agents which might be used; and medical countermeasures might not be effective.^[10] Improvements to health systems and international disease surveillance networks on the other hand, are important and these advances should not be subjugated to an elusive quest for absolute security against biological weapons.

Conclusion

The challenges ahead for proponents of a strengthened BTWC are many. The success of international treaties is measured not by things that happen, but by those that don't. It is difficult for proponents of treaties to show a direct causal link between the BTWC and proliferation that has not occurred. Therefore an ongoing challenge for proponents of a strengthened BTWC will be to attempt to convince policymakers of its effectiveness in a way that has a comparable impact to the daily tallies of terrorists detained or killed in Afghanistan or the next target of the war on terrorism.

The results of these efforts will be apparent when the Fifth Review Conference resumes in Geneva in November 2002. For the sake of its own security as well as that of the international community, it is important that the United States use the intervening time to re-evaluate the achievements of the BTWC and its importance. Optimally, all States Parties will return to the 5RC intent on sending a clear signal to the world of the importance of the BTWC in combatting biological weapons proliferation and terrorism via cooperative measures to strengthen the treaty.

Jacqueline Simon is a former member of the SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project. She can be contacted at jackiesimon@hotmail.com.

The SIPRI homepage at www.sipri.se has a special section on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Arms Control. The webpage posts results of the SIPRI project and relevant documents to allow easy access to primary sources, and it offers access to an electronic discussion forum on the issue for which you can register on the webpage.