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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
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Bulletin 18 - Supplement |
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Moving Beyond Missile Defense
Workshop Summary
Santa Barbara (USA), March 19 - 21, 2001
"Moving Beyond Missile Defense", a joint project of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, held its first international workshop to launch the project in Santa Barbara, California, March 19-21, 2001. It was the first in a series of workshops that will take place in several different international regions, including Northeast Asia, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
For three days, 17 experts in science, technology and security gathered to discuss the technological and geopolitical problems as well as the negative impacts of missile defenses on international security. Workshop participants included: Jackie Cabasso, US; Merav Datan, US; Regina Hagen, Germany; Wade Huntley, US; David Krieger, US; George Lewis, US; Andrew Lichterman, US; Eugene Miasnikov, Russia; Bahig Nassar, Egypt; Carah Ong, US; Reuven Pedatzur, Israel; M.V. Ramana, US; Jürgen Scheffran, Germany; Dingli Shen, China; Alice Slater, US; Abdul Hameed Toor, Pakistan; Hiromichi Umebayshi, Japan.
Below are summaries of the presentations given by participants of the workshop. At the end of the conference, a set of conclusions was adopted and next steps for the project were outlined.
Missile Defense Implications for the Korean Peninsula and East Asia
Wade Huntley
East Asia faces challenges posed by development and deployment of BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) most gravely. It is a defining motif for security in the region.
In the Korean Peninsula, Theater Missile Defense is embedded in a larger BMD architecture, and the US has already deployed considerable BMD systems in South Korea. The missile threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is very over-exaggerated for both known and unknown reasons. There are no assembly lines, either for tractors or for launchers, and each missile is a unique piece. Therefore, testing is of little use, because no one missile is like another. Consequently the missile force is unreliable and inaccurate.
More important is the DPRK's ability to proliferate missiles and technologies to other countries. There is credible evidence that cooperation between Pakistan and the DPRK dates back to the 1970s.
There are still a few long-term choices for US policy in the post-Cold War era. Bush is showing willingness for deep cuts in arsenal. This will reduce interventionalism. But beneath is a much more aggressive posture drawn from lessons learned by the Cold War. The end of the Cold War had two significant components for shaping US policy. The first is material - the US won the Cold War by outspending; the second is ideological it was good that the Soviet Union fell apart because it marked the victory of capitalism and freedom over communism.
There is a commitment in the Bush administration to learn lessons from the Cold War and apply them to the current situation. Even if things turn around in short-term, US policy lurking in the background does not offer the prospect of building global peace. The task for this workshop is to think beyond immediate challenges and to aim efforts at a world vision.
Problems and Implications of Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense
Can Missile Defense Prevent a Future Missile Threat?
George Lewis
The US is moving toward limited missile defense deployment. The primary motivation for the system is the prospect of attack from a developing country, and secondarily, an accidental attack from Russia or threat from China. The single most important factor behind BMD deployment is US domestic politics. The beginning of deployment is inevitable because Republicans are united on it whereas Democrats are not. There is still time to react.
The Bush administration is considering a total of 17 options. It could decide to abandon land-based system. Unless Bush continues with the technology developed under the Clinton administration, it is likely that a system will not be deployed while he is office something unacceptable to a Republican Congress. Bush will probably start with parts of NMD (National Missile Defense, deployment start 2006/2007) and add to the Clinton proposal, giving it global coverage.
The Pentagon has stated that Navy Theater Wide can be used in conjunction with a national missile defense and this will increase China's worries. There are no current figures of interceptors for the Navy Theater Wide, although 600-650 was projected a few years ago. Navy Theater Wide has the same vulnerabilities as NMD. Boost-phase systems could also be added and they are much harder to defeat. The Air-Borne Laser (ABL), which is projected to first be tested in 2003, would work better against strategic systems than against theater missiles. If the ABL works, it could be used as a boost-phase system against smaller countries like North Korea and Iraq. The ABL may also be incorporated into NMD system. Boostphase interceptors on ships could be incorporated into the Navy Theater Wide system.
Most scientists believe that the NMD system will not work. The US is spending 60-120 billion on a system that won't work because politicians believe that the system will develop and expand over time and that questions of technical feasibility will not slow the system down.
Is There a Missile Threat?
M. V. Ramana
In general it is assumed that the main motivation for missile defense is regional security threats. We must examine sources of motivation including political, technological and prestige. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was initiated in 1987 and has grown to 32 member states but does nothing to deal with missile threat from the five official nuclear weapons states (P5). Additionally, continued possession of long-range missiles does not come under MTCR, and export control regimes may be counterproductive. At best the MTCR has delayed some programs. Options for a stronger missile non-proliferation regime - i.e. a global control regime without the obligation to disarm - would provide a perspective on technology development. But, the P5 would not want to disarm their missiles; therefore others would not want to abstain.
Abdul Hameed Toor
US deployment of a National Missile Defense would have grave impacts in South Asia. China would likely deploy multiple warheads, MIRV and other advanced technologies to defeat the system. There would then be pressure on India to do the same in order to maintain a "minimum deterrent" against China. Pakistan would also enhance its missile and nuclear capability to maintain its deterrent against India. The result would be greater military spending in all three countries. A treaty similar to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is needed in the region.
Self-made Arms Race
Andrew Lichterman
Missile defense and nuclear weapons are related on a number of levels. There is clearly pressure from the military to continue weapons development. TMD (Theater Missile Defense) - and in a larger context the current and possible follow-on NMD systems - yield a growing range of weapons both conventional and nuclear. This is happening in a broader context where there is an increasing blur in the public mind and military policy.
Nuclear weapons laboratories continue to be involved in BMD and have been since the 1960s. Once it was respectable to talk about the military-industrial complex but this has fallen out of debate in the US. Something more important is overlaps in particular technology areas where there are multiple program drivers. The technologies are used for nuclear weapons development as well as for BMD deployment. Facilities and programs will have different sets of military and corporate drivers; other program drivers may be out there to which we are not paying attention.
BMD systems do not have to work to be destabilizing. It takes many years to go from a concept phase to deployment. The long development cycles are also true for other countries who can't be sure what they will face in the future but have less money to throw at these programs. Focusing on technical critique alone will not work, the entire enterprise of BMD will continue. We must challenge the fundamental ideology behind BMD and we must challenge US deployment of overwhelming military capabilities. We must make connections to what is there already and bring out the underlying issues.
Pearl Harbor in Space
Regina Hagen
For the US Space Command, missile defense includes a whole collection of systems. It is global and unlimited in terms of the technologies used and includes space-based weapons components (space-based laser, microwave weapons, electromagnetic pulse). Missile defense is part of "Global Engagement" which includes the components "Integrated Focussed Surveillance" and "Force Application" from space. In addition to "Global Engagement", the US Space Command's Vision for 2020 also covers the areas "Control of Space", "Full Force Integration" and "Global Partnerships". Missile defense is part of a broader scheme leading to global engagement and the Vision for 2020.
In July 1999, the US DoD (Deparment of Defense) published the Directive 3110.10, Space Policy, that provides political backing for the Space Command's ideas. Point 4.11 states that "space capabilities shall assure access to and use of space; deter and, if necessary, defend against hostile actions; and counter other nations' space systems and services." The new report on space by the second Rumsfeld Commission, released in January 2001 is projecting a threat in space from hostile nations or terrorists against which the US must prevent a "Pearl Harbor in Space." The same people who pushed for NMD to defend against potential threats are now pushing to weaponize space. The US Space Command is pushing missile defense issues because most of the systems used in missile defense activities are needed to realize force application in space - for them missile defense is just "getting a foot in the door."
Regional Perspectives
Russian Perceptions
Eugene Miasnikov
National Missile Defense is a clear violation of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty which Russia views as cornerstone of disarmament. Many Russian officials on many occasions have reiterated this.
Ambassador Yuri Kapralov, Director of Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, stated that Russia would discontinue implementation of START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as an immediate consequence of NMD deployment. START III would then become impossible. Most Russians believe that the attitude in society is increasingly negative towards arms control due to failed hopes of reaching a true partnership with the West and increasing economic costs in Russia. Steps of Russian leadership at the end of the 1980s were motivated by goodwill in hopes that the West would reciprocate.
Negative public attitudes toward the West are intensified by shortcomings of the START II treaty, as well as NATO expansion, US plans to deploy NMD, US and NATO policies toward resolving conflicts in Yugoslavia and the reluctance of the US to strictly implement the START I treaty. Russia is concerned that the US is not strictly implementing the treaty with respect to MX missiles. There is also concern over Trident tests (under START II, both sides are supposed to warn of tests, and the UK and US are currently testing and not sharing information). In terms of conversion of B-1 bombers, Russia has concerns that the measures being taken to convert nuclear into conventional bombers do not ensure irreversibility.
Russia is also concerned over growing US conventional forces and this will play a major role in the next round of Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. In particular, the problem of conventional weapons was discussed in a report by the environmental ministry. Problems are intensified by Russian military deterioration. Russia feels that is has no chance to achieve balance in the START process.
There are also some centrist views in Russia that deployment of NMD, linked together with development of conventional precision guided weapons, by the US is aimed to devalue Russia's nuclear arsenal. Under these circumstances Russia has no choice but to take adequate measures to ensure the efficiency of its nuclear arsenal.
Chinese Perceptions
Dingli Shen
The US State Department is using the new jargon "missile defense system" to replace TMD and NMD. Ballistic missile defense hurts China's interests and could destabilize the world order. Even if the US and Russia were to reduce their arsenals to START III levels, the numbers are not limited in terms of the levels of other countries.
Western figures for Chinese ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) are quoted to be around 20. China has fissile material for some 1,000-2,000 strategic weapons. However, mid- and short-range weapons could also have strategic impact. The first configuration of National Missile Defense deployment (100 interceptors, with a 4:1 hit-to-kill ratio) would be powerful enough to counter China's current strategic force. However, China could build up its missile force, and it would only need to increase its arsenal by one for every four interceptors deployed by the US.
There is growing concern in China of an escalating conflict with the US, especially as Taiwan increasingly speaks out for independence. In regards to the issue over Taiwan, China has stated that it will use force if Taiwan announces independence, if Taiwan is occupied or invaded, or if Taiwan were to indefinitely refuse talks on the peaceful settlement of reunification.
China is modernizing its army and weapons and capability. There is danger because of the Taiwan Act, a US policy requiring the US to intervene if its security interests are involved. However, China believes that Taiwan is an internal issue. China's strategic force gives it some confidence that US intervention would be limited. As long as China's ICBM force is survivable, China believes it is safe from unlimited US intervention. The Taiwan question devalues this sense of security in China. If NMD is deployed, the US could interfere in the China-Taiwan relations without being threatened by a symmetric response from China.
China may sign a treaty later this year to codify a strategic alliance with Russia to counter US force and impact Washington. Also, China may alter its nuclear doctrine to incorporate first use, which may preclude a fissile materials cut-off. NMD will trigger a strong response from Beijing leading to missile build up in China. China is willing to talk about missile defense, is trying to engage US government, and has always done so. In China's view, the only barrier for US to deploy a NMD is technology. Russia's proposal to collaborate with the US on missile defense would isolate China, leaving it the lone opposition.
European Perspectives
Regina Hagen
In general, Europeans believe that NMD is destabilizing and unnecessary and poses the danger of new arms races. Europe is reluctant to agree to a NMD. The Defense Ministers often support the idea and Foreign Ministers oppose it because of international implications. The situation varies in individual countries. The United Kingdom is key because it is a close US ally and follows the US blindly (e.g. continual bombing of Iraq). On the other hand, the US plans to have a radar station in the UK, and the UK is reluctant because the NMD radar component at Fylingdales may make it a target to reduce the workability of the NMD system. As to Denmark, the US plans to have a radar station in Greenland. The Danish government is not clear on the issue, but the population in Greenland opposes it. Germany is now ambivalent, even though initially it was outspoken because of the instability proposed by deployment. However two weeks ago, the German Chancellor Schröder reiterated that the US will do what it pleases, therefore Germany should cooperate in order to participate economically and technologically. France has been outspoken in its opposition to the system.
Jürgen Scheffran
Europe faces a dilemma. If it does not cooperate with the US, it could lead to the decoupling of NATO. If it does cooperate, it will justify missile defense. China, Russia and Europe are examples that 'divide and conquer' works. While there has been a split amongst NATO countries over NMD, there has been a greater push for TMD, on which there has been joint work since the 1980s. In 2005, the Alliance will make a decision, and deployment could begin as early as 2008. From a technical level there are many overlaps. For example, the PAC3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3) system, SMT, lower-tier system, THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense), and upper-tier are all systems with strong US dominance that could be used in Europe. There are two exceptions: a domestic French system and a joint system with Germany, Italy, and the US. It's become clear, however, that the US does not really want to cooperate, but wants to bring in its own technology.
The Missile Race in Critical Regions
Israel
Reuven Pedatzur
The future negotiations on arms control will be one of the most problematic components of the political process in the Middle East. Most of the countries in the region are armed with weapons that range from conventional to nuclear. Political agreements must lead to control and dismantling of weapons. Launching ballistic missiles is a taboo subject in the Middle East.
Plans for control must be based on a regional approach, but the profile of the Middle East suggests that this will be impossible in the near future. Three approaches have traditionally guided efforts to control missile forces including: the imposition of quantitative and, less frequently, qualitative constraints on missiles; limitations on the way states deploy missiles and conduct operations; and the elimination of entire categories of missiles.
There are six factors that have contributed to attempts to arrive at a plan based on these traditional approaches. First, at least ten countries in the region possess ballistic missiles and at least six of those have equipped their missiles with chemical, and/or biological, warheads. If only one country in the region decided not to take part in the arms control effort, it could be enough to doom any plan to control or limit the region's missile arsenals.
Second, given the nature of the players in the Middle East, their attitudes towards using weapons to resolve conflicts, and the great number of conflicts in the region, the likelihood that they will give up the missile option is slim. From the Israeli point of view it would be unacceptable to reach an agreement on the limitation or elimination of its ballistic missile arsenal that did not include all the other countries in the region.
Third, to be effective, an agreement would have to include all the member states of the Arab League (twenty-two), as well as Iran and Israel, and the stretch from Algeria in North Africa to Iran and the Persian Gulf. The large number and diversity of necessary participants, in itself, is a significant obstacle to agreement. Another factor is the great number of missiles already existing in the region, estimated at between 1,200 and 2,000. Because of these figures, the number of countries involved, and the diversity of the territory in which the missiles are deployed, the ability to verify compliance with a control regime would be very limited. There are a number of diverse political systems, ranging from open democracies to closed and tightly controlled dictatorships. In the case of closed societies, particularly those with relatively large territorial extents, it is possible to hide weapons development and production programs from international inspectors.
Fourth, the proximity of adversarial states in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf would make it difficult to negotiate any range limitations low enough to be militarily meaningful.
Fifth, Israeli nuclear hegemony makes it impossible not to link Arab ballistic missiles and the Israeli bomb. It is unlikely (and unacceptable to the Arab countries) that the question of missile proliferation will be addressed in isolation from the nuclear issue. From the Arabs' point of view, their ballistic missiles provide the only means to address the problem of nuclear asymmetry in the Middle East.
Sixth, as long as there are countries that do not accept the rules of the arms control 'game' there will be a source of missile supply. The determination of players in any arms limitation regime, whether global, regional, or bilateral, is only as strong as the verification and safeguards systems that are implemented.
One of the most important discussions should refer to the influence of missile defenses on regional stability. Deploying missile defenses in the Middle East will bring a dramatic change in the 'balance of terror', which was created by the arsenal of ballistic missiles. The MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) is not the answer. There is tremendous need for cooperation.
Egypt
Bahig Nassar
The Situation in the Middle East with respect to proliferation is very different from that in any other region. The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel has provoked proliferation.
Egypt is concerned with threats to non-nuclear weapons states. Only political steps will work to change the danger in the Middle East. First, political non-proliferation steps assume paramount importance in conjunction with disarmament steps. Second, BMDs have already been deployed and already are a threat in the Middle East. Third, current BMD deployment leads to crisis and arms races in regions among non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Israel's unwillingness to speak about its nuclear weapons is a serious problem in the Middle East. Blind deterrence will prevail where countries pursue and possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Because Israel possesses nuclear weapons, other countries are pursing WMD possession. With the exception of North Korea, all 'states of concern' are in the Middle East. In the Middle East, there remains only one possibility for hope, that is to create a more stable political situation. The concerns of all parties, both Arab states and Israel must be addressed. It is in the interest of Israeli security to come to good terms with Arab countries.
During the Cold War, the emphasis was on the two superpowers, but now regional security is of utmost importance. The key is that we are living in a different time than during the Cold War confrontation, and US strategy has changed from confrontation to domination. Each region has special characteristics. There are two ways to prevent proliferation: politics and force.
India
M. V. Ramana
India has global ambitions. The nuclear tests of May 1998 reflected India's desire to join world powers. The tests proved the "rightful place of India." On a positive note, there is a peace movement emerging in India. India has also stated that it would participate in de-alerting if such a proposal is set forth and it could make an unverified promise to keep warheads unmated.
The Indian nuclear arsenal is small and India is reluctant to divulge information. A moratorium from India to ban long-range missiles is not relevant to Pakistan. Practically all installations in India are within 150-200 km. India and Pakistan should not keep weapons near borders and one proposal could be to create a missile free zone along the border region. There is also a possibility of a cooperative monitoring center in both countries. However, the current political climate in India and Pakistan makes these steps unlikely and NMD and TMD only make the situation worse.
Pakistan
Abdul Hameed Toor
There is a strong link between nuclear weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons. Any steps should link these two things and address this problem. There is an advantage in Pakistan to have a missile program. We must address the need to eliminate attack aircraft. There is a movement against missiles but no regime for attack aircraft. There is a very limited number of countries who can produce attack aircraft and they decide to which countries to sell. But missiles can be produced by anyone. A treaty similar to the ABMTreaty between India, Pakistan, and China is one option available now in order to at least avoid a build-up of missile defense systems in the region.
Japan
Hiro Umebayashi
In terms of regional security, the missile defense issue has implications of deep distrust. There is a strong belief in Japan that the US largely secured the stability and prosperity of the region. The continued presence of US troops is a clear evidence that security has not been successful and will not be sustainable. China's no first use policy is not respected in Japan because of distrust. The US-Japan joint TMD work reinforces this distrust. Confidence and security building measures must be called for by civil society, and civil society must be engaged in the process. A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone would allow the beginning of such a process.
Since Bush took office, Japan has not yet issued a statement on ballistic missile defense. If Japan is to remain consistent with disarmament policy, Japan will have to continue to argue for the preservation of the ABM Treaty. With regard to TMD, the joint research is based on Japan's allegation that it is not linked to NMD, therefore it will not jeopardize the ABM Treaty or the START process. Japan is vulnerable to criticism because of its joint research on TMD.
Strategies and Ways Out of the Missile Race
Missile Defense, Disarmament, and Stability
Jürgen Scheffran
During the Strategic Defense Initiative debate in 1983, Reagan was looking for a defense-dominated world. Gorbachev said that nuclear disarmament would make defense obsolete.
There are problems of stability when in addition to nuclear weapons, missile defense also exist. When offensive and defensive capabilities are equal, deterrence would be questionable. With defensive systems, the point of instability would come earlier. After a first strike, less nuclear weapons would exist and defense capability would diminish the offensive capability of the other side much earlier. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) stated in 1985 that the transition to a defense-dominated world would require more arms control rather than less.
After the end of the Cold War, a new situation has emerged creating a complex uncertainty. It is difficult to define whether or not deterrence works. Everything depends on worst-case perceptions leading to strong reactions and counter-reactions. The introduction of defensive forces in an offensive world would create even more problems. The situation is easier to stabilize without the introduction of defensive capabilities.
In regards to specifically controlling missile defense systems, we already have the ABM Treaty. But, the ABM Treaty is under double pressure because of US attempts to withdraw from it and technological advances undermining it (e.g. development of TMD capabilities). Therefore, we must work to save the ABM Treaty as an interim measure until something more comprehensive can replace it.
We need more comprehensive approaches in the future. The focus can remain on nuclear disarmament, but we need to incorporate the discussion of ballistic missile defenses, conventional weapons, etc. A ballistic missile as a conventional weapon can do as much damage as a nuclear warhead. The question then is can missiles be banned for certain purposes only? Is a distinction between civilian and military purposes possible? Missile quantity limits and missile testing limits could be imposed.
Other proposals to consider include missile flight test restrictions and bans, missile free zones in particular regions, international missile disarmament (a.k.a. zero ballistic missiles), an international monitoring system, improving information exchange, improving missile early warning, and on-site inspections.
Aim For a Campaign: What can NGOs Do?
Jackie Cabasso, Merav Datan, David Krieger, Regina Hagen, and Alice Slater
We need to shift the framework to build a movement linking the past, present and future while challenging the 'winning arguments' for missile defense. We must be careful about alarmist information and argumentation on this issue. In the present, most people are in a state of denial regarding US proclamations of national security policy and global domination.
One of the mistakes to avoid is focusing too narrowly on opposing specific systems or saving a particular treaty. It is not our purpose as a movement to preserve the ABM Treaty. We need to promote positive alternatives like an improved Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Weapons Convention. Must return to core values of the non-violent struggles of the past, which translates to the way in which we do our work.
To deal with the emerging situation, we need a campaign to avoid the demonization of China and other peoples. There is a strong need for people-to-people contacts to diffuse the 'rogue states' notion. One possibility is to bring delegations of Chinese and North Koreans to the US.
We need to emphasize the distinction between governments and civil societies. It is not in our interest to associate ourselves with the national interests of any country. We need to decolonize our minds; it must be them and us.
We also need to fundamentally redefine security in terms of individuals, not territories. We need to offer alternative forms of security.
We need to put missile defense in the context of abolishing nuclear weapons. A more secure world demands abolition of nuclear weapons - this is crucial also for future generations. BMD takes away from possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons.
Compiled by Carah Ong, Researcher, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
For more information on the project, contact INESAP, c/o IANUS, Hochschulstr. 4a, 64289 Darmstadt,
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