International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Space Without Weapons

Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponization of Space

Rebecca Johnson

At the international conference "Space Without Weapons - Arena of Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century", held under United Nations auspices in April 2001, Rebecca Johnson from the London-based Acronym Institute gave a presentation that described the US plans to further militarize and also weaponize space. She then continued talking about the role of international space law and suggested that a "Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space" be negotiated. A written version of the presentation was published in Disarmament Diplomacy #56. The following is an extract from her paper.

Space Sanctuary: an alternative US view

Responding to the notion of putting weapons in space, Senator Tom Daschle (Democrat) of South Dakota was memorably direct. He called it "the single dumbest thing I have heard so far from this administration... It would be a disaster for us to put weapons in space of any kind under any circumstances. It only invites other countries to do the same thing."^[1]

Three years earlier, Lt. Col. Bruce M. Deblois of the United States Air Force had come to the same conclusion. Rumsfeld's Commission reported that China was developing methods and strategies for defeating the US military in a high-tech and space-based future war, viewing this as a sign of vulnerability justifying US plans to enhance their military and weapon capabilities in space. Deblois challenges the prevailing assumption underlying US Space Command's mission, i.e. that "space will be weaponised; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead". Despite accepting that the advantages of being the first nation to put weapons into space were "undeniable", Deblois contends that the weaponisation of space is not inevitable and that crossing this threshold would not be the best long term strategy for US national security.^[2] Arguing that weaponising space would be profoundly destabilising, invigorate a high-tech arms race and potentially a new emphasis on mutual assured destruction (MAD) doctrines, and that the US would have the most to lose from such developments, Deblois advocates the pursuit of a policy he calls 'space sanctuary'. Deblois utilises some of the same arguments as US Space Command regarding American dependence on space for intelligence, communication, surveillance, navigation, commercial interests and commercial and military data acquisition, but comes to a very different conclusion.

Where Rumsfeld's Commission argued that the attendant vulnerabilities must be met with aggressive development of military space capabilities, Deblois describes three approaches for defending space assets: I. diplomatic/political defences (agreements aimed at building collective security); II. passive defences (hide and seek), and III. active defences (essentially Rumsfeld's option of deploying ground ASAT and space-based weapons). Deblois recommends combining options I. and II. and the "active, aggressive avoidance of the third."^[3] Deblois contends that seeking to control Earth from a space-based battle platform would conflict with wider American ideals and objectives, but he focusses most on the military reasons for not weaponising space. In particular, he argues that space weaponisation strategies lack the element of survivability and would be militarily and politically self-defeating; they are expensive, provocative and escalatory; and they maintain a bogus centre of gravity (COG) of vulnerability, for which other strategies might provide better defence and protection. Finally, any initial advantage from being the first to put weapons in space would soon be neutralised as other major powers seek to develop space weapons of their own, while lesser powers could offset them with asymmetric responses.^[4] It must be recalled that the United States seriously underestimated the speed with which its advantage as the sole nuclear power in 1945 would erode. The heart-stopping near miss of the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred less than 20 years later.

International agreements and continuing concerns

Although weapons have not yet been placed on satellites, space is already substantially militarised. This fact has to be taken into account when looking at the kind of restraints that might be feasible now. US capabilities currently far outweigh the rest, but several countries have satellite-based surveillance and intelligence capabilities. Russia and the United States have for many years been researching and testing ASAT weapons, though not without technical problems. Over the past 30 years, a number of treaties and agreements have been concluded to protect assets in space, but with Washington pressing aggressively ahead with NMD, such measures look increasingly inadequate.

Of the agreements, the Outer Space Treaty is central. While it prohibits the placing or stationing in earth orbit or on celestial bodies of any objects carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, the treaty accepted that "passive military use" such as reconnaissance satellites, surveillance, early warning or communications would be allowed.^[5] Although military personnel could conduct scientific research, the testing of weapons in space or the holding of military manoeuvres or establishment of military bases was banned. Ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons through space were permitted, as were 'conventional' weapons not capable of mass destruction. A further confidence building Treaty was negotiated in 1975, the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Registration Convention). This complemented the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, but neither agreement has received much attention or prompt observance. More than a decade later, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Agreement) was signed in December 1979 and entered into force in 1984. The 1932 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Convention, as amended in 1992 and 1994, protects civilian satellites from interference.

Space issues are also discussed in the United Nations. There is the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) attached to the General Assembly's Fourth Committee, and UNI-SPACE, which holds periodic meetings. These provide a useful sounding board for concerns but have no power to regulate activities. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has long had an agenda item on PAROS, although for much of that time the issue failed to get into the CD's annual programme of work. Traditionally, the lead in PAROS in the CD and UN resolutions has been taken by Sri Lanka, together with Egypt. British science fiction writer and long-time resident of Sri Lanka, Dr. Arthur C. Clarke, author of 2001: A Space Odyssey, addressed the CD in 1982 as a member of Sri Lanka's delegation and emphasised the need to prevent nuclear war and war in outer space. In 1985, as pressure increased from US plans for SDI (quickly dubbed 'Star Wars'), Sri Lanka's ambassador to the CD, Jayantha Dhanapala, noted that "we have watched [PAROS] in its transition from what appeared to be a slice of science fiction to being perhaps the single most important development in the arms race today."^[6] That was sixteen years ago, and his words are even truer today.

During the ensuing years, PAROS issues were intermittently discussed in CD plenaries and subsidiary bodies. Talks often foundered on a basic conflict between the non-aligned states, who wanted discussions and exploration of the issue to be directed towards negotiations to achieve appropriate agreements, and others - mainly Western states - who were prepared to countenance exploratory discussions only as an end in themselves, ruling out negotiations. Some countries sought the middle ground. Among the working papers issued in 1993, for example, was a call from France for confidence building measures in outer space to enhance the existing treaty regime, strengthen the security of space activities, prevent the aggressive use of space, and promote space cooperation for civil and scientific purposes.^[7]

The last time a CD ad hoc committee was convened on PAROS was in 1994. The committee considered whether existing space treaties were sufficient and speculated about what kind of legal instrument or measures should be employed or negotiated. The non-aligned states and China took the view that PAROS was still important and urgent, while most Western and Eastern-European countries advocated confidence-building measures instead of treaty negotiations, on the grounds that the end of the Cold War had brought about considerable changes and there was no longer an arms race in outer space.^[8]

With the advent of US plans for ballistic missile defences, that sanguine view has now been revised even by America's allies. In successive years the UN General Assembly resolution on PAROS has garnered increased interest and votes. In December 2000, UNGA resolution 55/32 was introduced by Sri Lanka and co-sponsored by a number of non-aligned countries plus Russia and China. It reaffirmed the importance of the Outer Space Treaty, emphasised the need for consolidation and reinforcement, including verification, of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, and called on countries with major space capabilities to refrain from acts contrary to maintaining a peaceful outer space. The resolution received 163 votes in favour and none against. The United States, Israel and Micronesia abstained.

Negotiate a new space treaty

As Senator Daschle pointed out, turning outer space into a future battleground is demonstrably a mad idea. Unfortunately it is not something we can ignore and hope it will go away. US Space Command has been thinking, researching and planning for the military domination of space for a long time, and with Bush and Rumsfeld in power, they believe their time has come. The sooner the TV, telecom and electronics moguls and the rest of the world wake up to the importance of preventing the weaponisation of space the better, before much more US military commitment, finances and prestige are invested. Recognising the political realities, which mean that PAROS is unlikely to get properly addressed, let alone negotiated, in the CD in the near future, a space-focussed 'Ottawa process' should be considered.

The Ottawa process, whereby civil society and a few conscientious states led the way in getting a worldwide ban on landmines, is not easily reproducible, but space may be one area where the conditions prevail to make it seriously worth considering. In the first instance, the role of NGOs will be crucial. There are already signs in Europe that the peace-movements are experiencing a resurgence of public interest as a result of fears about 'star wars', missile defence and the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto protocol and other important agreements. While some NGOs need to take the arguments about weapons and war in space out to schools, churches, parliamentarians, the media and other public opinion shapers, others need to engage quietly with the telecommunications, navigation and entertainment industries. Countries and industries with significant commercial interests in non-military satellites, which include powerful lobbies in the United States itself, have a vested interest in keeping space peaceful.

Think tanks and experts are needed to work out some of the difficult technical and legal definitions and questions that will have to be resolved, such as: whether the production, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons can be distinguished from BMD and other ballistic missiles or if a ban is feasible only on the use of ASAT weapons; where to define the boundary between air space and outer space; what constitutes a weapon or a component of a weapon; whether there is a feasible or necessary distinction between low and high altitude ASAT; what constitutes testing of space weapons; and so on.^[9] Although many continue to speak of the peaceful uses of outer space, that is a misnomer, given the military reliance on space-based intelligence, surveillance and navigation assets. We may not be able to turn the clock back to preserve space for genuinely peaceful purposes, but it is not too late to prohibit weapons and regulate space activities to prevent offensive and aggressive deployments and activities.

As civil society becomes more aware of the dangers associated with US plans for space dominance, it is time for a group of states concerned about keeping space peaceful to take the lead and establish a conference (probably outside Geneva) to look into these issues, with a view to preparing and then negotiating a Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space.^[10]

Both the 1959 Treaty of Antarctica and the 1971 Seabed Treaty provide good, though not exact, precedents. Since some military activities are already carried on in space, it will be important to agree clear definitions and parameters on what types of activity are to be permitted, regulated or prohibited. While some may wish to demilitarise space altogether, such a radical step would be dependent on a far-reaching and deeper demilitarisation of international relations. Not impossible in the future, but at this stage it is more feasible to concentrate on preventing future weaponisation and on seeking agreement to regulate military activities rather than the purer but considerably more difficult objective of banning military involvement in space altogether. It is also important to recognise that while the majority of satellites do have a military purpose, many also play a role as 'national technical means' for monitoring and verification of arms control and non-proliferation. Space is a fragile environment. The deployment of weapons in space, including the increased likelihood of ASAT retaliation, are unpredictable, but they could be devastating. Already 30 years' worth of space debris have become a worrying hazard for satellites and space exploration.

Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space

Negotiations on a Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space would have to cover at least three main components:

I.   a ban on the deployment and use of all kinds of weapons in space, thereby extending and strengthening the 1967 Outer Space Treaty's prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction in space so that laser and other directed energy weapons and kinetic energy weapons are also banned, as well as any other potential offensive innovations that military researchers or planners might dream up;

II.  banning the testing, deployment and use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, whether earth-based or space-based; and

III. establishing a code of conduct for the peace-supporting, non-offensive and non-aggressive uses of space.

Individually, none of these proposals is new. Similar ideas have been put forward on all three components over the past decades. In 1981, 1983 and 1985, the Soviet Union put forward several initiatives, including a draft treaty banning the possession, use and testing of ASAT capabilities. In 1985 Sri Lanka proposed a moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons coupled with multilateral negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the stationing of weapons in space and the prohibition of any weapons (whether deployed on land, air or in space) designed to damage, destroy or interfere with any country's space craft. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia undertook voluntary restraints on ASAT. The CD discussed space 'rules of the road', a draft code of conduct that encompassed a formal renunciation of actions that might interfere with the operation of space objects, whether civilian (which are in any case protected from interference under the ITU Convention) or military. None of these got anywhere, in part because space was not seen as a priority issue for arms control. What is new is that plans for space weapons are now being taken seriously.

An independent route to start multilateral negotiations on a new space treaty has two major virtues: it removes PAROS from its blocking position in the CD; and it ensures that prevention of the weaponisation of space gets addressed sooner rather than later. Inevitably, the United States (and possibly others) will object and try first to prevent the talks from taking place. That is unavoidable, and advocates of a space treaty must be prepared to start negotiations without the Bush administration on board. As with the Landmines Treaty, the next US tactic if negotiations went ahead would be to evoke the NATO loyalty card, then perhaps to join in the multilateral talks in order to redirect them, and finally to try to scupper any agreements or treaties by refusing to sign.

If indeed the US were to stay completely outside of a treaty and international norm banning weapons in space, and if it were to pursue its Vision for 2020 unhindered, that would undermine the purpose and effectiveness of the measure. But though the current administration seems to care little about international treaties and opinion, President Bush listens to big money. There are very significant US commercial interests in space, not all linked to the military. They include some which are globally integrated with other international commercial interests. If transnational civil society and a strong cross-section of countries were to move forward to establish a treaty and norm against space weapons, and if the companies whose commercial interests would be most jeopardised by an ASAT free-for-all were prepared to lobby from the inside, it would be more difficult for the US government to proceed with space weapons regardless. A US boycott of the treaty would be particularly difficult to sustain if its code of conduct included technology sharing and commercial incentives for countries abiding by rules prohibiting the aggressive or offensive uses of space and loss of trade for enterprises belonging to countries that are not party to the agreements. Such commercial incentives played a part in bringing the United States into the Chemical Weapons Convention just before it entered into force in 1996.

Big money for BMD - some $60 billion and rising - may be dangled in front of US defence firms and their Congressional backers, but it needs to be shown that there is also big money - American and international - with vested interests in keeping space peaceful. If negotiations get underway, it should be a priority to build coalitions, not only among a large group of countries, but between civil society and major commercial enterprises, and even sectors of the military, for whom communications are the Achilles heel of ever more sophisticated, high precision, conventional weaponry. For some, there will be contradictions in dealing with such industries. Nor can it be our intention to make the heavens safe for 'smart' bombs! Nevertheless, a successful strategy to negotiate a new space treaty will require such alliances.

It is likely that some will argue for just an ASAT ban as an initial step. Back in 1987, the United States Office of Technology Assessment noted that "there is a strong relationship between ASAT and BMD technologies and the technical, political and diplomatic action taken in one sphere will almost certainly affect the other."^[11] Because of this complex relationship with BMD, an ASAT ban by itself is now out of reach, requiring that the question of space weapons be addressed comprehensively. In view of the interest some countries are now showing in the development of some limited kinds of missile defence, including land and sea-based, a further complication is that it would be difficult to distinguish between the testing and deployment of ASAT and ballistic missile defences that might be deemed legally acceptable or legitimate.

Since there are significant similarities between the technology and characteristics of forms of ASAT and BMD, two approaches could be considered, depending on feasibility and political conditions. By the more radical approach, a Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space could be combined with global restrictions on BMD. Alternatively, if the international community ends up accepting some level of missile defences, it might be necessary to focus on explicitly banning only the use of ASAT, thereby creating a norm-based regime with incentives for compliance and very severe penalties for violation. Such questions will need to be considered by technical and political experts during scoping talks at an early stage.

Conclusion

The growing international interest in finding collective ways to prevent space being turned into a battleground is fuelled by US plans to deploy ballistic missile defences and by a lack of clarity from the Bush administration over how far they mean to go. Bush has launched consultations with America's allies and Russia and China. While a number of countries may now be prepared to discuss some aspects of missile defences, there are indications that they want to draw a red line to prevent the weaponisation of space. The difficulties should not be underestimated. But neither should the political and technical complexities be a reason to give up without trying. It is important to engage the United States as much as possible, while recognising that Rumsfeld and Bush seem already to have made up their minds about positioning the United States to weaponise and control space. It is necessary to distinguish between the concept of defending against missile attacks, which is quite understandable, and the context of how such defence is approached. The United States needs to look at how its own security could be harmed if it pushes ahead with BMD plans that turn outer space into a future battleground and destabilise international relations and collective non-proliferation and security arrangements. At the same time, US allies, Russia et al (not forgetting China) have to be prepared to work constructively with Washington to put in place more effective ways to combat missile proliferation and the threat of terrorists (whether state or sub-national) armed with weapons of mass destruction, of which missile deliverable weapons are only a part.

In 1985, Dhanapala noted that preventing an arms race in outer space "is an easier task than attempting to control and decelerate such a race after it has begun". People are beginning to wake up to this fact and realise that the window of opportunity to keep space from becoming the site of the next arms race is fast closing. It is imperative now to translate the growing sense of urgency and the wider level of international commercial and military interests in the non-offensive uses of space into a transnational movement to prevent space from becoming a violent battleground in the future.

It is now clear that the Bush administration believes the United States needs to place weapons in space, to protect not only its military and commercial assets in outer space, but also to dominate and control activities on Earth from space. This paper argues that attempts to dominate space militarily will backfire, and could risk a new arms race and increase the vulnerability of important commercial, communication, verification and intelligence assets in space. Although I have considered proposals put forward by Russian diplomats and others for amending the 1967 Treaty or negotiating an additional protocol to it, I have deliberately not proposed this. I am concerned that any opening of discussion into the scope of the Outer Space Treaty could prompt arguments (particularly in the United States) that this treaty is outmoded and should be abandoned. In my view, therefore, it is vitally important to build on but not to seek to amend that treaty, thereby leaving its core prohibition against WMD in space enshrined in international law. What is needed is a new instrument to prohibit all weapons in space and regulate space-related activities. This will not necessarily exempt the 1967 Treaty from attacks by those who might want to pull out, but it will make it very much more difficult for them to do so.

Most importantly, this paper argues that the initiative to begin negotiations on a new treaty to prevent the deployment of space weapons must be taken now, by as large a group of states as possible, backed by a strong international push from civil society. The objective would be to convene preparatory meetings and then full negotiations on a Treaty to Prohibit Weapons and War in Space, to halt further militarisation, prevent weaponisation and a future war in outer space, and to preserve space as a sanctuary for exploration, communication, verification and non-violent purposes of benefit to life on Earth.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.