International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Defense, Deterrence, or Disarmament?

Principal Points drawn from Strategic
Consultation of the Middle Powers Initiative

The Strategy Consultation convened by the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) at the United Nations, New York, April 29-May 1, 2001, examined in detail the 13 Steps agreed upon by all 187 States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Sixth Review in 2000. Here are the Principal Points that emerged from the Consultation, which MPI recommends that governments take action on.

De-alerting (step 9D)

The persisting launch-on-warning status of some 5,000 US and Russian nuclear warheads is irresponsible and unacceptable, especially in light of US President Bush's statement May 1, 2001 that "we are not and must not be strategic adversaries". The goal should be global zero alert. The US should make this a central element of its Nuclear Posture Review, being prepared to take into account the asymmetrical nature of their respective strategic nuclear forces, and offering major proposals for the removal of all strategic nuclear warheads from what President Bush described as "hair-trigger alert."

Preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty (step 7)

The ABM Treaty must be preserved and strengthened, because of the potentially grave consequences for the whole treaty regime underpinning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament - and thus for global security - if it is abrogated. Following President Bush's May 1 speech, this becomes more urgent. His clear intention to proceed with multi-layered ballistic missile defence risks reviving a nuclear arms race and stimulating the weaponisation of outer space. Strong interest was expressed, therefore, for a proposal that a group of like-minded States establish a conference outside the CD with a mandate to prepare and start negotiating a Treaty to Prevent War in Space.

Unilateralism versus the rule of law (steps 7, 9A, 9C)

The treaty-based approach to nuclear disarmament must be continued and reinforced, not abandoned. Recent US resistance to this approach, evidenced by Senate rejection of the CTBT and expressed willingness to abrogate the ABMTreaty if necessary, must be reversed, especially in the wider context of its uncooperative stance towards such treaties as he Kyoto Climate Change Protocol. However, unilateral disarmament steps can be productive if they are carried out to support, not undermine, the rule of law.

Thus, President Bush's stated intention in his May 1 speech to "move quickly to reduce nuclear forces" is welcome, echoing the mutual unilateral cuts in 1991 by his father and Gorbachev. However, unilateral cuts in nuclear weapons outside the framework of international treaties lack transparency and verifiability, which raises the possibility of reversion. It is important, therefore, that unilateral cuts be followed by transparency and verification measures, which should be codified as part of the disarmament treaty process.

Irreversibility (steps 5,6)

Signatory states should insist that the unequivocal undertaking made by the NWS (Step 6) includes an understanding that the gains made in nuclear disarmament cannot be reversed by possible destruction of the non-proliferation regime following deployment of a US missile defence system. The principle of irreversibility should be applied to all cuts, including particularly the 1991 US/Russia unilateral reductions and dismantling of non-strategic nuclear weapons, systems covered by the START regime, and those removed from service by the UK and France. As part of this process, the work of nuclear weapons laboratories should be redirected to verification and dismantling.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons (step 9C)

There is an urgent need to address the serious problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are most likely to be used first. Suggestions included: supporting a UN resolution focusing on this; pressure for all such nuclear weapons to be withdrawn to possessors' national territory; codification of the 1991 Bush/Gorbachev declarations; establishment of a register with a view to much greater transparency and verification on numbers; and inclusion of them either in START III or a new global treaty.

No testing, bring CTBT into force (steps 2, 1)

All NPT member states are politically bound by the 2000 NPT Review Conference final document, which called for a moratorium on nuclear explosions pending the entry into force (EIF) of the CTBT. This was strongly endorsed, with a call for high-level ministerial participation - especially by the New Agenda and NATO 5 - at the EIF conference in New York September 25-27, 2001. A demand needs to come from that conference to the major holdout, the US, to ratify, without which little progress will be made. Meanwhile, pressure should be increased to close the test sites in the US, Russia and China (France has closed its site in the South Pacific).

Inventory of all fissile materials (steps 3, 10)

To help unblock the start of negotiations for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), support was given to pressing for establishing an inventory of all weapons-usable fissile materials (plus Tritium) which would comprise a register and database. To this end, assistance should be sought from leading non-governmental agencies, such as ISIS and VERTIC, which would provide the leadership and expertise needed to kick-start the initiative. It was noted that the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs has a budget for a weapons of mass destruction database, of which this could form a part. It was proposed that informal meetings between NGOs and supportive governments should be arranged as soon as possible, with a view to preparing a message for delivery in September, 2001 to the UNGA.

Standardised reporting (steps 12, 6, 9F)

There is a need for the NWS to be required to present reports to the NPT PrepComs in a standardised way, which should be devised as soon as possible (perhaps by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs with assistance from NGOs). Their reports should be annual, with specific criteria (e.g. number of weapons cut/dismantled, budgets, de-alerting), and covering intentions as well as achievements. Such reports should be linked to: their unequivocal undertaking (Step 6), in that it cannot be indefinitely deferred; Step 9F under which all the NWS are required to be engaged as soon as appropriate; and the final, unanimous subparagraph 105f of the 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion. Similar reports should also be demanded nationally in the NWS for annual presentation to parliaments.

Urgency (all steps)

Ways should be pursued to convey a sharper sense of urgency to the nuclear disarmament process, built around the need to raise awareness that the central problem of nuclear weapons is the mindset of those possessing them. Following reports that some NWS were suggesting that nothing had changed with their agreement to the 2000 NPT Review final document, widely-supported suggestions included encouraging the UN Secretary General's proposal for a global conference to eliminate nuclear dangers (this could be pursued if the 2002 NPT PrepCom ends in deadlock, and be planned to uphold, rather than threaten, the NPT); the NAC to raise their profile to President/Prime Minister level; leading middle power governments to engage directly with the US public (for example, Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme did this over Vietnam, and helped establish the Six Nation Initiative); and both governments and civil society to contribute to the ongoing UN study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.

New conferences (all steps)

As an integral part of the need to inject urgency into nuclear disarmament, several suggestions were supported for new conferences and new use of bodies outside the existing framework of the NPT process and CD. Some examples: using the G8 summits to raise the nuclear disarmament crisis; a conference of NWFZ signatory states plus Mongolia to strengthen NWFZs and provide a forum for new initiatives; holding seminars on the margins of the CD to advance technical aspects pending agreement by the CD of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament.