International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Defense, Deterrence, or Disarmament?

The United States, Europe, and the Perspectives for Arms Control

Götz Neuneck

These days there is growing criticism from Europe concerning US foreign policy, in particular the Bush government's behavior on arms control issues. Some Europeans make the charge that the US is losing interest in international norms and treaties. Examples are the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the global land-mine ban, or the International Criminal Court (ICC).^[1] In the Middle East, the engagement of the Bush government is obviously not very successful and the important dialog with North Korea was partially interrupted. Additionally, there are diverging opinions on the issues of missile defense, the questions how to treat 'states of concern', and the development of the Common European Security and Defense Identity. In particular, there is much concern that the United States is following an new course of selfish unilateralism and becoming increasingly hegemonic.

The Bush-Administration’s antiarms control course

After the first three months in office, it is not yet clear in which direction the Bush administration will move. Most of the security issues such as nuclear reductions, military spending, force transformations, and missile defense remain speculative. An open question remains whether the Bush Administration will decide on a unilateral or a multilateral approach. Until now, the Bush administration seems to prefer weapons to international arms control agreements. 'Homeland defense' and 'global leadership' seem to be more attractive than 'arms control and cooperation'.

During the Presidential campaign 2000, the Republican Platform followed an anti-arms control course by stating that the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) "is another anachronism of obsolete strategic thinking. This treaty is not verifiable, not enforceable, and would not enable the United States to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent."^[2] Many appointees and top officials in the Bush-Administration have been opposing arms control for decades.^[3]

The New York Daily News reported an unnamed Bush foreign policy adviser as having said: "The Clinton people got intoxicated with the idea of cooperation. Those days are over. It's time for us to cooperate when we can but to put our strategic interests first. No more romance".^[4]

There are many indications that the Bush people favor the unilateral approach. The following events and rhetoric are worrisome:

The administration seems willing to overturn environmental regulations and does not accept the restrictions of the Kyoto protocol.

n The administration rejected going ahead with a protocol and the protocol negotiating process to the BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) that would have given states the right to obtain information about and inspect sites where biological weapons (BW) are suspected of being developed, produced, or used. To many observers it is contradictory that the administration warns of bioterrorism and the future BW threat on one side and refuses to take steps to reduce the threat by means of international cooperation and arms control measures on the other side.

The President declared that Russia is no longer an enemy but that it "may be a threat"^[5] Secretary of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld challenged Russian arms exports to Iran and infuriated the Russian government by saying: "Russia is an active proliferator; they are part of the problem,"^[6] without giving detailed evidence. President Bush also announced that he will withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the sake of the build-up of the planned missile shield. "I have made it clear that treaty hampers our ability to keep the peace and to develop defensive weapons necessary to defend America against the true threat of the 21st century," Bush said. "We will withdraw from the ABM treaty on our timetable at a time convenient for America," adding that he had no specific timeframe in mind.^[7]

With respect to the assistance the US gives Russia in handling the safety and nonproliferation problems of its nuclear and chemical stockpile, the White House is considering to restructure or even to end two programs: the disposition of hundreds of tons of military plutonium, and a program to shrink Russian cities that were devoted to nuclear weapons production and development. The administration wants Russia to make a financial and political commitment that it will stop the sale of conventional weaponry and nuclear expertise to Iran and other 'states of concern'.^[8]

The key Bush officials consider China as a new threat to American policy in Asia. Secretary of State Colin Powell said at his confirmation hearing: "China is a competitor and a potential regional rival,"^[9] thus rejecting the characterization of China as a 'strategic partner' prevalent under the Clinton administration.

By reevaluating the US nuclear force posture, President Bush seems to favor further cuts in nuclear arsenals. In his May 1 speech the President said that the US "can and will change the size and the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over". Unilateral force reductions are possible, but this will mean overcoming entrenched mindsets within bureaucracies. Reducing the stockpile to 2,500 warheads does not call for significant reductions in the number of delivery systems. It is also being considered to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons for use against hard and deeply buried targets such as command bunkers and WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) facilities.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has not yet been ratified by the US and China, cannot enter into force and is under additional pressure from an influential group of people who want to pave the way of a nuclear revival.^[10] The development of mini-nukes could ruin efforts to stop the spread of WMD by diplomatic means and would undermine the pledge of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the five declared NWS (Nuclear Weapons States) promised not to attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons.

During his confirmation hearing, Rumsfeld also argued that the US needs more space capabilities: "We must develop the capabilities to defend against missiles, terrorism and newer threats against our space assets and information systems." A Commission that he chaired believes that the vast array of space assets - communication, navigation, intelligence - is more and more vulnerable to "state and non-state actors hostile to the United States and its interests." Although the United States is without a real rival among space-faring nations, it warns of a "Pearl Harbor in Space". The aim of the Commission's recommendations are clear: the U.S. military must invest more in establishing a space force and must be willing to weaponize space to protect the U.S. economy as well the economy of its allies and friends. The President should "have the option to deploy weapons in space to deter threats to, and if necessary, defend against attacks on U.S. interests." The report also examines the barriers which could come from international arms restriction regimes: "There is no blanket prohibition in international law on placing or using weapons in space, applying force from space to earth, or conducting military operations in and through space."^[11] Every year, the United States blocks a resolution and serious discussions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a new treaty to prohibit weapons in space.

Missile Defense

The President and the three top security advisers - Rumsfeld, Powell, and Rice - agree in moving expeditiously toward deploying an NMD (National Missile Defense) system. Rumsfeld argued for expanding the more limited Clinton NMD approach to a "phased and layered deployment scheme that could be based on land-, sea- or space-borne systems." Such an expanded missile defense system will certainly lead to more delays in deployment. The first step toward an NMD system, the construction of a radar site on Shemya island in Alaska, was postponed until next year. Rumsfeld and Powell agreed that the 1972 ABM Treaty should be altered or canceled because it is "no longer relevant" (Powell) or "ancient history" (Rumsfeld).

The ABM Treaty permits deployment of up to 100 interceptors, but it un-equivocally imposes the obligation "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense." The Treaty also prohibits space-based or mobile systems which have the capability to intercept strategic missiles. Indeed, nuclear disarmament as undertaken in the START framework is inconceivable without ABM restrictions. In this concept, strategic weapons can only be reduced when all parties involved are certain that even a small number of nuclear warheads would suffice to effectively counteract a massive attack. As soon as one party protects itself against the retaliatory strike by means of a missile defense system, this stability is threatened. Fundamental nuclear arms control would be seriously impacted and might even break down.

In addition, US missile defense research also deals with Theater Missile Defense (TMD) intended to protect against tactical missiles. Some of these systems, however, are designed with capabilities which might in theory give them significant strategic capabilities.^[12]

On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he would leave the decision to deploy the planned NMD system to his successor. He also said that "the technology of the system is promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven."^[13] He also made clear that the technology was not yet ready, that a deployment would undermine U.S. security and that the U.S. is pursuing diplomatic efforts to reduce the threats from the so-called 'states of concern'.^[14]

It is doubtful that building a missile shield can be justified by the so-called emerging missile states such as North Korea and Iran. In the view of most European countries, the threat of ballistic missiles is not increasing significantly. And even so, the threat by 'rogue states' cannot be completely eliminated by implementation of a missile defense.

A crucial question is also how effective a future NMD system would be. Intercepting high-speed warheads which travel at a speed of 5,000 m per second or more with a missile is an enormous technical challenge. So far, the recent test program experienced a number of delays and failures. Experts doubt that the NMD system can work at all. Technical analysis shows that the current technology cannot distinguish between enemy warheads and decoys.^[15] The key factor in determining the effectiveness of NMD will be the ability to overcome efforts to counter the system. The current system will be ineffective against the threat because of feasible countermeasures that confuse the 'hit-tokill' interceptors.^[16] Countermeasures are designed to overwhelm or deceive a defense system and have been a fundamental problem for any ballistic missile defense from the beginning of the missile age. These countermeasures require technology much less sophisticated than is needed to build a long-range missile in the first place.^[17]

Over the past decade, the United States has spent more than US$ 100 billion in its attempt to create an effective protection shield against incoming ballistic missiles. Since 1983,^[18] tests have been conducted, of which only four were reported to be successful. 18 And even after the latest successful test there is good reason for considerable doubt as to whether the result is worth the effort: technologically, it is not feasible to achieve 100% protection against the nuclear threat, which furthermore is not necessarily a ballistic missile threat.

NMD and the implications for European security^[19]

If the US proceeds in developing its various NMD and TMD systems, this will have four dimensions with different implications for Europe:^[20]

1.   On the global level, START II implementation is currently blocked by the Russian Duma's insistence that its implementation must be coupled with the preservation of the ABM Treaty. Future progress in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is dependent on Chinese cooperation, which in turn is blocked by the refusal of the United States, unilaterally, to agree to start negotiations on outer space. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty and NMD deployment could lead to a new arms race between the US, Russia and China, which could also affect India and Pakistan.

2.   On the transatlantic level, a breakdown of the ABM Treaty could have serious repercussions for the NATO alliance. As noted by the annual IISS Strategic Survey, allied disagreements over the ABM Treaty are part of a wider phenomenon in which "the bridge of communication [between the EU and the US] seems to have broken down and, unless some way is found to reconstruct it, the loss of trust could have a profound impact on the alliance's cohesion."^[21]

3.   On the intra-European level, there exist ramifications of US unilateralism in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and deploying NMD for both the nuclear arsenals of France and Britain and independent European defense efforts. An unraveling of nuclear weapons arms control could pressure Paris and London to increase their nuclear arsenals, while additional expenditures on missile defense could undermine efforts to develop a robust and autonomous European security policy.

4.   On the regional level, missile threats emanate from such countries as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or Syria. While most Europeans do not yet see specific ballistic missile threats from these countries, it is also true that serious analysis on future threats and adequate responses is only just beginning in Europe. The Europeans need to develop joint positions on future missile threats, taking into account specific European factors (different notions of vulnerability from the US, constrained defense budgets, fewer global military commitments) that can produce positive policies for dealing with the proliferation of missiles and WMDs.

So far, a common threat analysis does not exist. To understand this, one should also stress some European characteristics which could explain some differences between the US and the European position.

1.   Vulnerability is a normal condition for Europe, as it has been a continuous reality over the last fifty years. Especially during the Cold War, Germany was a designated nuclear battlefield.

2.   The Europeans have shrinking defense budgets and have not yet found their proposed European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

3.   They have fewer military responsibilities and commitments around the world than the Americans.

These points together create a different conception of interests with respect to the assessment of future threats. Additionally, one should bear in mind that the geography, the dense traffic, and the multi-ethnic population in Europe could create many threat scenarios with WMDs.

It is readily acknowledged by most Europeans that they have limited leverage when it comes to influencing a US NMD decision. Apart from giving consent to the upgrading of US early warning radars in the UK and Greenland, the main point of leverage will be in pushing for the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the continued involvement of Russia in the global disarmament process.

If there were an official European position one could sum it up as follows: the Europeans would welcome an agreement on the subject between Russia and the US. Russia should be included in any future agreement, and future steps should be accompanied by further arms control and disarmament steps. The greatest fear is that Russia could withdraw in its own military fortress by leaving arms control treaties such as the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) or the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty.^[22]

In sum, among various concrete steps that could be taken are the following:

1.   the sharing of information on missile-related activities and capabilities;

2.   the creation of a global early warning system to monitor and share information on civilian and military missile launches;

3.   making available satellite launch capabilities;

4.   increased financial contributions to the control and destruction of Russian fissile material;

5.   investing more in preventive diplomacy in troubled regions where the ballistic missile threat is the greatest, such as the Middle East; and

6.   working to establish a new ballistic missile arms control regime.

Nuclear disarmament in a stalemate

A decade after the end of the Cold War the danger of a massive use of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia against each other has now greatly diminished. As compared to the stockpiles of the Soviet Union (45,000 nuclear weapons in 1982) and the United States (33.000 nuclear weapons in 1967), some progress has been made in downsizing to the present arsenals. Each side still deploys some 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, each of which is roughly ten times more destructive than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Twenty of these warheads targeted on cities would kill 25 million Americans or Russians.^[23] Additionally, the US retains nuclear components to deploy another 5,000 warheads. These enormous destruction capabilities increase the risk of unauthorized or accidental use or theft of nuclear weapons and the fear of a rapid breakout from treaty restrictions.

And the additional dangers are "many and diverse."^[24] The dangers of a regional nuclear war has increased especially in South Asia where a regional nuclear and missile arms race continues. Due to the fragmented Russian early warning system, the high alert status of the nuclear forces, and the risk of miscalculations, the danger of an unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons has risen. It is believed that the dangers of proliferation are increasing due to the proliferation of relevant material and knowledge. The economic situation in Russia also raised the specter that nuclear warheads or material might be stolen.

In the field of arms control and international security much momentum was lost by the lacking will to further reduce the nuclear stockpile. The five nuclear weapon states failed to commit to any timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons at the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences. The Clinton administration lost a Senate vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the US Senate failed to ratify it in October 1999. Some commentators say that the US Congress completely lost interest in further improving and developing existing and future arms control agreements. The entry-into-force of START II remains in doubt even after its ratification in April 2000 by the Russian Duma, because the implementation is coupled with the preservation of the ABM Treaty, which is not acceptable to the US Senate.

Concerning their capabilities, further "sins of omission" can be stated:^[25]

The US and Russia failed to remove all strategic nuclear forces from short-reaction-time alert.

Reserve strategic warheads, all tactical warheads, and stocks of bomb-usable materials remain outside formal controls and would remain so even under START II.

Both the US and Russia are retaining enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in military reserve to permit a rapid return to Cold War levels of nuclear armament. At least 100 tons of military plutonium and 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) are surplus to the Russian and American weapon programs.

In this situation, the US moves toward a unilateral renunciation of the 1972 ABM Treaty imperiling the foundation of nuclear arms control to pursue an unworkable defense.

In the last decade, both nuclear superpowers, the US and Russia, failed to proceed with more drastic nuclear arms reduction, greater transparency in the nuclear sector and a far-reaching dismantlement process. John Holden put it in a nutshell: "[The superpowers] failed, in short, to seize the opportunity to devalue the currency of nuclear weapons in international relations. They had the chance to devalue that currency, but didn't do it."^[26]

The challenge ahead can only be met through arms control and disarmament steps. Non-proliferation and arms control should be the first priority in reducing the threat, not ineffective defenses.

In the field of security policy, the gap between the Unites States and Europe looks greater than it was 10 years ago. At first one has to consider that both continents have different priorities: the US is focusing on its role as a global superpower and emphasizes military restructuring, missile defense, and the 'revolution in military affairs', whereas the Europeans are only just starting to create their own defense identity without directing many resources to this endeavor. European and Americans define burden-sharing and cooperation differently. While the Americans emphasize the geopolitical and the military dimensions in particular in their search for new adversaries, the Europeans concentrate on economics and the integration of their continent. The priorities of the European Union are these days shifting towards creating its own European rapid reaction force to deal with regional conflicts and humanitarian crises. One reason for this is without doubt Europe's experience in the Balkan crises over the last decade.^[27] The Europeans were also frustrated by the widening military technological gap between the US and Europe, especially in the fields of air power, communication, reconnaissance, and equipment transportation. The 'Defense Capability Initiative' was created to close this gap between the US and the European NATO forces. Reception of this initiative in the USA was lukewarm although officially the key officials supported it.

As William Wallace in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs explained: unilateral approaches carry costs: "Even if they are successfully imposed on foreign states, they build up resistance to cooperation in other areas where U.S. interests are at stake". The multilateral approach, on the other hand, "requires negotiations and compromise with partners who respect American leadership and whose contributions American policymakers respect."^[28] One should not forget that many of the mentioned initiatives such as the test ban or the arms control idea were American inventions or were launched by the US. Hopefully, American society will remember that and will not take the wrong course toward a selfish and autistic unilateralism.