International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

Some Practical Remarks on Missile Defense and Space Weapons From a Regional Perspective

Hiromichi Umebayashi

Since there has been extensive expert analysis and discussion about the dangerous impact of the US missile defense plan and the US-Japan joint research of TMD (Theater Missile Defense) upon the regional security of East Asia, and the present author has recently added a small piece in a book to be published by a co-sponsoring organization of this workshop,^[1] this note focuses on issues relating to the future problems to be addressed to reverse the situation.

A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone approach to the long-standing regional security problems

In most of the issue-specific discussions about the regional security agenda, such as TMD, with officials of the Foreign Ministry of Japan, NGO end the conversation with a renewed recognition of the deepness of their distrust of the Asian partners.

Since long before the missile defense issues came on the agenda, the weakness of the regional security arrangement in East Asia has been a keen subject among concerned citizens of the region. Joseph Nye, then Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, stated in his East Asia security strategy report in 1995 that the stability and prosperity of the region had been secured thanks to "American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial United States forces,"^[2] and he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to maintain a forward presence in the region at the level of 100,000 troops. However, this very necessity of continued presence of U.S. 100,000 troops was considered by those citizens to be a clear evidence that such security arrangement had not been successful and would not be sustainable.

The existence of U.S.-focused military alliances and forward-deployment of U.S. forces in East Asia and the Pacific has been a major factor to prevent non-military security dialogs among China, Japan, and the two Koreas. It has enforced, or at best preserved, the division among these key nations which was created during World War II and the Korean War. Even at present, the principal source of threat perception of people in this region is attributed to mutual distrust, deepened under the lasting division. A policy that could contribute to confidence building in other parts of the world often does not work as such in this region. For instance, China's constant unconditional security assurance not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states has not been accepted by the government of Japan because of fundamental distrust.

The U.S. NMD (National Missile Defense) plan and U.S.-Japan joint TMD development will enhance and perpetuate just the same regional relationship of distrust. While it is obviously important to resist such disastrous attempts, the real solution of the problem from the perspective of the region is to be found in an approach where people of the region and their governments can effectively establish a mechanism to create confidence and a security-building dialogue among them. Considering the nature of prevailing distrust, it is essential that large parts of civil society are engaged in such a process.

Since the mid-nineties, several initiatives to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, including one suggested by the present author,^[3] have been proposed as an appropriate approach in this direction. Although it does not address the missile control issues directly, the process will involve opportunities to discuss them, with a verifiable nuclear weapon-free zone as a shared foundation.

In this respect, a promising development occurred in late January 2001. An NGO conference was held in Seoul to establish the Preparatory Committee for the "International Network to Promote a Northeast Asia NWFZ." The "Conference for Peace and NWFZ in Northeast Asia," was hosted by the School of International Studies, Catholic University of Korea, and was sponsored by the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, the Peace Depot Japan, and Gensuikin Japan.

Influencing Japan's BMD policy

The position of Japan regarding BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) is not so firm as it appears. With regard to NMD, Japan has not yet issued an official statement since the Bush Administration took the office. However, if Japan remains consistent with its nuclear disarmament policy, in particular with its publicly announced emphasis on the salience of the START process and entry-into-force of the CTBT, Japan will have to continue to argue for the preservation of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty so that both issues may remain relevant. The following Foreign Minister Yohei Kono's statement at the UN Millennium Assembly in September 2000, which welcomed Clinton's postponement of NMD deployment decision, reflects such position of Japan.

"I highly appreciate the final document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference this spring, since it contains practical steps to be taken in the future in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. I also appreciate the postponement by the U.S. Government of its decision to deploy a National Missile Defense, as a result of prudent consideration with an emphasis on a further dialogue on this important issue. Japan hopes that this announcement will inspire a further deepening of the discussion on issues surrounding NMD. I hope other countries respond to this move by taking actions to avoid a vicious circle of an arms race, and to create a benevolent circle toward nuclear disarmament."

With regard to the TMD joint research, the apparently firm position of Japan is based upon its allegation that TMD is not linked to NMD and that its co-research will jeopardize neither the ABM Treaty nor the processes for START and CTBT. However, it gets ever clearer that the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD), an upper tier sea-based system of TMD, which is the theme of US-Japan joint research, can be integrated into a comprehensive NMD in the future. There is no ABM demarcation agreement between US and Russia concerning the NTWD. Therefore, the government of Japan is very much vulnerable to the criticism that Japan's involvement in the NTWD research contradicts its longstanding policy to push the START and CTBT processes.

Thus, with regard to both NMD and TMD policies, Japan will be placed in a hard position to maintain apparent consistency with its nuclear disarmament policy. This is even more so after the NPT 2000 Review Conference, because the phrase "the early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible" is contained in the 13 practical steps in the final document adopted by consensus. Since the last UN General Assembly (UNGA), Japan started to propose a new UNGA resolution to press the implementation of these 13 steps. If international voices pointing out such contradiction reach Japan, it will be influential in encouraging and stimulating policy debates in Japan.

Amendment of the Outer Space Treaty

One of the most serious consequences of the US NMD plan is to trigger an arms race in space. Obviously, there is already a race about the military use of satellites. It is the age of an arms race with space-based weapons. The Space-Based Laser (SBL) is one such weapon that is already studied by the US. In the Clinton's version of 'limited' NMD, all the destructive weapons were to be placed on the surface of the earth. However, there is yet no concrete plan announced regarding Bush's more 'comprehensive' NMD. It will inevitably depend upon the technological development, but it is very probable that it will embrace space-based weapons.

It is urgently requested for the international community to pursue a legal instrument to ban any space-based weapons. Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which has been ratified by about 95 states and signed by 27 more states, only weapons of mass destruction are prohibited in space. Article IV of the Treaty reads, "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner."

However, the Treaty stipulates that it can be amended by majority support of the State Parties. The amendment is provided in Article XV, which reads: "Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it."

According to this provision, it might be possible to amend the Treaty so as to ban any space-based weapons as support by a majority of the 95 State Parties seems to be a feasible goal. Although strong public voices will have to be mobilized in order to get key countries to accept the amendment, no doubt it is necessary to endeavor for it for the sake of the future of this planet.

This paper was presented at the Santa Barbara Workshop "Moving Beyond Missile Defense", 19 - 21 March 2001.