International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

The Missile Race in the Middle East

Is There A Way Out?

Reuven Pedatzur

Most of the countries in the Middle East are armed with ballistic missiles. Any political agreement which intends to resolve territorial disputes will necessarily consider also the control, limitation, or dismantling of these weapons.^[1]

Over the years, the emergence of certain unwritten 'rules of the game' dictated ballistic missile use in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The policy not to resort to the use of these missiles, even though both sides possessed them, capable of striking deep inside enemy territory, strengthened the reliance on these rules. This tacit understanding on the non-use of missiles, especially against civilian targets and even in the most precarious situations, conferred on these weapons a reserved status, thereby considerably diminishing their threat on the battlefield.

Before the Gulf War, Israeli policy had been based on the premise that the probability of a missile attack against Israel was very low. But now, after the Gulf War and the launching of the Iraqi missiles against targets in Israel, any future defense policy must be based on the opposite assumption: that an attack is entirely probable, and that the reasonable possibility of one on the Israeli rear can no longer be ignored.^[2]

Therefore the ballistic missile threat becomes an onerous burden on the Israeli defense establishment, which must accordingly develop appropriate operational responses. An enormous allocation of funds is bound up in the development of appropriate operational responses. Removing the missile threat or succeeding in containing it, then, become critical objectives of the negotiations between Israel and its Middle Eastern neighbors. ...

Regional control of ballistic missiles - disarmament efforts in the 1990s

The plans for ballistic missile control must be based on a regional approach, allowing for differences in the conditions, the players, and political and military considerations. The regional profile of the Middle East suggests that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reach consensus on control, or the limitation of the ballistic missile forces in the region.^[3]

To focus solely on proliferation is not enough; the traditional arms control approach of limiting numbers and types of weapon must be supplemented by measures addressing the most destabilizing factors in the Middle East. The importance countries ascribe to their missile forces is one of the vital considerations in devising arms control policies. Three approaches have traditionally guided efforts to control missile forces:

1.  the imposition of quantitative and, less frequently, qualitative constraints on missiles;
2.  limitations on the way states deploy missiles and conduct operations; and
3.  elimination of entire categories of missile.

Six factors contribute to the attempt to arrive at a plan based on these traditional approaches:

1.  the number of players;
2.  the short ranges of the missiles;
3.  the 'nuclear catch';
4.  suppliers who do not abide by the 'rules';
5.  the determination of the players; and
6.  the influence of missile defense systems.

The number of players

At least ten countries in the region possess ballistic missiles (almost half the number of countries world-wide that have them), and at least six of those have equipped their missiles with chemical, and/or biological, warheads. It would be difficult to create a control plan that would address the interests of all the players. If only one country in the region decided not to take part in the arms control effort, it could be enough to doom any plan to control or limit the region's missile arsenals.

Given the nature of the players in the Middle East, their attitudes towards using weapons to resolve conflicts, and the great number of conflicts in the region, the likelihood that they will give up the missile option is slim. From the Israeli point of view it would be unacceptable to reach an agreement on the limitation or elimination of its ballistic missile arsenal that did not include all the other countries in the region.

The first issue in the consideration of any arms control agreement in any region is the scope of the region to be included. In conflictual regions, such as the Middle East, the core region is defined in terms of potential or actual states that might be involved in military confrontation in which nuclear weapons or threats could play a role. In comparison with the other areas in which regional agreements have been created, the Middle East is particularly complex.^[4]

To be effective, an agreement would have to include all the member states of the Arab League (twenty two), as well as Iran and Israel, and stretch from Algeria in North Africa to Iran and the Persian Gulf. The large number and diversity of necessary participants, in itself, is a significant obstacle to agreement.^[5]

Some of the countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, do not take part in the peace process, while others such as Syria will not join in the multilateral talks; it will be impossible, however, to reach any agreement on arms control out of the context of the peace process.

Throughout the 1980s, Israel and the Arab states were divided on major issues of the process. While Israel insisted that the negotiations take place through direct face-to-face talks as part of a regional peace process, the continuing refusal of the Arab states (with the notable very important exception of Egypt) to end the state of war with Israel created an impasse. This basic obstacle was reduced, to some degree, in 1991, following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, in which many of the parties participated (with the exception of Iraq, Iran, and Libya).

The Madrid Conference led to the establishment of a number of multilateral working groups, including one on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS), which, for the first time, provided a format for direct negotiations on such issues. However, the refusal of Syria to participate, as well as the absence of Iran, Iraq, and Libya, limit the ability of ACRS to consider regional security issues such as the idea of control, monitoring, and disarmament of ballistic missiles in any detail. Without the active participation of all of these states in this or a similar forum, it is difficult to proceed towards any significant regional agreements.^[6]

Another factor is the great number of missiles already existing in the region, estimated at between 1,200 and 2,000. Because of these figures, the number of countries involved, and the diversity of the territory in which the missiles are deployed, the ability to verify compliance with a control regime would be very limited.

The Middle East poses some very difficult verification requirements. There are a number of diverse political systems, ranging from open democracies to closed and tightly controlled dictatorships. In the case of closed societies, particularly those with relatively large territorial extents, it is possible to hide weapons development and production programs from international inspectors. The Iraqi case is a very good example. Both IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) inspectors have been attempting to determine the extent of the Iraqi capability since 1991. For almost eight years, the Iraqi government has been able to keep significant capabilities and information hidden from the international inspectors, despite the agreement guaranteeing access and cooperation as specified in UN Security Council 687.

The proximity of the countries

Because of the number of players, any imposing of limits on the range of missiles would be complicated. The western border of Iraq is less than 500 km from Tel Aviv, and because Iraq's western part is largely uninhabited, a retaliating Israeli missile would need a range of about 800 km to reach Baghdad. Lowering the limit to 300 km in order to solve the problem between Israel and Iraq, however, would not solve the problem between Israel and Syria or between Israel and Saudi Arabia, nor eliminate missiles that these countries could use against each other. Indeed, "the proximity of adversarial states in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf would make it difficult to negotiate range limitation low enough to be militarily meaningful."^[7]

The Israeli strategic situation is essentially unique. In the Arab-Israeli conflict zone, Israel is a small state, and geographic, demographic, military, and economic asymmetries have played a central role in the development of security policies and strategic culture. In area, Israel consists of less than 21,000 square kilometers (excluding the West Bank and the Golan Heights), compared to 1 million square kilometers for Egypt and 186,000 square kilometers for Syria. This small size, and the extremely narrow area between the Eastern border and the Mediterranean (15 kilometers in the pre-1967 borders), leave Israel without the strategic depth necessary for absorbing armored and air attacks, and without the ability to recover and respond.^[8]

Major strategic and populated assets in the northern part of the country are in the range of unguided artillery rockets (like the Frog-7, with a range of 70 - 80 km) or even long range Katyushas (with a range of 40 km), which Syria has in its possession. In October 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, Frog-7 rockets were fired by the Syrians at Ramat David military airfield, located only 55 km from the border. The distance from the Israeli-Syrian border to the Haifa metropolitan area (which contains a large number of strategic assets) is only about 65 km. Tiberias, a large city in the north, is barely 22 km from the border.

Because of their geographic proximity to each other, the countries in the region would face a nuclear threat so diversified and numerous that no defenses will ever provide them with perfect protection. The relative proximity of major population centers to the front in many parts of the Middle East accords strategic significance to ballistic missiles of the type that in Europe was considered tactical in range and application. One of the implications of the constricted geography of Israel is that the distinction between 'tactical' and 'strategic' missile threats is not valid.^[9]

The 'Nuclear Catch'

Israeli nuclear hegemony makes it impossible not to link Arab ballistic missiles and

Israel regards its nuclear weapons - unacknowledged but generally agreed to exist - as the only means to achieve 'total deterrence'. Given the strategic conditions in the Middle East, and the fact that Israel continues to suffer disparities in virtually every standard categorization of national power components vis-a-vis the Arab world, Israel refuses to give up its 'last resort weapon', even if the result would be an Arab missile-free zone.^[10]

In January 1996, former Prime Minister and IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Chief of Staff Ehud Barak, declared that in the absence of proven and reliable regional peace agreements, "Israel's nuclear policy, as it is perceived in the eyes of the Arabs, has not changed, will not change and cannot change, because it is a fundamental stand on a matter of survival which impacts all the generations to come."^[11]

Thus this 'nuclear catch' will place an unavoidable, and probably impossible, obstacle in the path of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The 'nuclear catch' will become a much more complex and problematic obstacle if and when other countries in the Middle East will acquire nuclear weapons.

Suppliers who do not abide by the 'rules'

As long as there are countries that do not accept the rules of the arms control 'game' there will be a source of missile supply. China and North Korea, both missile producers, ignore the mild pressure that the USA applies on them and continue to supply ballistic missiles to Middle Eastern countries.^[12]

Development efforts, in many cases fueled by foreign assistance, have led to new capabilities, as illustrated by Iran's Shahab-3 launches in July 1998 and July 2000 and North Korea's Taepo Dong-1 space launch attempt in August 1998. Also disturbing, some countries that traditionally have been recipients of missile technologies have become exporters.^[13]

The Clinton administration acknowledged in May 1999 that Chinese companies are still providing assistance to Iran's intermediate ballistic missile program. On May 14, responding to a congressional report by Senator Richard Shelby about Chinese proliferation, State Department spokesman James Rubin said that the Clinton administration is "concerned, in many respects, about certain Chinese entities that may provide technology - especially to Iran and Pakistan" and "will continue to work with China to bring its policies and practices more and more in line with international norms."

The Senate Intelligence Committee report said: "PRC [People's Republic of China] is one of the world's worst proliferators of missiles and missile technology to potential U.S. adversaries and to other unstable parts of the world." It also noted that Chinese missiles "may now benefit from U.S. technology," referring to allegations that the Clinton administration and certain U.S. aerospace companies allowed unlicensed and unauthorized transfers of technology to China.^[14]

One of the sources for missiles and missile technology is Russia. The US House of Representatives discussed the issue, during a debate on the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997: "The Committee notes that Russian entities have already provided Iran with missile components and critical know-how and technological support... The Committee notes that, according to open sources, early this year U.S. and Israeli intelligence reports revealed a technology transfer between Russia and Iran involving construction of a delivery system for the Russian SS 4 and Iranian Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 long-range missiles. Successive reports detailed contracts signed between numerous Russian entities and Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) to help produce liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, a wind tunnel for missile development and related technologies."

"The Committee notes, again according to open sources, the following entities have been involved in missile technology transfers to Iran:

Defense Industries Organization (DIO), an Iranian agency charged with development, production and procurement of military technology;

Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), part of the DIO responsible for development and production of ballistic missiles and related technology;

Inor, a Russian scientific and production center implicated in transfer to SHIG of materials used in missile construction;

Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, implicated in collaboration with SHIG on wind tunnel construction;

Russian State Corporation for Export and Import on Armament and Military Equipment (Rosvoorouzhenie);

Bauman Institute, a leading Russian scientific research center;

NPO Trud, a Russian rocket motor manufacturer;

Polyus, a leading Russian developer of laser technology; and

Russian Space Agency, headed by Yuri Koptev."^[15]

Entities in Russia, North Korea, and China supply the largest amount of ballistic missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using this assistance to develop new ballistic missiles and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of existing systems. China provided complete CSS-8 SRBMs (Short-Range Ballistic Missiles), North Korean equipment and technical assistance helped Iran establish the capability to produce Scud SRBMs, and Russian assistance accelerated Iranian missile development.^[16]

The determination of the players

Any arms limitation regime, whether global, regional, or bilateral, is only as strong as the verification and safeguards systems that are implemented. For example, the 1972 Biological Warfare Convention has been ineffective, reflecting the absence of any verification system. The NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) has failed in areas where verification and safeguards were too weak to deter violations, as in the case of Iraq and North Korea, and, it is increasingly feared, now Iran. The IAEA in general, and the safeguards and verification system in particular, are vulnerable to political influence, allowing states to exclude inspectors from some areas, and to manipulate the system in a way which would prevent or delay the "timely detection of violations" and allow states to produce weapons before an international response. The IAEA Board of Governors, which appoints IAEA officials and must consider whether to report cases of suspected safeguards violations for action to the United Nations Security Council, is a political body, with representation based on politically defined groups. Some states, such as Israel, are systematically excluded from these groups, and therefore from representation on the Board of Governors.^[17]

The conclusion is that any country determined enough to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction will succeed in doing so, regardless of the international treaties and control regimes. The cases of Iraq before the Gulf War and Iran are the proof of this conclusion.

The influence of missile defense systems

The implications of the deployment of missile defenses by the countries of the Middle East must rely on theoretical and strategic analysis. One of the most important discussions should refer to the influence of missile defenses on regional stability. Deploying of missile defenses in the Middle East will bring a dramatic change in the 'balance of terror', which was created by the arsenal of ballistic missiles and had a significant stabilizing effect.

Proponents and opponents of the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) had already conducted the discussion on the implications of missile defenses on the stability of nuclear deterrence. We could take the main arguments of this discussion and use them in the analysis of the implications of missile defenses on the future stability of the Middle East.

Proponents of SDI have criticized opponents of the defensive concept by arguing that they are hostage to the 'outdated' doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and that it is this that forms their opposition to SDI.^[18] But this criticism is grossly misplaced. Critics of strategic defenses base their case on the impossibility of escaping a MAD world.^[19]

Using the same rationale, critics of missile defenses in the Middle East base their case on the impossibility of escaping a 'balance of terror' in the region, or a regional version of MAD. The emphasis of Mid-Eastern MAD will be on deterrence. We can use Geoffrey Howe's defense of the doctrine of MAD, based on "the clear recognition of mutual vulnerability. In my view the 'D' [in the acronym MAD] should stand for Mutual Assured Deterrence, not destruction."^[20]

One result of the deployment of missile defenses would be 'the operational option' - to increase the stockpile of launchers and to increase the rate of fire so as to overwhelm defensive systems. Another 'operational' option could be to acquire cruise missiles of sufficiently effective types that could defeat both air defenses and missile defense. That is to say that the deployment of missile defenses in the Middle East would result in increasing the number of deployed missile warheads and launchers above the current level, and in more emphasis on nuclear forces, in order to maintain a minimal penetration capability.^[21]

Countries that regard their ballistic missiles as their strategic defense and deterrence will upgrade these existing missiles to defeat TMD systems through countermeasures, either indigenously or with assistance from friendly industrial states.^[22]

Another outcome of deployment of defenses would be the growing danger of launching pre-emptive wars by countries that attribute significant strategic value to their missile forces. In order to preserve their advantage, they might carry out a pre-emptive strike, before the completion of the development of the defense system by their rival. For example, Syria, a country whose ballistic missiles are a cornerstone of national defense policy, may embark upon a spoiling war to influence the peace process or to regain territory before Israel's Arrow system becomes operational.^[23]

Regarding all these implications and consequences, development of missile defenses could precipitate regional crises and generate renewed arms races between missile owners and TMD users. The introduction of TMD systems to the Middle East will disrupt existing military balances and instigate new instabilities. It could pulverize the delicate strategic deterrence in the region.

The present control regime

In 1987, the USA joined seven other countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), supposed to become an efficient tool to restrict exports of missiles and missile technology to the Third World. The problems of defining and implementing even the MTCR's modest restrictions demonstrate the complexities of attempts to co-ordinate activities among the countries that joined the regime.^[24]

The main problem with the MTCR is that it concentrates on the export of missile systems and technologies to states with nuclear weapons programs, permitting supplier and recipient states to benefit commercially from legitimate technology transfer. There is no clear definition of legitimate or illegitimate technologies. The MTCR also applies only to missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg warhead over a range greater than 300 km. Thus missiles such as the SS-21, Mar-350 (the Israeli system with a range of 90 km), Iran-130 (with a range of about 130 km), Lance, and FROG-7 are not covered. The SS-21, for example, is more accurate and thus more effective than the longer-range missiles such as the Scud B and At-Hussein.^[25]

By decreasing the range of the Scud B (300 km), a country could exclude this missile from the MTCR. The MTCR is a framework in which the supplier governments and not the recipients must take responsibility for the end-use of any transferred technologies, so as to ensure that they are not employed for missile building. However, there is no central coordinating body which can oversee the uniformity of the application of the MTCR guidelines. Neither is there a body capable of administering sanctions against those countries, businesses, or individuals who contravene them. The decision to transfer equipment remains under the sole jurisdiction of the supplying government.^[26]

The MTCR is largely irrelevant to Israel's missile program because of its maturity. It has test fired its Jericho II medium-range missile and has placed satellites in orbit before and since the MTCR was announced.^[27]

The successes of the MTCR unfortunately appear to have been relatively few and quite modest. Indeed, in the Middle East the proliferation of missiles and qualitative improvements of many existing systems have continued.^[28]

The Bush initiative

The first step toward an arms control plan after the Gulf War was the Bush initiative of 29 May 1991. This proposed a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles by states in the region, with a view to their ultimate elimination from national arsenals. Suppliers would also step up efforts to co-ordinate export licensing for equipment, technology, and services that could be used to manufacture surface-to-surface missiles. Export licenses would be provided only for peaceful end-uses.^[29]

As in the case of the MTCR, the scope and the exact definitions of the Bush proposal are unclear. Indications are that a surface-to-surface missile could be taken to include short-range tactical weapons, such as anti-tank weapons, as well as long-range systems such as the Scud B and the Israeli Jericho missile. Whether long-range artillery rockets, such as the FROG-7 with a range of 70 km, would be banned is unclear.^[30]

Following the Bush initiative, the P-5 states (the USA, Russia, the UK, France, and China), which are also the five principal arms suppliers, held a meeting in order to translate the vague plan into concrete guidelines for a new policy. The participants in the Paris meeting, held in July 1991, issued a joint communiqué calling for the establishment of "a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East". This included a ban on ground-to-ground missiles. The missile freeze proposal provided no guidance on how to deal with indigenous missile development programs or on how a ban would affect local producers in the short or the long term.

The apprehension is that the P-5 group is paying lip service to the idea of arms control in the Middle East, without the intention to act decisively in order to achieve this goal. A further study would also envision pragmatic approaches, which would encourage the deeds of the P-5 to match their hitherto merely noble statements.

A regional control mechanism

The plans for ballistic missile control must be based on a regional approach: the conditions, the players, and the political and military considerations are different from region to region. The basic conditions and the regional developments in the Middle East suggest that it will be a complicated if not an impossible task to reach an agreed plan for the control or limitation of ballistic missile forces in the region.^[31]

In his statement to the 1996 United Nations General Assembly, Israel’s Foreign Minister David Levi declared: "After peaceful relations and reconciliation have been established among all states in the region, Israel will endeavor to establish in the Middle East a Zone Free of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, based on mutual and effective verification. Negotiations to establish such a zone will commence following the signing of bilateral peace accords between Israel and all states in the region.^[32]

The need for co-operation

Past attempts to attain the full co-operation of the P-5 group have failed. The divergent interests of the parties made it very difficult to achieve consensus. This is most evident in the case of China, which, although a regular participator in the discussions of the major suppliers, persists in selling ballistic missiles and technology to countries in the region.

Only control and limitation agreements that will be implemented by the P-5 states would be practicable. Each one of these five nations could violate any agreement for controlling the supply of missiles, equipment and technology. However, additional supplier countries such as India, Brazil, Argentina, Pakistan, and Germany could influence the implementation of any future agreements. Therefore, the consent of every one of these suppliers to all the details of future agreements would be a critical prerequisite for the success of a ballistic missile control regime in the Middle East.

A Middle Eastern ABM Treaty

The prospective introduction of TMD systems could compel regional ballistic missile powers to opt for accommodation and peaceful settlement of conflicts, if they judge the other options to be either untenable or too expensive.

An arms control agreement similar to the ABM Treaty is also possible: unilateral or bilateral limitations on types and deployment areas of missile defenses. The countries in the region could adopt the purpose of the ABMTreaty, as stated in its Preamble: "Effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile system would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war, [and] would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms."

This article is an abridged version of a paper presented at the Santa Barbara Workshop "Moving Beyond Missile Defense", 19 - 21 March 2001.