International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

Chinese Perspective on National Missile Defense

Dingli Shen

The U.S. ballistic missile defense

Ballistic missile defense has drawn heated debate in the international community in the recent years. On the one hand, the U.S. has made it a national policy to develop a limited ballistic missile defense program, with a deployment decision to be made by the Administration of George W. Bush.^[1] On the other hand, the U.S. missile defense build-up has been much criticized by other countries. It is often argued that missile defense would, if unchecked, tilt the balance of power and therefore affect the international political and security order.

Indeed, there may well be a genuine concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other types of delivery means. Coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation presents a major challenge to international security and stability. This was manifest during the second Gulf War of 1991, when Scuds that were fired against Saudi Arabia and Israel gained in psychological importance. Ever since then, more and longer-range missile flight tests have been conducted in South Asia and Northeast Asia.^[2] While the countries concerned may have reason to acquire missiles for their defense, such a proliferation trend does not bode well for global or regional stability.

Ballistic missile proliferation has thus raised concern among states. There are three kinds of responses. First, denying the intention of those who might seek to acquire such delivery vehicles. This would require the creation of a more secure environment in order to reduce the incentive to acquire them. Second, denying the availability of missile-related technology due to transfer, if denial of intention fails to work. Third, establishing a certain level of ballistic missile defense as a protection against incidental and/or unauthorized attack, or a limited intentional attack with ballistic missiles.

In this context, it is not impossible to understand the need for a limited missile defense, if it is truly limited, especially for a global power as the United States, which has vast overseas presence and interests, which in turn could invite attack.

In fact, the U.S. has never given up its attempt to build various missile defense systems. The U.S. set out to build the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile program in 1967 against China's nascent nuclear deterrent.^[3] For the last two decades, the U.S. government has persistently pursued missile defense. The Reagan Administration launched its 'Strategic Defense Initiative', a land- and space-based multi-layer missile defense system that was never successfully developed. The Bush Administration converted the 'Star Wars' dream into a 'Global Protection Against Limited Strikes' (GPALS). The Clinton Administration has decided to continue ballistic missile defense, with components of both 'National Missile Defense' (NMD) and 'Theater Missile Defense' (TMD). Now the George W. Bush's new administration has committed to furthering the NMD development.

This article addresses China's position on a missile non-proliferation regime and its concern on National Missile Defense. It is suggested that China and the U.S. address their respective security concerns and seek a co-operative solution in missile non-proliferation and missile defense issues.

China and the missile non-proliferation regime

Over the last decade, China has been increasingly exposed to a periphery that is prone to missile proliferation. Its key neighboring states either have a formidable missile arsenal, a significant missile program, a fast developing missile capability, or an alliance with a nuclear superpower. As such, missile proliferation has clearly affected China's international environment.

Therefore, China has taken a series of steps addressing this problem through joining international missile non-proliferation efforts. It has been cautious concerning the transfer of missiles, adopting strict and effective controls over the export of missiles and related technology. Beijing has committed to missile non-proliferation and kept its obligation.^[4]

In February 1992, China committed to observing the guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in force at that time.^[5] With the enhanced dialogue that emerged between China and the U.S. in the missile area, the two countries signed a joint statement in October 1996, reaffirming China's promise and obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 kilometers or more with a payload of 500 kilograms or more.^[6]

Although China has not joined the MTCR's formulation and revision, it has signaled that it would study the feasibility of joining the regime. This came as a result of the Jiang-Clinton Beijing summit of 1998, reflecting their effort to cultivate a constructive partnership. It is understood that China has conditioned its joining the MTCR on the question of the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, especially U.S. TMD development and deployment in this part of the world.

The two countries were engaging on this matter until their talks on non-proliferation, arms control and international security were, unfortunately, suspended in the aftermath of NATO's bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. Their arms control talk was not resumed until July 2000, following their security consultation in Beijing in February. On November 21, 2000, Beijing made a statement to the effect that "China has no intention to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers)."^[7] In this statement, China made it clear that it will publish a comprehensive export control list of missile-related items including dual-use items.

NMD affecting Russia's and China's security

On March 17 and 18, 1999, respectively, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved National Missile Defense System legislation, stating, "It is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense."^[8] This has evoked tremendous repercussions around the world, drawing negative responses from all other nuclear weapons states and even U.S. allies in NATO.^[9]

According to the Clinton NMD plan, the U.S. would deploy 100 interceptors in Alaska in its first configuration. Assuming a 1-in-4 rate of interception, the U.S. could hit at most 25 incoming missiles, a more than sufficient capability to take care of the alleged threat from those 'rogue' states that are considered to be developing long-range ballistic missiles to target America. At later stages, the U.S. would deploy further kinetic kill vehicles in North Dakota in order to provide nation-wide missile defense.

The U.S. has stated clearly that China has not been figured in the NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the U.S. intentions in terms of NMD development. From China's perspective, it is untenable that the U.S. would spend 60-100 billion dollars on a system that has only 'rogue' states in mind.

A capability to counter a strike by intercontinental ballistic missiles owned by 'rogue' states does not yet exist. Excluding the P5 (i.e. the five official nuclear weapons states), only Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran are currently believed to have medium-range missiles with ranges above 1,000 km. Only four of these states, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, may have active programs to develop intermediate-range missiles with ranges of over 3,000 km.^[10] It is highly unlikely that any of them will acquire an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capability within a decade or so. The CIA's classified 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Development recognized that the ICBM threat to the United States from so-called rogue states is unlikely to materialize before 2010, with the possible exception of the DPRK.^[11]

Only Russia and China currently have the capability to hit the United States with nuclear warheads on ICBMs. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Both the U.S. and Russia have maintained their nuclear arsenals of thousands of deployed nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenals are at basically comparable levels in terms of quality and quantity. It is the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty signed in 1972 that has prevented the U.S. and the former Soviet Union from embarking on unlimited strategic arms race.

The ABM Treaty does allow the U.S. and the former Soviet Union (now Russia as its sole legitimate successor) to deploy a limited capability against strategic ballistic missiles for the sake of defense against incidental and/or unauthorized attack. The Treaty has doubly served strategic stability. First, for limited nuclear attack due to incidental/unauthorized launch, it provides limited capability of interception. Second, for an all-out nuclear attack and counterattack, it assures the rivals of their mutual destruction. Indeed, the Treaty has helped dissuade the two nuclear weapons superpowers from further escalating their strategic offensive build-up.

With Russia's ongoing social and economic disruption, its military capability has been affected significantly. In the context of the strategic offense-defense relationship, Russia is being pressed threefold. First, a significant amount of Russia's strategic force is aging and has to be phased out. Therefore, Russia needs deep bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with the U.S., but it refuses to do so at the expense of revising the ABM Treaty which would change the balance of power in favor of the U.S. Second, under START II Russia's would eliminate its land-based MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle). At a time of U.S. rhetoric about abrogating the ABM Treaty anyway, Russia has to reconsider the necessity to disarm its lethal MIRVed weapons. Third, Russia's missile defense, permitted under the ABM Treaty, is eroding, as its early warning satellite system can no longer provide full coverage.^[12]

As such the world is experiencing a double danger. Russia cannot properly execute the launch-on-warning of its strategic forces, as it is unable to fully track the missile launch and flight. Russia's refusal to cut its nuclear force, when actually there is a need to cut it, also creates difficulties in the nuclear disarmament process. However, the latter issue is a result of the U.S. missile defense build-up in violation of the ABM Treaty.

Consequently, the U.S. NMD build-up will be harmful to U.S.-Russian relations. It presses Russia to be hesitant in continuing strategic nuclear disarmament, and may force Moscow to strengthen its offensive capability. By revising or even abandoning the ABM Treaty, the U.S. appears to maximize its security regardless of the negative effect on the security of other countries.

From China's perspective, the U.S. national missile defense would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington. Though China has not publicly made its nuclear capability transparent, its CSS-4 ICBM force, capable of reaching the U.S. with a range of 13,000 kilometers, as reported by Western publications, is largely believed by the Western strategic analysts to number around 20-25.^[13]

China's concern over the U.S. national missile defense in violation of the ABM Treaty has been expressed through various channels many times.^[14] Primarily China is concerned about two issues. One is that the NMD will destabilize the world order, and harm the international relations. The other is that NMDs advertised technical capability will undermine China's strategic deterrence, weakening China's confidence in its strategic retaliatory capability.

A limited anti-ballistic missile capability, as allowed by the existing ABM Treaty, would be enough to defend the strategic assets of the U.S. against potential missile threats from outside the P5. Indeed, the one-site base of anti-ballistic missile deployment under the framework of the ABM Treaty cannot immunize the whole U.S. from being hit. It is exactly this reason that has given Russia (as well as other nuclear weapons states) a confidence that they retain a credible nuclear deterrence vis—vis the U.S. Theoretically, part of the U.S. would thus be exposed to some missile threat from 'rogue' states. However, either that threat has been too remote, or the overwhelming strength of the U.S. in both nuclear and conventional weapons will be powerful enough to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities.

Also, the envisaged NMD cannot stop an all-out Russian nuclear attack, considering the thousands of strategic weapons at Russia's disposal. Therefore, Beijing can only take the view that U.S. NMD has been designed to effectively neutralize China's strategic deterrence.

Given the reported level of China's full-range ICBM force (CSS-4), the NMD plans requiring an ABM Treaty revision would, if successfully implemented as advertised, compromise China's strategic capability in two respects. Geographically, it will protect the whole U.S. from being deterred. Numerically, even interceptors deployed at a single site may be enough to knock out all Chinese CSS-4s.^[15] Hence China's national security interest is in jeopardy.

To hold the U.S. credibly deterred is just to reciprocate, to a much lower extent, what the U.S. has long done against China during the nuclear age. In fact, it was the U.S. nuclear threats to China on a number of occasions that prompted Beijing to start its nuclear weapons program.^[16]

Though the U.S. has the most formidable nuclear arsenal and most powerful and sophisticated conventional arsenal, it retains the option of a first-strike with nuclear weapons as its deterrence policy. Now the U.S. would even revise or abolish the ABM Treaty that assures nuclear weapons states of their mutual security.

China has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals and least advanced conventional weaponry among all the nuclear weapons states. However, it still adopts a nuclear no-first-use policy, and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear weapons free zones.

China's national security thus rests with what the ABM Treaty provides. The U.S. indeed can develop and deploy a capability against strategic weapons, as permitted by the ABM Treaty, in order to gain a certain sense of security against incidental and/or unauthorized attack by nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it ought to take into account the common security of all nuclear weapons states. When the U.S. improves its own security at a time of ballistic missile proliferation, it should mind not to undermine the national security of others. There is an internationally acceptable limit that the U.S. can pursue, i.e. developing its strategic missile defense capability in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Addressing China's concern

The U.S. can argue that it is its sovereign rights to develop and deploy NMD beyond the ABM Treaty, as the new administration is advocating. However, if the U.S. were to go ahead regardless of the others, it certainly would not create a win-win situation. It would rather be counterproductive in facilitating international cooperation in missile non-proliferation. Apparently this is contrary to the interests of the U.S.

Some in the U.S. have been indifferent to the negative security impact that a revision of the ABM Treaty would bring upon other states. In this theory, the U.S. would at least to some extent consider Russia's concern. As the ABM Treaty was concluded between the U.S. and Russia, there seems no need to address China's concern.

The U.S. must understand that the ABM Treaty both balances the power between the U.S. and Russia, and, more fundamentally, is a cornerstone of global security. In the latter context, China's security is affected by the standing of the ABM Treaty. It has expressed its interest in maintaining the ABM Treaty and in multilateralizing it, in the hope of expanding ABMTreaty membership.^[17] Being a party to the ABM Treaty, Beijing would be in a better strategic position to enhance world stability.

There have thus far been three interception tests of NMD systems. The first was carried out on October 2, 1999 and was found to have flaws.^[18] The second test on January 18, 2000 was a complete failure due to a 'plumbing leak'.^[19] On July 8, 2000 the third test failed because no separation occurred between the boost rocket and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.^[20] President Clinton announced on September 1, 2000, that he would not proceed with deployment of the planned limited NMD.^[21] More interception tests have been scheduled for May/June of 2001.^[22] Even though future tests could be more or less 'successful', it would be still quite questionable as to the true effectiveness of the system under real conditions.^[23] It will be in neither America's ultimate interest, nor the interest of the rest of the world, to have such a system installed by breaking the ABM Treaty.

If the U.S. insists on hurting the national interests of Russia and states with a smaller nuclear weapons arsenal, it would be difficult to gather international support for non-proliferation initiatives on other fronts. The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FissBan), is an obvious example. Were the U.S. to break the ABM Treaty, medium nuclear weapons states would be reluctant to give up their option of re-starting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, when they feel their deterrence capability is being undermined.

It should also be pointed out that there are ample means to defeat a missile defense.^[24] Various means such as submunitions, high as well as low altitude countermeasures, balloon decoys, chaff and missile fragment decoys can all be considered. MIRVing and ASAT (Anti-Satellite) approaches might also be tempting. It goes without saying that if a state is able to independently develop a strategic missile capability, it should also be able to develop a capability to cost-effectively defeat missile defense.^[25]

Some argue that there is a growing threat from China as it is modernizing its strategic forces. Looking at the CSS-4 force developed and China's sea-based deterrence, one can hardly reach this conclusion. A land-based strategic force of about two dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a very small submarinebased missile force, is hardly any match for the arsenals of the United States.

As China follows a no-first-use strategy, it serves China's interest to keep a moderate force. However, China has a need to modernize its force as its defensive policy requires doing so, and as all other countries are doing the same. This is especially true at the age of precision-guided weaponry. An ICBM force of some two dozens of missile does not justify the U.S. to revise or abolish the ABMTreaty. Quite to the contrary, China's moderate strategic force and modernization play a key role in assuring the U.S. of adequate security, which serves a stabilizing role in terms of China-U.S. relations, and world security.

In sum, the United States may have legitimate concern over missile proliferation. That concern requires understanding but shall not be exaggerated. Major powers of the world, along with other countries, should work together to address such international problems, and to find solutions that serve both international stability and their respective national interests. Moving along the lines provided for by the ABM Treaty provides such a way forward. On the contrary, going ahead with damaging the ABM Treaty and other countries' interests can only be counterproductive.

This paper is updated from: Chapter Three, Missile Defence and China's National Security, in: Ben Sheppard (ed.), Jane's Special Report on Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Jane's Information Group, London, March 2000, pp. 31-38.