International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

Is There a Missile Threat?

The Dynamics of Missile Proliferation and the State of Missile Control

M.V. Raman

The question posed has a short answer and a long one. The short answer is yes. The Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project lists 38 countries that have operational ballistic missiles with range capabilities over 100 km.^[1] (Table 1 lists the countries with or developing missiles with range greater than 300 km.) If one were to equate possession with threat, as is often done, then clearly there is a missile threat.

The long answer begins with another question: who is it that perceives the threat? Given that the most attention to the issue is to be found in the United States, it is not surprising that the implicit or explicit assumption in listing missile threats usually is that these threaten the United States or its allies. This extends not only to various government agencies but also independent, academic assessments. For example the CIA's National Intelligence Council suggests that: "We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq."^[2] The Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at the Lancaster University in England claims: "it is clear that there is a gang of states - including North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya who are actively engaged in bartering technology, capabilities and resources with one another in order to acquire both ballistic missiles and WMD. Left unchecked, they will pose new and growing threats to Western interests in coming years."^[3]

However, if one were to look at actual use, the overwhelming user of missiles in the last decade is the United States. These were mostly cruise missiles, especially Tomahawks. The first time that such conventionally armed cruise missiles were used was in the Gulf War, when 288 Tomahawks were used during the course of the war. In ensuing actions against Iraq, 45 were launched on 17 January 1993, 23 more on 26 June 1993, 31 on 3 - 4 September 1996 and 330 during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998. Similarly there has been a history of use of Tomahawks against Serbia starting in 1995. The Kosovo war also marked the first time that Tomahawks were used by non-American forces with British submarines launching Tomahawks. In August 1998, the US Navy fired 79 Tomahawks against Afghanistan and Sudan, destroying a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. As defense analyst Steven Zaloga puts it, the Tomahawk "has proven to the ideal weapon of the New World Disorder, a 'Big Stick' when diplomacy fails."^[4]

This lesson has been well learnt by other countries too. For example, Indian "Navy specialists" argue for a "cost-effective cruise missiles for mounting a conventional seaward attack on land."^[5] Analysts have argued that "cruise missile development may be the most effective route for India to achieve its aims of regional and global nuclear reach."^[6]

In general it is assumed that the main motivations for programs such as the Indian cruise missile program are regional security threats. Even if this were true it must be remembered that the P-5, especially the United States, have a global presence and therefore its missiles and other force projection capabilities pose as much a regional threat, if not more, than any other countries belonging to the region.

Motivations for missile programs

However, the question of motivations for missile programs is a complex one, and the answers to this are similar to the motivations for countries to acquire nuclear weapons. In the nuclear proliferation debate, one can broadly categorize explanations for why countries acquire the bomb into three categories: security related, domestic or bureaucratic politics related, and prestige related.^[7] Reality, of course, is a bit of everything, with perhaps different emphasis on each of these motivations in each case.

Theories on proliferation of missiles can follow the same contours. And therefore in order to see "unproliferation" of missiles - i.e., the reversal of missile programs - it is necessary to address each of these sources of motivation. Existing efforts have focused primarily on nonproliferation, i.e., trying to prevent new countries from acquiring missiles. The modus operandi has been through the institution of export controls to inhibit the acquisition of technology that could be used to make missiles, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR was initiated in 1987 with seven members and has grown to 32 member states; members agree not to help non-members build or acquire ballistic missiles with ranges greater 300 km and payloads greater than 500 kg.^[8] However, such an approach does not tackle any of the three motivations that I described. First, due to the continued possession of long-range missiles by many countries, especially the P-5, all countries face a potential security threat. With its unilateral military actions in Kosovo, for example, the United States has increased concerns in a large number of countries, who may currently not think of themselves as opponents or at danger from a US attack. Export control regimes, by reinforcing the perception that the possession of missiles is a mark of advanced technological prowess or even "trappings of power," may even be counterproductive. This spurs the development of indigenous missile technology, with or without the help of arms merchants and other middlemen around the world, and thereby fueling the growth of institutions with vested bureaucratic interests in maintaining and expanding missile programs. Thus, the MTCR has had little effect in creating and sustaining an international norm against missile acquisition, at best delaying some missile programs.

Efforts for missile control

There are a few efforts to buttress or widen the scope of the MTCR. At a recent MTCR meeting in Paris, the United States, Britain, and France offered steps to reinforce MTCR export controls by an increased dialogue with non-MTCR parties, pre-launch notification for missile and space launches, and international standards in the missile field. Similarly, Canada convened a meeting of ballistic missile experts from the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Russia, and the United States to examine options of a multilateral approach to more effective ballistic missile control, international monitoring, and early warning.^[9] These included the expansion and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, de-alerting, improved ballistic missile early warning and launch notification, an extension of the concept of no-first-use specifically to ballistic missiles, and the monitoring and surveillance of missile and space-related activities and exchange of technical data, and multilateral space regulations reserving the use of space for commercial rather than military uses.

Other states are now considering options for a stronger missile nonproliferation regime specifically as an alternative to missile defense. At the June 1999 G-8 summit in Germany, the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS). However, the GCS proposal is merely a nonproliferation regime, comparable in some respects with the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty but without its Article VI obligation to disarm. It seems unlikely that major developing countries would accept another regime in which the five nuclear weapon states are left as the only missile powers. If, on the other hand, all of the states currently with missiles or planning such a capability in the near future were allowed to keep their missile arsenals, then the value of the regime would be severely limited and may only serve to incite future missile developments plans in other states.

Given the state of efforts to control missiles, it is therefore important to consider comprehensive efforts of ballistic missile disarmament. Such a regime would address both the multiple threats and technologies claimed as necessary either to deter them or to provide direct defenses. Even if achieving a global ballistic missile control regime is unlikely in the immediate future, discussion of such a regime would, by providing a different perspective on technology development, the dynamics of arms racing, verification issues, and the reasons claimed for constant upgrades to military forces, help break the current deadlock in nuclear arms reduction efforts. Let us hope that BMD can stand for Ballistic Missile Disarmament rather than Ballistic Missile Defense.

Country Name Missile Characteristics Range (km) Payload (kg) India Sagarika naval cruise missile 320 500 (?) India Dhanush naval ballistic missile 350 500 (?) India Agni II ballistic missile 2000 1000 Iran Shahab III ballistic missile 1300 750 Israel Jericho ballistic missile 1500 1000 Israel[10] ? cruise missile 1500 ? North Korea No Dong ballistic missile 1000 1000 North Korea[11] No Dong II ballistic missile 1500 1000 North Korea Taepo Dong ballistic missile 2000 1000 Pakistan Shaheen-I ballistic missile 600-750 750-1000 Pakistan Shaheen-II ballistic missile 2500 1000 Pakistan Ghauri I & II ballistic missiles 1500-2300 6500 Taiwan Sky Horse[12] ballistic missile 950 500

Table 1: Sample Ballistic Missile Programs (Range >300 km, non-P-5 countries)

This Paper was presented at the workshop "Moving Beyond Missile Defense", Santa Barbara, March 19 - 21, 2001.