International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

MTCR Draft Code of Conduct

The MTCR Draft Code of Conduct has been documented in Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 57, May 2001. Disarmament Diplomacy introduced the text as follows (excerpts):

"At the 15th plenary meeting of the member states of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Helsinki, October 10-13, 2000, a draft code of conduct was circulated and discussed. Under pressure from states outside the MTCR regime and an implied US lack of confidence, represented by plans for national missile defence, the member states wanted to show that the MTCR regime could address missile proliferation more pro-actively and effectively than before. ...

At first, MTCR members requested media silence on the draft code of conduct in order to allow discussions with other governments to take place without undue pressure. The international debates on missile proliferation and missile defence have now moved on, driven by the ill-defined but far-reaching plans of the Bush administration. In view of the alternative approaches to preventing and combatting the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, it is now necessary that the MTCR draft code of conduct be discussed more openly. As part of our ongoing debate on missile proliferation and defence, Disarmament Diplomacy has decided it is time to publish the draft code of conduct, as received in October 2000. ...

At the time of the Helsinki Plenary, the MTCR had 32 'partners', or member states, including Russia: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States. In late March 2001, the Republic of Korea was admitted to the regime."

Subscribing states agree to respect and implement the following principles, commitments and other measures in all national and collective activities relating to rockets and rocket systems.

a) Principles

1.  Recognition by subscribing states of the increasing security challenges caused by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and of the need to prevent and curb such proliferation through international endeavours, including through this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;

2.  Recognition by subscribing states of the importance of strengthening, and gaining wider adherence to, existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;

3.  Recognition by subscribing states that adherence to, and full compliance with, disarmament and non-proliferation norms build confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states;

4.  Recognition by subscribing states that participation in this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is voluntary and open to all states and that this Code of Conduct will complement and strengthen existing national, bilateral, regional and multilateral security arrangements and disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;

5.  Recognition by subscribing states that all countries alike must be able to continue to reap the benefits of the utilisation of space for peaceful purposes in ways that do not contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;

6.  Recognition by subscribing states that space launch vehicle programmes should not be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes, considering that there are similarities between both types of programmes in terms of technology, facilities and expertise;

7.  Recognition by subscribing states of the necessity of appropriate transparency measures on ballistic missile programmes and space launch vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology;

8.  Confirmation by subscribing states of their commitment to the United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 51/122 of December 13, 1996).

b) Commitments

1.  Commitment by subscribing states to ratify:

2.  Commitment by subscribing states to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and to undertake measures to prevent such proliferation, both at a global and regional level through multilateral, bilateral and national endeavours;

3.  Commitment by subscribing states to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security;

4.  Commitment by subscribing states to exercise the necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes;

5.  Commitment by subscribing states not to support any ballistic missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with the norms established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

c) Incentives

1.  Consideration by subscribing states to provide, on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, incentives to subscribing states who choose to eliminate their existing ballistic missile and/or space launch vehicle programmes, as appropriate, and who commit to forgo such programmes in the future.

d) Confidence Building Measures

1.  Agreement by subscribing states to implement transparency measures as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail, to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles:

I.   With respect to ballistic missile programmes, to:

II.  With respect to expendable space launch vehicle programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to:

III. With respect to their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programmes, to:

exchange pre-launch notifications on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches and test flights.

These notifications should include such information as the generic class of the ballistic missile of space launch vehicle, the planned launch notification window, the launch area, and the planned direction.

Implementation of the above confidence building measures will have no bearing on the question of legitimacy of the rocket programmes concerned in respect of the obligations and norms deriving from the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, and of the principles and commitments set out in this code.

e) Organisational Aspects

1.  Agreement by subscribing states to:

'Draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,' Final Draft, agreed at the 15th Plenary meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) , Helsinki, October 10-13, 2000. MTCR/HEL/PL/00/CHAIR/01

source: The Acronym Institute, 2001 [http://www.acronym.org.uk]