International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation


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Bulletin 18 - Moving Beyond Missile Defense

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Moving Beyond Missile Defense

Preliminary Project Information


Summary description

Current plans to build missile defense systems against the projected "missile threat" pose serious problems in the coming years for international security and stability, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. The project "Moving Beyond Missile Defense", pursued by INESAP in collaboration with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, aims at developing alternatives to the emerging missile race. The project will introduce science-based proposals into the international debate and the political decision-making process on missile defense, and promote concepts and initiatives that enhance international stability and cooperation on governmental and non-governmental levels.

An international Study Group of experts assesses the political and technical link between missile proliferation and missile defense, and develops a science-based framework for feasible and adequate responses to the missile threat. The Study Group explores and promotes innovative ideas on how the roots of the problem can be resolved by political and diplomatic initiatives, and evaluates concrete arms control and disarmament proposals (e.g. improving international missile control, limitations of ballistic missile testing, ballistic missile free zones, Zero Ballistic Missile regime, regionally extended ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, nuclear-weapon-free world, space weapons ban). Technical issues, such as the monitoring, verification, and the dual-use of relevant technologies, will play a prominent role. For each of the topics, international expert teams will be formed, and all proposals are discussed in their global and regional context. Results and recommendations are to be closely integrated into an international policy-oriented process and the decision-making of relevant countries by means of media work, conferences, briefings, and lobby meetings. In order to strengthen the science-policy link, political decisionmakers, diplomats, the media, and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) shall be involved in regional activities (North-East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Europe, Russia), with Europe as a key player. Findings of the Study Group will be presented to media and political representatives and distributed in INESAP publications (Study Group Reports, Briefing Papers, INESAP Information Bulletin) as well as in other publications and via electronic communication channels.

"Moving Beyond Missile Defense" is an essential element in the future activities of the INESAP network, which has been restructured in early 2001. Since its foundation, the main objectives of INESAP have been to promote nuclear disarmament; to strengthen existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes; to develop and promote cooperative approaches to curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and controlling the transfer of related technology. INESAP draws on international experts in various disciplines and combines research, networking, policy advisory, and action in its work.

Detailed description of the project

Project background

Official US policy envisions a considerable threat to the US, its troops and allies by ballistic missiles of so-called "rogue nations" within the next few years. To counter this threat, the US plans to build a variety of multi-layered land-, sea-, air- and space-based missile defense systems in the US and abroad. Under President George W. Bush, these plans have gained new momentum and are vigorously pursued, undermining the basis of the US-Russian ABM Treaty and other arms control agreements in the near future.

Russia opposes the US plans and threatens to take political and military countermeasures. China is worried that the US are less concerned about North-Korea than about containing Chinese power and strengthening US influence in the region, in particular in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Israel not only has acquired a nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capability, but is also developing missile defense against missiles from neighboring countries which feel provoked to increase their arsenals. European NATO countries are developing extended air-defense systems to protect their homelands and forward deployed troops. The combined proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile defense systems could lead to a "missile race" that severely undermines security in various regions. Consequently, many experts in the arms control community, politicians, and NGO representatives fear that missile defense systems would undermine stability, impair arms control and cooperation, and lead to an arms race on earth and in space.

Issues addressed by the project

The project "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" has been launched jointly by INESAP and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The project is based on the premise that missile defense is not an effective tool against missile proliferation, that it would be counterproductive by increasing the dangers of missile proliferation, and that it could lead to a new arms race. Because of technical difficulties and the lengthy development periods for both ballistic missiles and missile defenses, the project recognizes a realistic chance for political initiatives to contain the emerging missile race. Instead of rushing to join a non-existing missile shield, the international community would be better advised to take joint action and collaborate on preventing a new arms race by strengthening and extending the international control regime for nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and space weapons.

With this project, INESAP wants to raise attention and provide a basis for international initiatives to prevent a missile race by political and diplomatic means. Previous efforts in missile control have been limited to US-Russian arms control (INF, START) and to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which restricts missile-related exports from smallplier countries. Recent initiatives and proposals (e.g. by Canada, Russia, China, Iran, UN General Assembly) have pointed to the need to overcome some of the limitations of the current regime, moving towards a more comprehensive international missile and space control regime.[1] Independent scientists have been developing proposals for multilateral ballistic missile disarmament since the early 1990s.[2] Increasingly, the link between missile defense and space warfare has inspired efforts to prevent an arms race in space and ban space weapons.[3]

The assessment of the problems and the development of solutions are inherently linked. The project centers around the following questions:

What is the status of the missile threat? Which factors drive ballistic missile development and proliferation?

Is missile defense a realistic instrument to prevent the missile threat, in terms of feasibility, effectiveness, costs and implications with regard to international security and stability, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament?

What are the likely political, technical and arms-related implications of ballistic missile defenses in key regions (North-East Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Europe and Russia)?

How efficient have previous missile control and disarmament efforts been? Are there alternative ways to deal with ballistic missile proliferation and threats?

How can the international control of ballistic missiles, missile defenses, nuclear weapons and space weapons be strengthened to prevent a missile race on earth and in space?

Which means to verify missile control and missile disarmament do exist and how can the dual-use problem of missile and space technologies be dealt with?

How can cooperative regional initiatives and security frameworks to prevent a missile race be strengthened?

Project objectives and goals

The project's main objective is to develop and introduce science-based proposals, developed by an international team of experts, into the international debate and the political decision-making process on missile defense, and to promote concepts and initiatives that enhance international stability and cooperation on governmental and non-governmental levels. The project shall serve as a nucleus for improved ballistic missile control and an international norm against ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and space weapons. The project shall raise public awareness and understanding of the problems of missile proliferation and missile defense, allowing citizen groups to voice their concerns about the dangers of missile proliferation and missile defense and utilize findings of the international Study Group to lobby political decision-makers for alternatives.

The following sub-goals are pursued in the project "Moving Beyond Missile Defense":

Develop creative, policy-relevant, scientifically and technically sound proposals that undermine the quest for missile defense. smallport Diplomacy-First initiatives to deal with the missile threat by strengthening their scientific and technical basis.

Evaluate alternatives to the missile race, such as strengthened international missile control, restrictions on missile testing, ballistic missile free zones, ballistic missile disarmament (e.g. Zero Ballistic Missile regime), nuclear-weapon-free world concepts (e.g. Nuclear Weapons Convention), space weapons ban, regional security frameworks.

Evaluate the possibilities and limitations of technical verification measures and their integration into comprehensive missile monitoring schemes. Study options to deal with the dual-use of ballistic missile and space technologies.

Focus on the regional specialties and smallport regional initiatives on missile control (North-East Asia, South-Asia, Middle East, Europe, Russia). smallport Europe as a key player in promoting political and diplomatic responses.

Link the project with existing studies and projects to provide a comprehensive analysis that includes the relevant aspects of feasible alternatives. Enhance networking with experts from critical regions.

Produce Reports, Briefing Papers, articles, INESAP Bulletins to make Study Group findings available to a larger audience. Publish Briefing Papers in different languages. Disseminate project findings and proposals to politicians, opinion leaders, and NGOs internationally and regionally.

Project methods

"Moving Beyond Missile Defense" will be done in several stages and is planned for a period of two years.

1. Study Group: For the evaluation of the above mentioned questions, INESAP brings together and coordinates an international Study Group of scientists and disarmament experts. The main issues of the study will be explored by subgroups which exchange and discuss the results of their research among each other, both at and between meetings. Drawing on previous studies and projects, the Study Group will analyze the available information, evaluate the different proposals in terms of technical and political feasibility and implications, and integrate them into coherent documents, each of which are to be presented to a particular audience. Individuals invited to participate in the Study Group come from a wide variety of countries and organizations. The regional workshops are used as an occasion to progress the planning of the Study Group, with most of the coordinators of particular issues being present. A Study Group workshop is planned for spring 2002. Most of the Study Group work will be done between these meetings by electronic mail.

2. Regional workshops: The project focuses on the key areas where development and deployment of missile defenses are likely to have a major impact: North-East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Russia. Therefore, an essential element of "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" are regional workshops, which serve the purpose of integrating regional frameworks into the international project. One workshop or conference in each of these regions gives certain individuals from the Study Group a chance to learn from each other directly, to exchange and discuss opinions and assessments, to get a better understanding of the regional situation, and to network with local people as well as to explore alternatives and find out differences of opinions and assessments.

All workshops will also be used to discuss further project planning and strategizing among the project coordinators and additional individuals.

1.  After the founding workshop of "Moving Beyond Missile Defense" which was held in Santa Barbara on March 19 - 21, 2001, the planned regional workshop in Shanghai/China (Nov. 30 - Dec. 2, 2001) is an essential next step in proceeding with the project, linking both global and regional project activities. The workshop is hosted by the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security (Dingli Shen) at Fudan University's Center for American Studies. North-East Asia certainly is a key region in the current missile defense debate. US plans for a national missile defense as well as for theater missile defense systems in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea can have a severe impact on the region. Stability in North-East Asia is very fragile, the Taiwan Strait conflict is latent, and the arms buildup in the region continues on all sides. China fears that its small arsenal of nuclear-tipped long-range ballistic missiles would be invalidated even by a limited missile defense and announced asymmetric measures as a response. In addition, China is one of the countries that take US documents for dominance in space very serious, and warns of the danger of a new arms race on the earth and in space.

The Shanghai workshop will focus on implications of missile proliferation and missile defense in Northeast Asia. Additionally, the workshop will serve to launch the project's international Study Group and to plan activities and next steps for the following months. Contributions at the workshop will be used in the chapter on North-East Asia of the Study Group findings. Non-regional contributions will also be prepared for use in chapters covering an international regime for the control of missiles, nuclear weapons and space weapons. In addition to dealing with regional issues, the Shanghai workshop will serve as the starting point of the Study Group work. The coordinators of the Study Group chapters will meet at the workshop to outline a six month working plan and progress will be reported at the Berlin conference in June 2002. Project coordinators will also use the chance to discuss the next steps in the project and to detail the planning for the Berlin conference.

2.  To involve Europe and Russia as key players, it is planned to hold a conference in summer 2002 in Berlin/Germany. The conference will present first results of the Study Group work (in particular on the link between missile control and nuclear disarmament, and on the regional chapters North-East Asia, Europe and Russia). This location was chosen for three reasons:

2.1 First, because of the strategic ties between European allies and the US. European allies have the greatest chance of influencing US decisions on ballistic missile defense and therefore pressure must be placed on European policymakers. NATO countries will also play an important role in the US decision to move forward with ballistic missile defense plans.

2.2 Second, Russian reactions to missile defense are vital for the future of nuclear disarmament and arms control. Russia threatened to respond to a violation of or retreat from the ABM Treaty by questioning previous nuclear disarmament agreements (the ratification of START II e.g. is directly linked to the US adhering to the ABM Treaty). This would put the global arms control regime at risk. Work on cooperative solutions with Russian experts is therefore of great interest for the project.

2.3 Third, just as other European countries, Germany in cooperation with Italy and the US develops its own missile defense system, and thus introduces a new factor that affects the stability in the region. Appropriate plans are part of a whole picture and should be addressed in the regional context.

In addition to discussion of the regional focus, the Berlin conference will be used to create a greater outreach of the project. Politicians, security experts, military, media, and a wider NGO audience from Germany and other European countries will be invited to attend the conference. In Berlin, the first Report of the Study Group will be presented along with first Briefing Papers. Detailed planning for the Berlin conference has yet to be done.

3.  Further regional workshops are foreseen to be held in the Middle East and in South Asia. Both regions are plagued by rapid horizontal and vertical proliferation of ballistic missiles and the availability of weapons of mass destruction in at least some of the countries. Here more than elsewhere there exists an urgent need for regionally based solutions and security frameworks which shall be discussed in cooperation with participants from the region.

3. Publication of Study Group findings, outreach, and lobbying: At various times, in particular at the end of each project stage, international perspectives, results and recommendations of the Study Group will be published in Reports, in Briefing Papers, in the INESAP Information Bulletin, on the Internet, and in as wide a range of articles as possible. INESAP will search for ways to ensure wide distribution of the project publications. Selected Briefing Papers shall be translated into the languages of a few key countries. In particular for the Berlin conference it is desirable to make some publications available in German in order to increase the outreach to the German audience.

Thematic work in the project is closely integrated into a policy-oriented process. In order to broaden the project smallport base, scientists and policy-oriented individuals from a wide range of organizations and institutes are encouraged to participate in the concept development and in the Study Group. To strengthen the exchange between the scientific and political fields, political decisionmakers, diplomats, the media and NGOs are encouraged to attend workshops, briefings, conferences, private meetings, consultations and other occasions where the Study Group findings will be presented and discussed on a national and international level. Only the major events (e.g. large workshops or conferences) will be organized by INESAP. Individual Study Group participants and INESAP smallporters will arrange local events on their own initiative and use occasions organized by other groups to present the project findings.


More Informations about the Project.


  1. See the survey in: J. Scheffran, Moving Beyond Missile Defense: The Search for Alternatives to the Missile Race, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 55, March 2001; reprinted in this issue. See also A. Lichterman, Z. Mian, M.V. Ramana, J. Scheffran, Beyond Missile Defense, Draft Working Paper, June 2001 (final version to be available soon). A more comprehensive framework, including nuclear disarmament and stability, is discussed in: J. Scheffran, Missile Defense, International Stability and Preventive Arms Control, Paper presented at the workshop on "National and Theater Missile Defenses after the US Elections", Berlin, February 14-16, 2001.
  2. See L. Lumpe, Zero Ballistic Missiles and the Third World, Arms Control, Vol.14 (1), April 1993, pp.218-223; A. Frye, Zero Ballistic Missiles, Foreign Policy, No.88, Fall 1992, pp. 12-17. For a technical evaluation of ballistic missile control options, including the dual-use of space launchers, see: J. Scheffran, Dual Use of Missiles and Space Technologies, in: G. Neuneck, O. Ischebeck (eds.), Missile Technologies, Proliferation and Concepts for Arms Control, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993, pp.49-68; J. Scheffran, Verification of Ballistic Missile Bans and Monitoring of Space Launchers, in: W. Liebert, J. Scheffran (eds.), Against Proliferation — Towards General Disarmament, Münster, Agenda, 1995, pp.156-164; J. Scheffran, Elimination of Ballistic Missiles, in: J. Rotblat, M. Konuma (eds.), Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, World Scientific, 1997, pp. 310-326; L. Trost, Designing Ballistic Missile Control Monitoring Systems (Excerpts from report of the Cooperative Monitoring Center), INESAP Information Bulletin, No.14, November 1997; M. Smith, Verifiable Control of Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Trust & Verify, No. 95, January/February 2001.
  3. A recent analysis can be found in: R. Johnson, Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Further Militarisation of Space, Disarmament Diplomacy No.56, April 2001, reprinted in this issue. The basic options and technical problems have been outlined earlier in J. Scheffran, Verification and Risk for an Anti-Satellite-Weapons Ban, Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.17, No.2, 1986, pp. 165-174. For a legal proposal see H. Fischer, R. Labusch, E. Maus, J. Scheffran, Draft Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space, reprinted in: J. Holdren, J. Rotblat (eds.), Strategic Defences and the Future of the Arms Race, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

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