International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Year 2000 and Nuclear Risk

Letter from over 160 environment groups, church groups, trade unions, and politicians from Australia, Europe, Canada, Russia, New Zealand, Japan, and elsewhere; August 6, 1999.

Dear Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, Defence Ministers and Defence Secretaries, Heads of State and UN Missions,

The organisations above, representing millions of people worldwide, are writing to convey their extreme concern over the possibility that Year 2000 (Y2K)-related computer failures in nuclear weapons systems may lead to an unacceptable risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.

In the current political situation this is most especially the case. According to Alexandr Arbatov, of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma, US-Russian relations are at `the worst, most acute, most dangerous juncture since the US-Soviet Berlin and Cuban missile crises.'

The danger during the Y2K rollover lies primarily in the possibility that spurious data may induce commanders, even at the highest levels, to mistakenly authorise the launches of nuclear weapons.

Events similar to this have already occurred. For example:

• In the US in 1980, a malfunctioning computer chip sent spurious alert signals;
• In 1983 in Russia, satellites mistook glare off the tops of clouds for a US missile launch, (and disaster was averted by the refusal of the local commander to believe the warnings were real);
• In 1995, a Norwegian research rocket prompted a full-scale Russian alert.

If Y2K breakdowns produce inaccurate early warning data, or if communications and command channels are compromised, the combination of hair-trigger force postures and Y2K failures could be disastrous. There should therefore be a `safety first ` approach to Y2K and nuclear arsenals.

Because none of the nuclear weapons states can guarantee that their nuclear- related computer systems are Y2K compliant, the only responsible solution is for them all to stand down nuclear operations. This approach should include taking nuclear weapons off alert status and decoupling nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

The stakes involved in any nuclear exchange between Russia and the US are such that they dwarf any other considerations. The future of life itself on earth could be in doubt.

In light of this, we strongly urge that you remove all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from `hair trigger' alert, and place them in a status in which at least hours and preferably days would be required to launch them.

The Canberra Commission in August 1996, noted that terminating nuclear alert status would:

• Reduce dramatically the chances of accidental or unauthorised nuclear missile launch.
• Help set the stage for intensified cooperation on a more far- reaching disarmament agenda
• Have a very positive influence on the political climate between nuclear weapon states.

This last is especially relevant in the current tension between Russia and NATO, which has prompted Russia to withdraw from cooperation with the US on Y2K problems.

According to the Canberra Commission, "Taking nuclear forces off alert could be verified by national technical means and nuclear weapon state inspection arrangements. in the first instance, reduction in alert status could be adopted by the nuclear weapon states unilaterally"

If both sides are verifiably de-alerted, it will not be possible for either to launch a disarming first strike.

The immediate stakes are so high, and the potential for global catastrophe so clear, that mutually verified de-alerting in the face of the Y2K computer problem must take precedence over all other considerations of politics and national security.

Source: John Hallam, Friends of the Earth Sydney, 17 Lord street, Newtown, NSW, Australia, tel +61(2)9517-3903, fax -3902, email nonukes@foesyd.org.au, http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd.