International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Draft for a Treaty on a

Nuclear -Weapon-Free Zone in Europe

Draft circulated by Vienna Peace Bureau, Kölblgasse 18/1, A-1030 Wien , Austria; tel+fax (+431) 796 50 21

Introductory Note

Proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe (NWFZE) were first put forward several decades ago. Since three nuclear-weapon states were (and are) located in Europe (France, Great Britain, USSR/Russian Federation) and a fourth state (USA) deployed nuclear weapons in Europe on the territory of its NATO allies, all of the proposals had the aim to make parts of Europe free of nuclear weapons. In contrast to NWFZs in other parts of the world (e.g. Latin America and Africa) the proposals for a NWFZ in Europe did not call for making the whole European continent nuclear-weapon free. In particular, they aimed for a NWFZ located geographically between the nuclear-weapon states of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have not made such proposals less significant - as contributions to peace building and as steps towards nuclear disarmament.

Since the successor states of the USSR, with the exception of the Russian Federation, have become nuclear-weapon-free and the new situation in Europe has generally increased the possibility of agreeing on measures of confidence building and disarmament, a NWFZE can now be envisaged which will cover a greater area than that aimed for in the earlier proposals.

At a Symposium held recently in Vienna it was suggested to intensify discussions on settingup a NWFZE and to prepare a draft Treaty as a contribution to these discussions. The draft, which has been prepared taking up this suggestion, is attached. Explanations of some provisions of this draft Treaty will be presented first.

Which states are to be the parties to the Treaty on a NWFZE? The text of the Treaty could list the states forming a North- South corridor in Europe, roughly to the West and SouthWest of the Russian Federation. This option would have the following draw-backs. The extent of the zone would be definitely fixed and there would be no orientation towards further European states to adhere to the Treaty, which would enlarge the NWFZE in a step by step process. Also the entry-into-force provision of a Treaty formulated in this way would probably require ratification by all state parties. This may lead to considerable delay till the Treaty becomes a binding obligation for the state parties.

Therefore, the draft foresees that any non-nuclear-weapon state having territory in Europe can become a party to the Treaty and will thus bring its territory into the NWFZE. The Treaty would enter into force when a certain number of signatory states have ratified it. Similar entry-into-force provisions are contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention and in the Ottawa Treaty on the prohibition of anti-personnel land mines. Such provisions facilitate more rapid entry into force and later expansion of Treaty membership.

The question has to be taken up whether such provisions will not make many states decide against signing and ratifying the Treaty because of fear that other European states, in particular those in their neighbourhood, which have not yet adhered to the Treaty, are making plans for deploying nuclear weapons. Taking into consideration the present general security situation in Europe, such mistrust is not likely to arise. Rather, it seems justified to expect a positive trend. Even if states that could be parties should not sign the Treaty as soon as possible, they are likely to recognize its benefits as it enters into force and verification is carried out, and will become participating states later.

Verfication of compliance with Treaty obligations is taken up in some articles of the draft. It should be pointed out that verification under a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA (see Article 7) concerns nuclear energy activities carried out by the state parties.

IAEA verification procedures are not directed at detecting nuclear explosive devices brought into the territory of a signatory state , e.g. by a state deploying other armaments or troops on such territories or making use of transit rights for military purposes. It may be advisable to include in the Treaty more specific provisions for the detection of such violations of the Treaty. In the present draft, there are only the general formulations of Articles 4 and 6:

"Each Party undertakes to prohibit in its territory the stationing or any other presence of any nuclear explosive device" (Article 4). "Each Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures ... to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a state Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons on its territory.." (Article 6).

In the discussion of the draft suitable verification procedures and techniques for detecting nuclear explosive devices on the territory of signatory States in violation of Treaty obligations should be considered. It is recommended to evaluate the possible role of international cooperation and of international organizations in the realisation of such verification measures.

The Parties to this Treaty

Guided by the Charta of the United Nations, which calls for effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace (Article 1 of the Charta, San Francisco 1945), also
Guided by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki 1975), in which the participating States have declared that they will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State , ...have recognized the interest of all these States in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament, ..have expressed conviction of the necessity to take effective measures which would constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York 1978), in which measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons are called for (Paragraph 20) and nuclear- weapon-free zones established on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the zone concerned and respected by nuclear-weapon States are seen to constitute an important disarmament measure (Paragraph 33),
Noting the important interrelationship between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, clearly expressed by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to this Treaty, which reaffirmed in its decision on „Principles and Objectives for Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament" that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones will enhance global and regional peace and security" and stated that the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome,
Noting the important role of existing NWFZs in restricting the spread of nuclear weapons and thus of nuclear confrontation,
Convinced that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe will be an important contribution to strengthening peace on this continent and to regional and global disarmament efforts,

Have decided to establish the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe and hereby agree as follows :

Article 1 / Definitions

1. "Nuclear-weapon -free zone in Europe" means the territory of the state Parties of this Treaty in Europe and in adjacent parts of other continents.

2. "Territory" means the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the sea bed and the subsoil beneath.

3. "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport and delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it.

4. "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment.

5. "Nuclear installation" means a nuclear power reactor, a nuclear production reactor, a nuclear research reactor, a critical facility, a fabrication plant for nuclear reactor fuel, a reprocessing plant for irradiated nuclear fuel , an isotope separation plant , a storage installation for nuclear materials, and any other installation or location at which fresh or irradiated nuclear material or significant quantitites of radioactive materials are present.

6. "Nuclear material" means any source or processed fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Article 2 / Renunciation of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes

(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;

(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device;

(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or posession of any nuclear explosive device anywhere.

Article 3 / Prevention of stationing of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes to prohibit in its territory the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

Article 4 / Prohibition of testing nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes

(a) Not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere,

(b) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

Article 5 / Prohibition of armed attack on nuclear installations

Each Party undertakes not to carry out, to assist, or to encourage armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe.

Article 6 / National implementation measures

Each Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons on its territory or under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 7 / Verification of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Each Party undertakes

(a) To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict measures that provide assurance of exclusively peaceful use;

(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertaking in subparagraph (a) of this article¹

(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with the IAEA.

Article 8 / Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

Each Party undertakes to maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. To that end each Party, inter alia, undertakes to apply measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by the IAEA for that purpose.

Article 9 / Conference of State Parties

1. The Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the Depositary as soon as possible after entry into force. Further meetings of the Conference of State Parties shall be held as necessary and at least once a year.

2. The Parties to Protocol 1 shall have observer status at the Conference of State Parties.

3. The State Parties shall have the right to address questions relating to compliance with or possible circumvention of the provisions of the Treaty as well as any other issue relating to the Treaty at meetings of the Conference of State Parties.

4. The meetings of the Conference of State Parties shall take place in Vienna, unless the Conference decides otherwise.

5. The Secretariat of the Conference of State Parties, which is to work under the guidance of the Chairman, shall be established within the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE.

6. The Chairmanship of the Conference of State Parties shall be assumed by State Parties in rotation, the period of Chairmanship to be one year.

7. The meetings of the Conference of State Parties are to consider:

(a) The operation and status of the Treaty;

(b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of the Treaty;

Article 10 / Annual Reports

Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Secretariat of the Conference of State Parties on its nuclear acitivities as well as other matters related to the Treaty, including national implementation measures, in accordance with the format for reports to be developed by the Conference of State Parties in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Each Party shall include in its annual report a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and give notification promptly of any change in those conclusions. The first report is to be submitted three months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Article 11 / Procedures for considering complaints and for settlement of disputes

1. The Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under the Treaty.

2. A Party which wishes to clarify matters of compliance with another Party or which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party to the Treaty or to Protocol I is in breach of its obligations under the Treaty shall submit a request for clarification to that Party, at the same time informing the Chairperson of the Conference of State Parties. A Party receiving such a request for clarification shall provide a reply within 30 days, giving all information which would assist in clarifying the matter, at the same time informing the Chairperson of the Conference of State Parties of this reply.

3. If the requesting Party does not receive a response or deems the response to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter to the Conference of State Parties, to be considered at its next meeting. In case the requesting Party considers the matter urgent, it may ask for a special meeting of the Conference of State Parties. The Chairperson will then inform all Parties of such a request, and in the event that within 14 days from the date of such a communication at least one-third of the Parties favour such a special meeting, he will convene this meeting within a further 14 days. A quorum for the special meeting shall consist of a majority of State Parties.

4. Pending the convening of a meeting of the Conference of State Parties, any of the Parties concerend may request the Secretary- General of the OSCE or the Chairperson of the Conference of State Parties to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested. By agreement of the requesting and the requested Parties the matter may also be submitted to one of the conflict resolution procedures which have been adopted in the framework of the OSCE.

5. The meeting of the Conference of State Parties shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. At the meeting of the Conference of State Parties every effort should be made to reach a decision by consensus. If no agreement can be reached in this way, the decisions shall be taken by a majority of States Parties present.

6. If the meeting of the Conference of State Parties , after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the requested Party, considers that there is sufficient substance in the complaint it may request the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct an inspection as soon as possible. A representative of the Conference of State Parties may be designated to accompany the IAEA inspectors. The request to the IAEA shall indicate the tasks and objectives of the inspection.

7. Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all information and places within its territory that may be deemed relevant by the inspectors.

8. The Party receiving the inspection team shall take appropriate steps to facilitate its work, and shall accord them the same privileges and immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA.

9. The IAEA shall report the findings of the inspection team as quickly as possible to the Chairperson of the Conference of State Parties. The meeting of the Conference of State Parties will then have to discuss and decide whether there has been a breach of obligations under the Treaty. It may request the State Party to which the complaint was addressed to take measures to establish compliance with the Treaty obligations. The Party so requested shall report on the measures taken in response to this request.

10. The meeting of the Conference of State Parties may suggest to the State Parties involved ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration. If the Conference of State Parties concludes by a two-thirds majority that a serious breach of Treaty obligations has occurred, it may refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council.

Article 12 / Signature, ratification and entry into force

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any non-nuclear-weapon State having territory in Europe. It shall be subject to ratification.

2. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the (tenth) instrument of ratification.

3. For a signatory State which ratifies the Treaty after the date of entry into force, the Treaty will enter into force on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 13 / Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 14 / Duration and withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely

2. Each State Party shall, in execising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other State Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. This notification shall include a full explanation of the reasons for the withdrawal.

3. A withdrawal shall take effect only six months after the notification of withdrawal is received by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

Article 15 / Review Conferences

Five years after entry into force of the Treaty a conference of the States Parties shall be convened to conduct a review of the operation of the Treaty. Further Review Conferences shall be convened in five-year intervals.

Article 16 / Amendments

1. Any proposal for an amendment to the Treaty submitted by a Party to the Depositary shall be circulated to all Parties.

2. Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken at a meeting of the Conference of State Parties by a three- fourths majority. A special meeting of the Conference of State Parties can be convened for deciding on an amendment within 30 days if a majority of Parties thus requests.

3. An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all parties after receipt by the Depositary of the instruments of ratification of three-fourths of the Parties.

Article 17 / Depositary

The Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

The Depositary shall register the Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Depositary shall transmit copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all Parties and to all States eligible to become Parties to the Treaty or to the Protocols, and shall notify them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and of the Protocols.

Article 18 /Authentic texts

The English, French, Russian and Spanish (.....).texts of this Treaty are equally authentic.

Annex I / Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The safeguards referred to in Article 5 shall in respect to each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. A Party that has already entered into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA is deemed to have already complied with the requirement. Any other Party shall ensure that the safeguards agreement with the IAEA is in force for it not later than one year after the date of entry into force of this Treaty for that Party.

For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to above shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown.

Protocol I

The Parties to this Protocol,

Convinced of the need to take steps towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and of the obligation of all States to contribute to this end, also
Convinced that the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe constitutes an important measure towards enhancing regional and international peace and security and will promote regional and global disarmament,
Desirous of contributing in an appropriate manner to the effectiveness of the Treaty, have adopted this Protocol:

Article 1

Each Protocol Party undertakes

1. Not to station nuclear explosive devices on the territories of the State Parties to the Treaty,

2. To accept for its citizens all legal and administrative measures undertaken by any State Party, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the Treaty on the territory of that State Party,

3. To declare as invalid any relevant provisions in agreements with any State Party of the Treaty concerning the status of forces of that Protocol Party which limit jurisdiction of a State Party to the Treaty in matters of legal and administrative measures referred to in paragraph 2,

4. Not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Party to the Treaty,

5. Not to carry out, to assist, or to encourage armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe,

6. Not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol.

Article 2

Each Protocol Party undertakes to indicate its acceptance, by written notification to the Depositary, of any alteration to its obligations under this Protocol that may be brought about by extension of the territory of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Europe, due to entry into force for further State Parties to the Treaty, or by entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty.

Article 3

This Protocol shall be open for signature by China, France, India, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

Article 4

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

Article 5

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary twelve months in advance. A statement of the extraordinary events which are regarded as jeopardizing the supreme interests of the withdrawing State are to be included in this notification.

Article 6

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Depositary or the date of entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is later.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

Note

1. Such agreements will be obligatory for all state parties, no matter whether they operate nuclear power plants or not, but the specic verification measures, will of course, differ.