International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Non-Proliferation in Crisis

Conflict and confusion before the 2000 Review Conference

Rebecca Johnson

The states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will undertake a full review of the Treaty in April-May 2000, the first since 1995, when the Treaty was effectively made permanent. The third preparatory committee meeting (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference took place in New York May 10-21, amid deteriorating international relations, especially between the United States and Russia and the United States and China, stalemate over strategic arms reductions, and deadlock at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), which has not yet started negotiating the promised ban on the production of fissile materials.

Along with the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, states parties in 1995 had adopted a set of two decisions and a resolution (on the Middle East) intended to strengthen the review process and accelerate the full implementation of the Treaty. This strengthened review process established 3-4 additional meetings in between the five-yearly review conferences, with powers to address substantive issues and a set of 20 `principles and objectives' on all the main themes addressed in the Treaty.

After a moderately successful first meeting in 1997, the second meeting in 1998 had ended in failure and recriminations, principally over the issues of nuclear disarmament and Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, viewed as a threat by the Arab states in the Middle East. As more than 100 of the 187 NPT members states met at the United Nations for the third PrepCom, there was confusion over what the review process was actually meant to achieve and anxiety that another failure could undermine the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

The non-proliferation regime faces some serious challenges, including:

• lack of adequate progress on nuclear disarmament, particularly the slowing pace of endeavours by the five NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states to move away from their reliance on nuclear weapons and deterrence doctrine and to bring nuclear arsenals closer to zero, after an initial flurry of positive and welcome steps taken as the Cold War ended in the early 1990s;
  
  
• nuclear tests conducted in 1998 by India and Pakistan and their efforts (spearheaded by India) to be accorded status as nuclear weapon states;
  
  
• violations of their safeguards agreements and Treaty obligations by NPT members Iraq and North Korea;
  
  
• the problem of the no-longer `threshold' nuclear states outside the Treaty, India, Pakistan and Israel, in terms of regional and international security and non-proliferation;
  
  
• plutonium accumulation, both commercial and from dismantled warheads, exacerbating problems of safety, security and proliferation incentives.

These are the issues that the NPT members and the review process need to be looking at. Because they are contentious, none of these issues are easy to find agreement on. If the review process is judged by the consensus documents and agreements it has produced, the verdict would be dismal. Either no agreement or consensus for the lowest common denominator of bland text tends to be the routine, even if the actual discussions at the NPT meetings have been more relevant.

Tasks for the 1999 Meeting

The 1999 PrepCom needed to accomplish certain procedural and political objectives, including:

• to decide on the procedures and organisation of the 2000 Review Conference, including the President and chairs, agenda, rules of procedure, and background documentation; and
  
  
• in accordance with the 1995 decisions, to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference".

This meant the PrepComs needed to take decisions that were essential to holding the 2000 Review Conference and they also had to address substantive issues, which in the minds of some states parties meant deciding what to do with the paragraphs of negotiated but not necessarily agreed text of working papers negotiated under the auspices of the Finnish and Polish Chairs in 1997 and 1998.

Additionally, arising from proposals at the earlier meetings, it would have been useful for the PrepCom to consider recommendations to make the NPT review process more relevant and effective, and if possible, make recommendations on:

• what form of agreements or documents the Review Conference should aim to produce (`products' in diplo-speak); and
  
  
• the role of the PrepComs, particularly whether they could have a role and function independently of the five-yearly review conferences, for example in making contemporaneous statements on relevant issues, such as nuclear testing or START.

Decisions taken and decisions deferred

From the very first day, a marked deterioration in political relations overshadowed the proceedings. All participants stood in silence to remember the people killed when the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was bombed a few days earlier. The war over Kosovo pervaded the meeting. There were no apologists for the brutalities of the Milosevic regime, but serious concerns were raised, particularly by China, Russia and some non-aligned states, about the role of NATO and its use of technology and overwhelming force against a much weaker opponent. US-China relations were also spotlighted by China's growing anxiety over US and Japanese missile defence plans and a climate of hostility over the `spy scandal' (the alleged theft of US-nuclear secrets by a Chinese-American physicist working at Los Alamos), which coincided as a hot topic in the US Congress and media during the PrepCom.

Despite this, the meeting managed to adopt a consensus final report. This was possible for two principal reasons: a common desire not to bear the blame for another debilitating failure after the deadlocks at the 1998 PrepCom, and skilful management and mediation by the Chair, who had prepared carefully and consulted widely in advance. There were indications part way through that some of the delegations which had predicted in 1995 that the review process was nothing more than a tool to facilitate the indefinite extension decision might not be averse to another PrepCom failure, which could be portrayed as proving their point. The NWS, in their different ways, likewise showed a marked reluctance to have the strengthened review process utilised for better progress on nuclear disarmament issues, although four out of the five provided greater detail on the arms control steps they have taken to comply with their Treaty obligations. In the end, however, just enough flexibility was shown by all sides to enable the essential decisions to be taken.

It was decided that the 2000 Review Conference will take place in New York from 24 April to 19 May, presided over by Jacob J. Selebi, formerly South Africa's ambassador in Geneva. The agenda and rules of procedure to govern the 2000 Conference were adopted after states parties agreed to amendments enabling subsidiary bodies to be established. South Africa and Egypt have argued for subsidiary bodies on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East respectively. The decisions will have to be taken in 2000, but both countries pushed for the rules of procedure to reflect the principle, as agreed in 1995.

Late on the last day of the 1999 PrepCom, it was finally agreed that the UN Secretariat be asked to prepare background documents on the various treaty articles, as well as the CTBT and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, "reflecting developments since 1995 with a view to realising fully the objectives of the resolution". Documents were also requested from the IAEA and the various secretariats overseeing the NWFZ treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok. By this means, Egypt has reinforced the perception of the resolution on the Middle East as an integral part of the package of decisions taken in 1995, while the United States was able to head off any special privileges for this resolution, including avoiding any additional responsibilities being assigned to the depositary states (Britain, Russia and the United States), who had sponsored the resolution in 1995.

The 1995 decisions charged the PrepComs with making recommendations to 2000, although as the review process proceeded from 1997 it became obvious that there was a lack of clarity or agreement about what kind of recommendations should be made, and what their status should be. Due to fundamental differences over some issues, including nuclear disarmament and the Middle East, and partly due to the different views of the status and weight of PrepCom recommendations, the third PrepCom was unable to transmit any recommendations on substance. This was acknowledged by all to be a failure.

Although not required, many considered it would also be useful to make recommendations on the outcomes for 2000. Reyes' attempts to encapsulate a majority position in favour of two documents were resisted by a few determined delegations, particularly Iran and France. The PrepCom eventually adopted recommendations on outcomes for 2000 that were so watered down that they did little more than reiterate the intentions outlined in the 1995 decisions. South Africa, which will Chair the Review Conference in 2000 appeared very disappointed that a more specific recommendation for two primary documents had not been made, believing this would have assisted its planning and structuring in 2000.

Other questions that were deferred to 2000 included: the role of the PrepComs, particularly Canada's proposal for statements on contemporaneous events; allocating the subject matter of the Treaty for debate and review (e.g. article by article versus clustering in main committees); and subsidiary bodies. While some delegations may have wanted agreement in 1998 or 1999 at least to make recommendations on these subjects, others fell back on the argument that only the 2000 Review Conference can legitimately decide on anything. In any event, whether dodged or merely deferred all these questions will now need to be addressed at the 2000 review conference.

Substance and Implementation

After the general debate, the first week was devoted to closed plenary sessions on the various clusters of issues grouped under the headings of nuclear disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, with special sessions on practical nuclear disarmament issues, the fissile material ban, and the Middle East. These sessions were not so much debates as statements of national or group positions. As expected there were statements from Indonesia on behalf of the NAM, which was accompanied by a working paper similar to last year's, from Germany on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated states, and from Algeria on behalf of the League of Arab States. For the first time the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), formed by the foreign ministers of eight nations in June 1998, also made a presentation, which was co-sponsored by 32 states parties. The NAC working paper issued a few days later drew 44 co-sponsors, including Switzerland, Indonesia, Chile and Nigeria. During the general and specific discussions and airing of national statements, the issues of major concern and most frequent mention were the following (not in any order):

• the importance of the NPT and non-proliferation regime and the risks of undermining it by failing to implement the strengthened review process constructively;
  
  
• concern about the impasse in the START process, the necessity for more effective progress on nuclear disarmament and suggestions for steps that could be undertaken, with frequent and specific mention of: the need to address and preferably remove all tactical nuclear weapons, taking nuclear weapons off alert; calls for the conference on disarmament to address nuclear disarmament, even to negotiate a nuclear weapons convention; and calls on all five nuclear powers to engage in more practical negotiations;
  
  
• condemnation of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998;
  
  
• the importance of getting sufficient signatures and ratifications for the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) to enter into force;
  
  
• the bombing by NATO of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia and the effect of NATO's actions on future prospects for arms control;
  
  
• concern about the destabilising impact of U.S. missile defence plans;
  
  
• the importance of getting negotiations on the fissban underway;
  
  
• security assurances;
  
  
• universality and adherence to the Treaty, especially the need to find ways to bring India, Pakistan and Israel into the non-proliferation regime as non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as concern about Iraq and North Korea and ways to prevent violations of the treaty;
  
  
• nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), especially in relation to the Middle East and Central Asia;
  
  
• nuclear energy;
  
  
• safeguards;
  
  
• nuclear safety and physical security;
  
  
• export controls

Eschewing the working papers from the two previous PrepComs, Reyes sought to reflect this discussion by means of a draft working paper from the Chair, in the hope that this might form the basis for recommendation to 2000. Comprising 31 paragraphs on eight themes (mirroring the 1999 Principles and Objectives, adding the Middle East), his first draft covered universality, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards, the resolution on the Middle East and `peaceful uses' of nuclear energy.

Two draft Chair's working papers

After reaffirming commitment to the Treaty, the paper welcomed new accessions from 9 countries since 1995 and urged states not yet party to the Treaty to accede. It contained paragraphs reaffirming the importance of full implementation of article II and calling on NPT parties to refrain from nuclear sharing within military or security alliances. Concerns about NATO nuclear sharing had particularly been raised in the NAM working paper and by Egypt, South Africa and China, but the argument that these security arrangements impinged on their NPT obligations was vigorously rejected by NATO states. Addressing the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998, three paragraphs affirmed earlier condemnations and called for full compliance with UN SC resolution 1172, pledging not to give recognition or status to any additional states possessing nuclear weapon capabilities.

There were five paragraphs on nuclear disarmament, ranging from general declarations of "unequivocal commitment" to eliminating nuclear weapons to more specific calls, including for ratification of the CTBT so that it can enter into force without delay, immediate negotiations on a fissile materials treaty at the CD, further progress in START, including increased transparency on the dismantlement of tactical nuclear weapons and for the rest of the nuclear weapon states to join US-Russian efforts "at an appropriate stage". Two paragraphs endorsed existing nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), such as in Central Asia, and also expressed support for proposals for such zones in the Middle East and South Asia. One paragraph on security assurances urged re-establishment of a committee in the CD, which angered South Africa and others who wanted security assurances addressed in the NPT context rather than the CD. South Africa had submitted a working paper containing a draft protocol on security assurances, which it would like the 2000 Review Conference to consider attaching to the Treaty.

After a long discussion, Reyes brought out a revised draft, double the length of the first. Although in the revised 61 paragraphs, Reyes had taken care to represent views with substantial support as a basis for seeking consensus, it was inevitable that some paragraphs pleased some delegations while infuriating others. One or other of the nuclear weapon states objected to almost all the paragraphs on nuclear disarmament. France was unhappy about making an `unequivocal commitment' to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. China did not like the call on all the NWS to "declare collectively a moratorium on the production of such material for such devices". The US and Russia objected to recommending a subsidiary body at the review conference and the provision of special time at subsequent PrepComs for "a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons" as had been proposed by South Africa. Nor did they want to urge the CD to establish a committee to address nuclear disarmament.

The NWS objected to a set of calls to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, based on New Agenda, Japanese and Canadian proposals, among others, such as revitalising the START process, a "seamless process" by which the other NWS would join the US and Russia in negotiations, addressing non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, transparency, steps to reduce nuclear dangers, such as de-alerting, de-activating and de-mating nuclear warheads, and to review strategic doctrine, as urged in the New Agenda resolution to the UN General Assembly (53/77Y), which had gained 114 votes in December 1998. Inevitably they also objected to a paragraph identifying that a nuclear weapon free world would ultimately require the underpinnings of a multilaterally negotiated instrument or framework of mutually reinforcing, legally binding instruments.

Conclusion

Compared with last year, adoption of the main procedural decisions must be counted a positive achievement, much to the credit of the Chair. But this pragmatic success was obtained at the price of shunting a number of political disagreements and contentious issues to be dealt with by the review conference. If judged on its ability to address substantial issues, which are fundamental to the health and longevity of a strong non-proliferation regime, the PrepCom — and indeed the review process over the past three years — must be judged as far from successful. Fundamental questions remain about the non-proliferation regime's ability to exert pressure on the hold-outs to join and on the recalcitrants to comply fully with their obligations — especially the article VI obligation to negotiate towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. What does it mean for the Treaty to be indefinitely extended if the regime is not strong enough to bring about its full implementation?

Some of the proposals put forward and discussions generated by the Chair's working papers dug deeper than in previous NPT meetings. Nevertheless, the PrepCom's debates and its inability to adopt any meaningful recommendations reflect the deepening crisis in international relations and arms control. The proceedings also served to highlight the growing chasm between the aspirations and ideas coming from a wide section of non-nuclear-weapon states and the five NPT nuclear weapon states.

International political events over the past year are flashing dire warnings about the health of the nuclear non-proliferation norm and prospects for arms control: nuclear tests by two neighbours and rising tension in South Asia; Clinton's apparent go-ahead for research and development funding for missile defence programmes, causing increased concern internationally, but especially in Russia and China; NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in April and reaffirmation of its strategic concept, embedding and even widening nuclear deterrence; NATO expansion of membership and missions, highlighted by its air war on Yugoslavia, causing greater tension with Russia and further and possibly fatal delays over START ratification; collapsing commitment to arms control, exemplified by political games in the Russian Duma and US Congress over START, the ABM Treaty and ratification of the CTBT; widely publicised debates in Belarus and Ukraine in which their decisions to give up nuclear weapons, taken as the Cold War ended, were criticised by parliamentarians as over hasty, with the inference that had they known then what they know now, they would not have surrendered their nuclear weapon `status' so quickly.

Though the Chinese were the only ones publicly to wonder if NATO would have bombed Belgrade if Yugoslavia had also been nuclear armed, there were many in the corridors who made the obvious connection. Over the past year nuclear weapons seem to have been reinforced as a currency of power, influence, and by reference to a demonstrated vulnerability in their absence, of security.

What do the politics, conflicts and conduct of the 1999 PrepCom say about the prospects for 2000?

• Nuclear Disarmament is an inextricable component of non-proliferation. Until the article VI goals are substantially achieved in the way that most parties consider the other articles to be, nuclear disarmament will continue to be the major subject of debate and disagreement, a reality that the NWS must acknowledge and address more constructively.
  
  
• The United States and Egypt need to try to establish ground rules for how to address the possession of nuclear weapons by one Middle East state, a proliferation issue within the NPT context, without overloading the treaty review with the related regional and security demands.
  
  
• Nuclear testing and the self-declared nuclear `status' by the two South Asian non-NPT members will need careful handling if the basis of the non-proliferation norm is to remain credible.
  
  
• Preparation and advance consultations by the President/Chair are vitally important in soliciting ideas, trouble-shooting likely problems, and building a sense of collective ownership and responsibility for the outcome.
  
  
• The outmoded group system is increasingly irrelevant and could be quite counterproductive in terms of managing the conduct, information flow and decision-making of the Review Conference and future PrepComs. Issue based coalitions, such as the New Agenda Coalition are likely to play a greater role.
  
  
• Some thought must be directed to interpreting the 1995 decisions so that the review process can work better. The role of the PrepComs, the meaning and status of any "recommendations" and other issues need to be debated and perhaps refined.

Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of The Acronym Institute.

Address: Disarmament Intelligence Review, 24 Colveston Crescent, London E82LH, England, tel + 44(0)1715038857, fax -9153, email: acronym@gn.apc.org.