 |
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
 |
 |
|
|
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
|
|
|
Introduction
Influenced by the disintegration of the bipolar system, the development of the global economy and the facilitation of other elements, the structure of international relations went into a period of readjustment and reorganization. Although it is hard to say whether the restructuring process has completed or when it will finish, some major powers' significance to international peace has been more and more clearly recognized in the process. In East Asia, the US, Russia, Japan and China are the countries which have been exerting great influence on regional security since the beginning of the century. They are still the major powers in the area. Considering Russia's economic and political chaos, however, the article will focus on the relationship among the US, Japan and China. This triangle relationship is playing a more and more important role in the security in East Asia, even in the world.
The triangle relationship between China, the US and Japan has experienced several stages in this century.1 Before the 1970s, the Sino-US-Japanese relationship was abnormal and unequal. It seemed that the US always had to make a choice between China and Japan during that period. With the normalization of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations, the three countries began a relatively benign cooperation in the cold war because of the common need against the Soviet Union. In 1989, however, the triangle relationship went down again. Differences on the political systems, the security demand and economic levels have always been negative factors for the development of their relations.
Among all those obstacles, the US-Japanese cooperation in theater missile defense (TMD) was a newcomer. Although some elements emphasize the "defensive" feature of TMD, it is obvious that TMD will further complicate the international relations in East Asia. The political implications of the TMD systems should not be underestimated even if the military effectiveness of the TMD can be left for the military to discuss. This article will discuss the implication of US-Japanese TMD cooperation to the Sino-US-Japanese relationship in the framework of East Asian security.
Sino-US-Japanese relationship is important to East Asian security
In comparison with Western Europe, the diplomatic arena of the first nation states, East Asia has two main different features. First, there are large divergences between Asian countries. Those differences can be seen not only in respect of the hard power of those countries, such as population, territorial space and economic development level, but also in respect of their soft power, including political systems, ideology, religion and culture etc. Due to the variety in East Asia, the establishing of any regional security regime will need to resolve more international frictions and to merge those differences.
The other feature of East Asia, which to some extent is related to the first one, is the lack of a regional security mechanism, which can cope with potential conflicts. Although East Asia is a peaceful area on the whole, there are a number of sensitive problems both in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Considering the tension on the Korean Peninsula as an example, some problems are rather explosive. Therefore, regional cooperation is necessary to maintain peace and stability in East Asia. In recent years, the ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum did gradually exert important influence on regional security affairs. But being limited by its strength, the efforts are far from sufficient. In addition, as many Southeast Asian countries have been seriously hit by the financial crisis, it has been questioned whether the ASEAN can continue its efforts on security. Thus, the responsibility to guarantee regional peace will rest more on major powers in the region.
As a result, the US, Japan and China, major powers in East Asia, should contribute more to regional security. As the only superpower in the world, the US has various interests in the region, which at least can be seen from its military presence in East Asia. In this respect, the involvement of the US is not only the result of global economic integration or economic interdependence, but also the choice of the US itself. Without the influence in East Asia, which is almost as important as Western Europe , the so-called "global-leadership" of the US would not deserve its name. As one of the most prosperous countries in the world, Japan's development cannot be independent from the long-term peace and stability of East Asia, although Japan once pursued a policy of "separating from Asia and entering into Europe." On the security issue, Japan should try to do better than its performance in the Asia-Pacific financial crisis, for many Asian countries have not forgotten the history of the Pacific War, and still worry about the potential expansion of Japan's military forces. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is reponsible for world peace. To realize its modernization, China also needs a peaceful and stable security environment. China has shown a more active attitude towards the regional security cooperation through its participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum. China's efforts on the Korean issue are also positively recognized by the world. With the further development of its economy, China can do more work for world and regional peace.
Another reason for major powers to take more responsibility in regional security is that many of the hot spots in the region are directly or indirectly related to the major powers. For example, the Diaoyu Islands issue is a territorial dispute between China and Japan, and the US and China have to engage in the Korean issue because they were the belligerent states of the Korean War. So, the coordination among major powers should be given a priority. However, the intention to carry out sincere cooperation among China, the US and Japan always meets an obstacle — the US-Japanese military alliance, which means that the US and Japan have special ties and the triangle relationship among China, the US and Japan is unbalanced. The US-Japanese military alliance is a product of the cold war. It was designed to contain the Soviet Union and at the same time put Japan under American control. With the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the mission of the military alliance was finished and the alliance should have come to an end. Contrary to people's wishes, the US and Japan reviewed the Guidelines of the US-Japanese Defense Cooperation and strengthened their military alliance. Since the military alliance is an exclusive arrangement in theory and always needs a real or imaginary enemy, China wonders what the real purpose of the alliance in the post-cold war era is. Considering the spreading of so-called "China threat," China's concerns and suspicions are not unreasonable.
Just under the background that there is a lack of confidence between China and the US and Japan, the issue of US-Japanese cooperation in theater missile defense was proposed and pushed forward step by step. Almost certainly, the cooperation will further increase the suspicion among the three major powers.
US-Japanese TMD cooperation and China's response
In East Asia, Japan is one of the main cooperators of the US on the TMD issue. Their cooperation at least can be traced back to as early as 1993, even if their exchange on the US Strategic Defense Initiative is excluded. In 1993, the US government conveyed its intention to cooperate with Japan on TMD. On September 22 of that year, Mr. John Deutch, who was in charge of acquisition in the Pentagon, went to Tokyo and held official talks with then Japanese Foreign Minister and director of Japan's Defense Agency. According to Mr. Deutch, Japanese officials gave a favorable response to the US proposal.2 Later, the US and Japanese defense ministers reached an agreement on the joint development of an anti-missile system. In 1994, the Japanese government established an office in charge of the study on ballistic missile defense. At the first Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting between the US and Japan in 1995, the ministers recognized that the study on Ballistic Missile Defense had been conducted smoothly.3 Since then, the ballistic missile defense issue has been a regular topic on the SCC meeting.
According to an article published in Orbis, Japan already operated six units of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) missiles, as well as the Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems, and is upgrading the Patriot with PAC-2 technology.4 Japan has procured two Aegis-class destroyers and will purchase two more, which could be upgraded with advanced US maritime TMD missiles. Also, Japan has purchased several Airborne Warning and Control System planes that could be used as sensors in a TMD system.
In June 1994 the US Ballistic Missile Defense Organization director Lt. Gen. Malcom O'Neill proposed four options for Japan to consider.5 Those options are:
l Option A: The Aegis destroyers would seek to engage all targets in the upper tier while the Patriot ground-based system dealt with missiles in the lower tier.
l Option B: It would use the existing Japanese Self-Defense Force inventory, but would also involve procuring eight more Aegis destroyers and a new surveillance radar system. The planned PAC-2 versions of Patriot would be upgraded as in Option A, and a new radar system would be located near Tokyo.
l Option C: The US BMDO would like to see Tokyo acquire six land-based Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) firing units. This option would also require the upgrading of Patriots to PAC-III standard as lower tier defense.
l Option D: It proposed the more realistic deployment of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis destroyers. The land-based elements are five THAAD firing units and the fully upgraded Patriot system.
On the issue whether to join the TMD research and development, however, Japan kept an ambiguous attitude for several years because there are two different opinions among Japanese officials and scholars. The supporters said that Japan needs defense against the missile threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). An obvious fact is that the starting of Japanese-US talks on theater missile defense were just after the test of DPRK's Nodong missile. Generally, Japan's Defense Agency is a driving force for the TMD cooperation with the US. In its 1998 budget, it has put 81 million yen on the survey of TMD and prepared to increase the expense to 1 billion yen in the 1999 fiscal year.6 However, different services have different views. The Navy is most active, because it is most possible to establish a sea-based TMD system for Japan since it basically is an island country.7 The introduction of a sea-based TMD system means that the Navy can acquire more warships and equipment, and increase its percentage in defense expense. On the contrary, the Army's attitude is more negative, because the increase of the Navy's budget means that other services will have to reduce their expense, assuming the total defense budget stays stable. Japan's military industry takes a positive attitude towards Japanese-US cooperation on TMD. Those companies hope that the cooperation will bring more US advanced technology to them. Finally, officials and scholars, who regard the Japan-US alliance as the pillar of Japanese foreign policy, also do not want to go against US wishes on this issue.
On the other side, there are some worries in Japan about the TMD cooperation. First, are those defense systems, especially some advanced TMD systems like the THAAD system, effective?8 According to some scientists' evaluation, the import and deployment of a TMD system may just be a waste of money. Secondly, many Japanese believe that the initial intention of the US to propose the TMD cooperation is to ask Japan to burden expenses on TMD development. They worry that the US will not give Japan the core technology.9 Thirdly, the development of TMD is not cheap at all. The burden may be too large for Japan. Finally, some Japanese officials and scholars, who attach great importance to Japanese-Chinese relations, worry that the Japanese-US cooperation on TMD will put a negative influence on the relationship with China. Therefore, for a long time, the Japanese government only expressed that they were considering the US proposal, but it did not clearly say yes or no.
However, with the nuclear tests in South Asia and the DPRK missile tests, Japan seems to make its decision, although it is a little bit farfetched to use the South Asian nuclear tests as an excuse.10 At a US and Japanese foreign ministerial-defense authority meeting on August 27, 1998, Japan announced its decision to finance the proposed joint research on the TMD initiative this year outside the framework of the budget for fiscal year 1999.11 On September 20, the Japanese and US governments reached an agreement to conduct joint research on a missile defense system, although no target date was set for the project.12 Thus, the US-Japanese TMD cooperation has gone onto the US-wanted track.
The active prompting of the US on the TMD cooperation has technical, political and economical considerations. Technically, TMD, different from the national missile defense, is mainly designed to deal with short- and medium-range missiles, although some of them do have the capability against strategic missiles.13 So, those expensive systems must be used to protect US overseas troops and allies, which are more easily to be attacked by shorter-range missiles from the countries hostile to the US. Politically, the TMD cooperation provides a new chance to consolidate the US-led alliance regime after the cold war. The political role of TMD was recognized in the 1991 Gulf War. It prevented Israel from engaging in the war and preserved the allied coalition. After the cold war, the US military alliance in East Asia also met challenges. In the early 1990s, East Asian countries asked the US to withdraw its troops and return military bases. The US influence in this area was shaken. Under this background, missile defense becomes a new way for the US to promote the union of its alliance and keep its leadership in this area. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., a senior policy analyst of the Heritage Foundation, said, "By exercising strong leadership in missile defense, Washington can regain lost political momentum and begin to reverse diplomatic damage."14 Economically, the development of a missile defense system is quite expensive, although the Clinton Administration's TMD is much smaller than President Reagan's "star wars." The participation of the allies will reduce the financial burden of the US, no matter whether they purchase the whole set of defense systems or just engage in the technical development. Therefore, the US has consistent interests in carrying out TMD cooperation with Japan and introducing TMD into East Asia.
As a major neighbor of Japan, China keeps vigilance on the development of the US-Japanese cooperation on TMD, because the deployment of a TMD system, especially an advanced TMD system, in Japan would directly influence China's security. Firstly, Japan is so close to China that the deployment of an advanced missile defense system, which may have the capability against strategic missiles, may affect China's strategic retaliatory capability.15 Secondly, the US-Japanese TMD cooperation is part of strengthening their military alliance, which is regarded as an arrangement directed against China. Thirdly, the deployment of missile defense systems will add obstacles for the course of China's reunification, because an advanced TMD system in Japan may cover the Taiwan Straits and would give a wrong hint to the separatists. Considering those negative influences, the Chinese government has repeated its concerns on the US-Japanese TMD cooperation on several occasions.
Implications to the triangle relationship and regional security
Furthermore, the US-Japanese TMD cooperation will impose a danger to East Asian peace, because it further weakens the fragile foundation of the triangle relationship among the US, Japan and China, which, as analyzed in the second part of the article, is crucial to maintain regional security but is unbalanced.
The unbalance of the triangle relationship can be seen from the strength disparity of the three powers and the status of their combination. The US is the strongest power among the three no matter being measured by political influence, economic level or military force. Between China and Japan, while Japan is an economic superpower, China has political superiority because it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and implements an independent foreign policy. In the military field, China is a little bit stronger than Japan, because China has nuclear weapons and the People's Liberation Army of China is one of the largest troops in the world. However, Japan's military equipment is absolutely not less advanced than China's. On the contrary, it many be more advanced, although the further development of Japan's military is still restrained by its domestic laws and world opinions. On the whole, considering the combination of political, military and economic strength, the US is the strongest, China the second, and Japan the third.
But, the US and Japan are allies. That means that the political and military connections between the US and Japan are much closer than those between China and the US or those between China and Japan, although the US and Japan sometimes have very intensive disputes on economic and trade problems and China is making efforts to improve its relationship with the US and Japan. In the triangle relations, it is China that is in an inferior position. However, the US and Japan are preparing to continuously expand their superiority in the triangle relationship regardless of the whole balance of the regional structure and China's feeling. The TMD cooperation is just one of the steps.
The introduction of TMD into East Asia will expand the unbalance in Sino-US-Japanese relationship at least for two reasons. One is visible and the other is invisible. The visible one is that the TMD system will further increase Japan's military strength and abate China's military deterrence based on missiles. That means that the military balance in East Asia will continue to slop to the US-Japanese military alliance. Due to the worry that some elements will use the military superiority of the US-Japan military alliance to intervene China's internal affairs, China may have to strengthen its own military development. Thus, the TMD cooperation between the US and Japan is possible to cause an arms race in East Asia. The invisible influence is the psychological effect brought by the TMD system. It is hard to say now whether the system will be effective in practice. However, the import and deployment of the system hint that the US is keeping a watch on China. It will increase suspicion among major powers, which will influence some possible cooperation in regional or world affairs. Therefore, the introduction of the TMD system is not a good idea to keep regional stability, which needs a balanced triangle relationship among major powers, namely the US, Japan and China.
Conclusion
Of course, defense is a right of every country. However, in the era that a country's policy will largely affect the security of other countries, of the region or even the world, every country should be very careful to choose a right way to consolidate its security. It is very important to keep in mind that the fundamental object is security not defense. So, what is urgent to do in East Asia is not to build up a so-called "theater missile defense" but to reduce suspicion among the major powers and gradually establish confidence among them. A triangle relationship of mutual trust among the US, Japan and China will become a stable foundation of East Asian security.
Notes
1 This classification is inspired by the article: Sino-US-Japan Relationship in 20th Century: A Chinese View, which was written by ZI Zhongyun and has been published in Pacific Journal, No. 1 1997, pp. 4-10.
2 Reuters News Agency reported from Tokyo on September 22, 1993, in English.
3 Joint Announcement of Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, September 27, 1995. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/joint0927.html
4 Steven A. Hildreth and Jason D. Ellis, Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense, Orbis, Winter 1996, pp. 110-111.
5 Steven A. Hildreth and Jason D. Ellis, Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense, Orbis, Winter 1996. James Clay Moltz, Missile Proliferation in East Asia: Arms Control vs. TMD Responses, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 4, Number 3, Spring-Summer 1997. Du Xiangwan, Scientific and Technical Bases of Nuclear Arms Control, National Defense Industry Press, Beijing, 1997, pp. 265-268.
6 New China News Agency: The Obuchi Cabinet and Japan-US relations, Nihon Keizai Shinbun, August 3, 1998.
7 New China News Agency: Japan Plans to Join US TMD Program, Asahi Shinbun, July 8, 1998.
8 New China News Agency: How the Government to Deal with US TMD Proposal? Asahi Shinbun, June 8, 1998.
9 New China News Agency: Japan Plans to Join US TMD Program, Asahi Shinbun, July 8, 1998.
10 New China News Agency: How the Government to Deal with US TMD Proposal, Asahi Shinbum, June 8, 1998.
11 New China News Agency: TMD Joint Research to Be Financed in This Year, The Yomiuri Shinbun, August 28, 1998.
12 The Associated Press, US, Japan Announce Joint Missile Defense program, September 20, 1998.
13 Lisbeth Gronlund, George Lewis, Theodore Postol and David Wright, Highly Capable Theater Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, Arms Control, April 1994, pp. 3-8. Du Xiangwan, Scientific and Technical Bases of Nuclear Arms Control, National Defense Industry Press, Beijing, 1996, pp. 255-260.
14 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Building A More Secure Asia Through Missile Defense, Backgrounder, No. 138, October 24, 1995, p. 12.
15 According to Appendix C, The Last 15 minutes — Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective, China has 284 strategic nuclear weapons and 150 tactic nuclear weapons.
Wu Chunsi is Assistant Researcher at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University. Address: 220 Handan Road, Shanghai, 200433, China; tel +86-21-6564-2265, fax -6511-9567, email cswu@fudan.ac.cn
|
|
|