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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
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Milestones of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear/missile programs and arms control efforts
1948 Foundation of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission to explore uranium ore
1960 Beginning operation of the Cirus (Canadian-Indian Reactor, U.S.) heavy-water reactor by the "Bhaba Atomic Research Center" BARC in Trombay/India
1962 The USA declare readiness to export an 5 MWe light-water reactor to Pakistan. PARR-1 goes 1965 into operation
1963 Beginning operation of the first plutonium reprocessing facility at BARC
1974 Testing of a "peaceful" nuclear device (ca. 12-15 kt) consisting of 15 kg Pu in Pokharan by India
1975 Acquisition and purchase of components for the gas-centrifuge technology in Kahuta/Pakistan
1980 Launch of a 35 kg satellite into orbit with the SLV-3 by India
1983 Start of the "Integrated Guided Missile Development Program", aiming at the production of five missile types (Prithvi, Nag, Agni, Trishul, Akash) of different range
1985 A 40 MW fast breeder reactor goes into operation at Kalpakkam/India
1988 First test of the Indian Prithvi short-range missile
1989 Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto sign an agreement, in which India and Pakistan oblige not to attack first the nuclear facilities of the other side
1989 First test of the Indian Agni (1500 km) and the Nag (4 km)
1994 Beginning of the Prithvi production
1996 The Indian Prime Minister Rao declares, India would not abandon its nuclear option
1997 Indian scientists announce the development of super computers
1994 Prime Minister Nawar Sharif declares that Pakistan has the atomic bomb
1998 Test of Trishul short-range missile and supposedly five nuclear explosions in India
1998 Test of the Ghauri intermediate-range missile and supposedly six nuclear explosions in Pakistan
Presumed foreign contributions to Indian missile programs (examples)
France
Germany
Russia
United Kingdom
USA
Presumed foreign contributions to Pakistani missile programs
(examples)
North Korea
China
| Estimated stocks of Indian weapon-usable plutonium at the end of 1994 and 1995 (in kg) | ||
|
31. Dec. 1994 |
31.Dec. 1995 | |
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Production |
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|
Cirus reactor |
240 | 250 |
| Dhruva reactor | 150 | 170 |
| CANDU | 0-25 | 0-30 |
| (first discharge) | ||
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Total production |
390-415 | 420-450 |
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Consumption |
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| Test in 1974 | -10 | -10 |
| Processing | -10 | -10 |
| losses (3%) | ||
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Fast breeder |
-50 | -50 |
| Purnima | -35 | -35 |
| Total consumption | -105 | -105 |
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Total stock |
285-310 | 315-345 |
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Mean value |
300 +/- 30% |
330 +/- 30% |
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Source: Albrigt, David et al.: Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, Oxford 1997, p.269 |
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| Estimated production of weapon-usable uranium in the Pakistani centrifuge enrichment facility at Kahuta | |||
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Weapon-usable uranium |
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Year |
Capacity | Annually produced | Totally produced |
| (SWU1/year) | amounta (kg) | amount (kg) | |
| 1986 | 3000-5000 |
19-31 |
19-31 |
| 1987 |
4500-7500 |
28-47 | 47-78 |
| 1988 |
6000-10000 |
38-63 | 85-141 |
| 1989 |
7500-12500 |
16-28b | 101-169 |
| 1990 |
9000-15000 |
28-47b | 129-216 |
| 1991 | 9000-15000 | 28-47c | 157-263 |
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a Tails Assay1 of 0,5% and the feed1 from natural uranium b It is assumed that between May 1989 and June 1990 no weapon-usable uranium has been produced because of an instruction of the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto c It is assumed that only in the first half of 1991 weapon-usable uran has been produced 1 SWU = Separative Work Unit; a measure for the work that is required for the enrichment of uranium. Uranium with a specific concentration of U-235, the so-called "feed"is separated into two parts, one with a higher U-235 concentration (the "product") and one with a lower U-235 concentration (the "tail"). The "Tails Assay" is the amount of the enriched uranium as part of the U-235 fraction. |
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Source: Albrigt, David et al.: Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, Oxford 1997,p. 277 |
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Data on the nuclear tests and the differences between the official information and data confirmed by experts |
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Date
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Official information |
International Monitoring
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Remarks
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INDIA
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18. May 1974
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“peaceful test” [15 kt]
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[2 kt]
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Pokharan
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11.May 1998
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3 tests total 50 kt
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2 tests total: 20 kt (CIA)
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Pokharan
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10:13:52.0 |
27.13N, 71.69E
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Low yield [< 1 kt] |
-
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Poss.artillery shell
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Fission [12 kt] |
2 kt
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Poss.Prithvi/air bomb
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Thermonuclear [43 kt]
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10-20 kt (Agni?)
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Poss. boosted primary
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13. May 1998
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200 to, 600 to
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Failure/bluff (?)
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Pokharan (sand dunes ?)
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1 Test cancelled |
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PAKISTAN |
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28. May 1998
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5 tests total 35-36 kt
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2-3 tests 4,6 mb [2-15 kt]
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Chagai Hills
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10:16:25.7
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29.06N 64.82 E
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| 30. May 1998 | 2 tests 18, 12 kt, | 1 test 4,3 [1.5 kt] | Chagai Hills |
| 6:55:06 | 28.56N 63.84 E | ||
Selected Literature
David Albright, Franz Berkhout, William Walker: World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, Oxford 1997.
Eric Arnett: Military Capacity and the Risk of War. China, India, Pakistan and Iran, Oxford 1997.
Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu: China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-off, in: Survival, Vol. 37 (4), 1995-1996, p. 147-167.
Otfried Ischebeck, Götz Neuneck Cooperative Policies for Preventing and Controlling the Spread of Missiles and Nuclear Weapons, Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 1996
Andrew Koch, Waheguru P.S. Sihdu: South Asia goes ballistic, then nuclear, in: Jane´s Intelligence Review, June 1998, S.36-37
Andrew Koch, Jennifer Topping: Pakistan´s Nuclear Weapons Program: A Status Report, in: The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 109-113
Wolfgang Liebert; Jürgen Scheffran (Eds.): Against Proliferation Towards General Disarmament, Münster 1995.
Timothy V. McCarthy: India: Emerging Missile Power, in: W. Potter, H. Jencks (Eds.) The International Missile Bazaar: The New Supplier' Network, Boulder/Col., 1994, p. 201-133.
G. Milhollin: India's Missiles - With a little Help from our Friends, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989, pp. 31-35.
Jürgen Scheffran: India and Nuclear Weapons in Ischebeck/Neuneck: Cooperative Policies for Preventing and Controlling the Spread of Missiles and Nuclear Weapons , Baden-Baden 1996,
Center for International Security and Arms Control: Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control, Stanford/Ca. 1991.
Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. 1995.
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