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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
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International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
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Reprinted with permission from Vital Signs, Vol.11, Issue 2.
With the recent round of nuclear testing, India and Pakistan have publicly submitted to the ideology of nuclear security. India, a longtime advocate of nuclear disarmament, points to its history of restraint as one reason for abandoning that restraint. Pakistan's response was largely taken for granted, an indication of worldwide acceptance of the politics of arms races.
Nuclear security is the idea that the threat of nuclear mass destruction provides security. Over the decades, the nuclear weapon states have developed and refined arguments along these lines to support deterrence policy. They claim that nuclear weapons are essential for their own security, and that of their allies, but they deny these weapons to others. By testing, India and Pakistan have rejected the discriminatory nature of the current non-proliferation regime, while echoing nuclear weapon state security rationales such as self-defense and sovereignty. This new regional context exposes and magnifies the weaknesses and flaws of nuclear security.
Deterrence and proliferation
According to nuclear security logic, the weapons are necessary in order to ensure that they never be used. As justification for deterrence, its supporters point to a history of non-use of nuclear weapons. But non-use does not prove that deterrence has actually worked or explain why since the end of World War II nuclear weapons have not been used directly (though they have been used for political muscle flexing). Certainly nuclear weapons have not prevented war.
In any case, the facts of history do not prove that deterrence will work in the future. The continuing vertical and recent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons make it increasingly likely that nuclear weapons will be used, whether by design, accident or miscalculation. One state's nuclear weapons are frequently the excuse for its neighbors and potential rivals to develop their own weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, biological or chemical.
Nuclear proliferation is fueled by continuing weapons development and deployment by nuclear weapon states, testing and other gestures that legitimize reliance on nuclear weapons, and the accelerating spread of nuclear materials and technology. The corresponding spread of reliance on deterrence policy increases the possibility that it will fail, that its assumptions will prove catastrophically false.
The pathology of nuclear security
At the heart of deterrence is the notion of security through military threat. Deterrence policy is used to mask the physical component of nuclear security- preparation for mass destruction - and to sidestep the moral and legal issues involved. The recent actions and statements of India and Pakistan mirror the security practices of the nuclear weapon states, highlighting the contradictions inherent in the underlying policies.
That nuclear weapons have come to be associated with progress and power is no mystery. Public support in India and Pakistan for the testing reflects this association and reveals widespread frustration with the nuclear weapon states and their stated intention to pursue nuclear disarmament. It also reveals the extent to which nuclear security has seeped into public consciousness worldwide. The illogic of nuclear security, the dependence on nuclear weapons for `national defense' and the popular association of nuclear weapons with independence and development are inventions of the nuclear weapon states, imported wholesale into South Asia.
Reversing the current proliferation trend will therefore require a psychological shift, a rejection of nuclear weapons as a means to security or to anything but eventual unprecedented disaster. These weapons should not be a source of pride. They are carriers of the ugliest application human beings can make of their intelligence and resources. Their existence is a reflection of our greatest weaknesses: fear, distrust, greed and indifference to suffering.
Nuclear law
The debate within India over nuclear deterrence reflects the problematic nature of this policy. Some see deterrence as creating stability, while others see it as dangerous and irrational. The debate also reflects conflicting interpretations of international law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of July, 1996, on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court did not directly address deterrence, but it did find the threat or use of nuclear weapons `generally' contrary to the rules of international law.
The Court's use of `generally' represents its inability to determine the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons `in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake'. Indian analysts, like others, are divided over the significance of this possible exception to complete illegality. But the Court directs the way to resolve this ambiguity. The Court found that the difference of views on the legality of these weapons threatens the stability of international law and `the international order it is intended to govern,' and that it is `important to put an end to this state of affairs' through `complete nuclear disarmament'. In short, disarmament negotiations are the solution to the current instability, as demanded by international law and as interpreted by the highest international Court.
Nuclear weapons force the question: Rule of law or rule of terror? The choice is between a world kept `secure' through constant threat of mass destruction and escalating risk of use, or a good faith effort to improve the function of legal and other mechanisms for genuine security. In the latter case, law is a tool, no more and no less. It can support conflict prevention and resolution, codify and standardize agreements, and help mediate conflicting interests.
Security through disarmament
On the future of nuclear weapons the law is clear: negotiate and conclude nuclear disarmament. Fortunately, India's role as a prominent player in the demand for disarmament has survived the nuclear testing. The Indian government, with strong public support, has called for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a global, comprehensive and non-discriminatory regime for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in South Asia is only possible in the context of universal action toward complete nuclear disarmament. Keeping elimination in sight as a universal goal can also bring immediate steps into focus. Unilateral measures consistent with the final goal, such as fissile material cutoff, de-alerting and separation of warheads from delivery vehicles, will improve the credibility of the nuclear weapon states and the political climate for disarmament.
Are India's calls for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention genuine? According to the nuclear weapon states, they are not. The truth is probably more complicated. It is quite possible to have conflicting interests and goals, to have a state associate nuclear weapons with prestige and independence, even as its members would actually prefer the security of a nuclear weapons free world. But if the nuclear weapon states wish to discredit India's demand, why not call India's `bluff'?
The nuclear weapon states have enough of a military cushion that they have nothing to lose by responding to India's call. Starting meaningful negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament would hurt no one and might reveal new approaches to stopping and reversing proliferation. Achievements to date have required great effort and risk, but have not prevented the growth of nuclear threats and nuclear insecurity. Negotiation, conclusion and implementation of a nuclear weapons convention and compliance with it are in the security interests of every single state on the globe.
Merav Datan is IPPNW's new Director of Programs. Prior to joining IPPNW she was Research Director for the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP). Address: Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 126 Rogers Str., Cambridge, MA 02142, USA; tel +1-617-868-5050 x.216, fax -2560, email datan@igc.org.
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