International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Steps towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

Martin B. Kalinowski

1. Introduction

With respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the Middle East appears to be one of the most threatened regions in the world. The recent crisis about the UN-inspections in Iraq underscored the need to design credible and consensual steps towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

For many years the UN General Assembly as well as the IAEA General Conference have regularly adopted a resolution on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The NPT PrepCom in 1997 in New York decided to allocate special time to address this goal. The multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East could have been another forum to support the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

All countries of the region with the exception of Israel have signed the NPT. In the case of a few signatories there are suspicions that clandestine nuclear activities may take place without being detected by nuclear safeguards. Anyway, due to the complicated interconnectedness of the three kinds of weapons of mass destruction and because it is vital not to single out Israel, it became a consensus among countries in the region that the attention should shift towards a mutually and effectively verifiable WMDFZ in the Middle East. This zone should be established in the framework of a regional security system.

The difficult and endangered peace process in this region has in the past precluded any significant progress towards this goal, and this is difficult to change. In many cases, more than non-intrusive monitoring measures are not likely to be acceptable at this stage. However, the peace process will probably significantly benefit from any small step towards reaching the ultimate goal. Nabil Elaraby, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations, suggests to begin a preparatory phase for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Likewise, Yitzhak Lior from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel favours a step-by-step approach and regional controls as basic features which made the Tlatelolco Treaty possible and successful.

As the experience of ABACC, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, demonstrates, bilateral or trilateral agreements offer an immediate and significant confidence-building measure that may evolve into a regional arrangement and that could be prepared with the support of the scientific community and NGOs.

It is proposed here to apply a non-intrusive monitoring approach. Considering the character of the political relations in the region, particularly the state of the peace process, there is no doubt that suggesting intrusive verification inspections would at the present time and presumably also in the near future be premature. Both the modest progress in the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group activities between 1992 and 1995 and successful arms control in other world regions lead to the conclusion that intrusive verification inspections will be politically acceptable only after a sufficient foundation of confidence has been built. To achieve such state of relations practical experience in cooperation as well as time is needed. The establishment of cooperative non-intrusive monitoring would in itself constitute a confidence-building measure.

The bilateral approach offers a useful tool to make progress in a situation in which countries are not prepared to accept the full implementation of international inspections. It paves the way for a multilateral arrangement. The mechanism for doing so may start by conducting measurements on both sides of the borders by national teams. The next step would be comparing results throughout the exchange of measurements, this is a step which is expected to boost confidence, significantly, within the scientific community and beyond. A later step would be to conduct cooperative measurements across the other side of the borders with the help of international observers. Such measurements may initially aim at verifying an environmentally safe operation and will embody the concept of reciprocity.

2. Cooperative non-intrusive monitoring as confidence building measure towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

What is required now in the Middle East are intermediate steps and elements for a cooperative monitoring system. This should be able to provide confidence that all countries in the region have ceased to produce biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as to test related delivery systems. Such an intermediate step has much in common with intermediate steps that are helpful on a global scale to reach the goal of a nuclear weapons free world. Mutual learning for both areas can be expected. Remote monitoring of non-production of nuclear weapons.

The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. Two new international agreements with relevance for remote monitoring of nuclear weapons' activities are currently in the process of implementation: The additional safeguards protocol and the CTBT. Also, the IAEA General Conference agreed in October 1997 to hold an expert workshop on the Middle East in 1998.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation starts to establish its monitoring network in the Middle East. Israel has signed the CTBT. The new Protocol (INFCIRC/540) which has the purpose of strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of nuclear safeguards allows for environmental monitoring. A number of Arab states expressed their objection to the strengthened safeguards system as long as it does not apply to Israel. It could be signed by Israel without a fundamental change in its policy, because it is not restricted to full scope safeguards according to INFCIRC/153, but can also be applied to facility related safeguards (INFCIRC/66) which are in force in Israel.

Israel said that, while the Agency's 93+2 Programme presented a shift in the attention of the Agency's safeguards system to undeclared facilities, the technical implications of this shift had not yet been satisfactorily resolved and further development was needed, especially concerning capabilities or wide area detection of undeclared facilities. The Model Protocol itself mentions wide area monitoring, but makes its application dependant on approval by the IAEA Board of Governors.

Environmental monitoring of radionuclides has the additional benefit of assessing the environmental impact of nuclear activities which is relevant for international relations due to the transboundary transport of radionuclides.

Non-intrusive monitoring of non-production of biological and toxin weapons

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) has been in force since 1975. However, initially it did not include effective provisions for verification. In 1986 a major step forward was made in openness and verification when the five-year review conference reached agreement on exchanges of information about all high-containment biological research facilities and all unusual outbreaks of disease or toxin-related illness. Currently, a verification system for the Biological Weapons Convention is under negotiation in Ad Hoc Group sessions in Geneva. In the past, a number of mock inspections have been conducted to gain experience and to demonstrate their effectiveness.

Non-intrusive monitoring of non-production of chemical weapons

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) entered into force on 29 April 1997. By the end of 1997 Iran was the only state in the Middle East which had ratified the CWC. Israel has signed it, but not yet ratified.

The chemical industry has obligations for declaration and will be subject to verification inspections on a basis of managed access. The CWC has an extensive Verification Annex and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is in the process of establishing its work. Remote verification is of minor importance for the CWC. Environmental measurements have some significance in investigating an allegation of the use of chemical weapons in a war. It has to be studied whether any confidence building measures by using specific non-intrusive monitoring technologies could be established before the CWC is ratified. Perhaps such approaches may still be of interest beyond the verification of the CWC after its ratification.

Remote monitoring of non-testing of delivery systems

International treaties with regard to delivery systems are still in a premature state. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is restricted to export controls. Neither does it put any restrictions on the signatories' own delivery systems nor does it include any provisions for verification. The proposed Zero Ballistic Missile (ZBM) regime is the ultimate goal. More realistic is a regional agreement for non-acquisition of further delivery systems or a freeze of their development and testing. The testing of missiles constitutes a fact that can easily be monitored from remote sites on ground, in the air or from space. The non-deployment of missiles can be verified with airborne visual inspection or from space. This involves tested and proven technology that has been used for the SALT and START treaties as well as for the Open Skies Treaty. In addition, procedures for on-site inspection and portal-perimeter monitoring of critical missile-related facilities will be considered, similar to the INF and START Treaties. Immediate steps could include confidence-building measures, in particular the announcement of ballistic missile launches beyond a certain range.

3. Proposed activities:

1. Develop a political concept for cooperative non-intrusive monitoring as a confidence building measure towards a WMDFZ in the framework of a regional security system in the Middle East.

2. Assess the successes and problems of UNSCOM in Iraq and Open Skies in Europe to draw lessons for cooperative non-intrusive verification in the Middle East.

3. Assess the progress and implications of implementing the CWC, BWC, CTBT, MTCR and the additional safeguards protocol in the Middle East.

4. Suggest and evaluate new technical and related political measures for cooperative non-intrusive monitoring.

5. Provide scientific evidence for the effectiveness of wide area monitoring methods for undeclared facilities and activities related to the production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

6. Undertake field-tests and implement pilot-scale instruments to demonstrate the technical effectiveness of specific non-intrusive monitoring measures and to provide for a precedence of cooperative remote monitoring for confidence building.

7. It has to be studied whether any confidence building measures could be established and could contribute to a cooperative non-intrusive verification system for weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

8. Follow the progress of the BWC Ad Hoc Group sessions to learn about realistic proposals with relevance for the Middle East.

9. Develop confidence building measures and verification procedures related to missile control in the region.

10. Develop a strategy for a political and technical process to implement promising measures which will be identified in the here proposed previous activities.

4. Conclusion

The difficult and endangered peace process in the Middle East has in the past precluded any significant progress towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in this region, and this is difficult to change. It is proposed here to choose a non-intrusive monitoring approach. Considering the character of the political relations in the region, particularly the state of the peace process, there is no doubt that suggesting intrusive verification inspections would at the present time and presumably also in the near future be premature. The establishment of cooperative non-intrusive monitoring would in itself constitute a confidence-building measure.

Acknowledgement

The following persons deserve acknowledge-ment for their comments and reflections to this paper: F. H. Hammad (ESAP, Egypt), Margret Johannsen (IFSH, Germany) Ayman Khalil (CRACS, Jordan), Wolfgang Liebert (IANUS, Germany), Kathryn Nixdorff (IANUS, Germany),.Reuven Pedatzur (Galili Center, Israel), and Jürgen Scheffran (IANUS, Germany). For example the report on Proliferation: Threat and response by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense (Washington, November 1997) puts by far the most attention to the proliferation in the Middle East. See Nabil Elaraby, The Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, in: Pericles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone (eds.), Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, UNIDIR/97/37, Geneva 1997, p.81-90. At the same time Lior makes the point that a number of other preconditions are of importance, including good neighbourliness. See Yitzhak Lior, Middle East - Future Perspectives, in: Alves/Cipollone (1997), p.91-93. See Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace. The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks, London 1996, pp. 36-45; Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, Cambridge, Mass. 1997, pp. 205-261. See also F.H. Hammad, Monitoring and verification of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 14, November 1997, p.41-44. See PPNN Newsbrief, Fourth Quarter 1996 See PPNN Newsbrief, Third Quarter 1997, page 10. The Model Protocol additional to the agreement(s) between .... and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards (INFCIRC/540, Vienna, September 1997) says in its Article 9 that a country ,shall provide the Agency with access to locations specified by the Agency to carry out wide-area environmental sampling, (...). The Agency shall not seek such access until the use of wide-area environmental sampling and the procedural arrangements therefore have been approved by the Board and following consultations between the Agency and ....". See e.g. Jürgen Scheffran, Verification of ballistic missile elimination, INESAP Conf. Proc. No.2, Gothenborg, Sweden, May 30 - June 2, 1996, Darmstadt 1997. These proposals are part of a proposed project of INESAP which was developed by the author in cooperation with F.H. Hammad, Ayman Khalil and Reuven Pedatzur.

Martin Kalinowski is Senior Researcher at IANUS, Technical University Darmstadt.

Adress: Zintl Institut, Hochschulstrasse 10, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany, tel +49-6151-16-3016, fax +49-6151-166039, email:kalinowski@hrzpub.tu-darmstadt.de