 |
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
 |
 |
|
|
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation |
|
|
|
An Analysis of the Gulf Conflict
Xanthe Hall 
Observers from the UN Oil for Food Programme, Unicef and World Health Organization (WHO) are among the other residents of the canal hotel in Baghdad where the UN Inspectors of UNSCOM live. There is a barely disguised animosity between the humanitarian workers and the inspectors, who live on the top floor and "think they are in charge", one nutrition expert reportedly said. The inspectors are scathing of the humanitarian workers, who they think are duped by the Iraqis and too sympathetic. Conversely, they have been dubbed "UN-Scum" by the other hotel residents, a name originally coined by the Iraqis.
The problem lies with the arrogance of some of the inspectors that has given UNSCOM a bad reputation. These were mostly the ex-US military personnel. Their behaviour has been deliberately provocative in an Islamic country: drinking too much and shouting, treating the hotel personnel and the Iraqis generally as menials, were examples of this. One US-American reportedly played the Spice Girls at top volume on his cassette recorder on returning to Iraq at Habbanja airport.
The Iraqi accusation that secret service officials were among the inspectors from the start, along with ex-US military personnel that took part in the invasion of Iraq in 1991, seems to be confirmed by various sources. The neutrality of UNSCOM is therefore undermined, and leads to the perception by Iraq that the inspections contravene their sovereignty.
The Sanctions
Malnutrition and other medical data from Iraq show that the sanctions have probably killed more Iraqis since than Allied bombs during the 1991 Gulf War. Denis Halliday, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, the originator of the idea of doubling the amount of oil for food, sees the sanctions as a torment for the Iraqi people, inconsistent with the human rights provision of the UN charter, and undermining the moral credibility of the UN. Money is deducted from the Oil for Food programme for compensation for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and for UN operations in Iraq, leaving a pitiful amount for food and medicine. Even after doubling the amount, this will not be sufficient.
According to UNICEF studies, one quarter of Iraqi children under the age of six - about one million children - are malnourished. It is estimated that approximately 800,000 people have died in the seven years of the embargo, of which 320,000 were children under 5 years old.
Exporting the Bomb to Irak
Sales to Iraq of arms and the means to produce weapons of mass destruction during the war with Iran are a direct cause of today's conflict with Iraq. Apart from the massive amounts of conventional arms that were exported to Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries in the eighties, the means to produce nuclear, biological and chemical weapons were supplied mostly by Western companies. More than half of the companies listed in a study by the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles as suppliers of technology are German. These companies were particularly helpful in the field of poisonous gas production and missile technology .
According to General Wafik Samarrai, leading strategist in the Iraqi army, who fled to Syria in 1994, the Germans were crucial for the acquisition of materials and know-how for the production of chemical weapons. The whole operation was directed from the Iraqi embassy in Bonn because the leading firms were to be found in Germany. Samarrai claims that the German authorities turned a blind eye to their activities because of the amount of business for German industry that they brought. On top of this, it was important to them that Iran, which propagated an Islamic revolution, should not be allowed to get the upper hand. Without this massive amount of help to build weapons of mass destruction, claims Samarrai, the Iraqis could not have held out against Iran for so long. Iraqi agents worked together with the German secret service, exchanging information about Iran's combat capabilities. The General claims further that during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's top agent, German diplomat Juergen Gietler, passed on information about the planned US invasion, including a letter from Bush to Kohl containing allied troop information.
According to "Der Spiegel", UN inspectors set up a secret database in which they have collated all the information about suppliers to Iraq of components, material and know-how to build weapons of mass destruction. Again, German companies rank high on the list for supplying the means for the nuclear programme, the Scud missile, and poisonous gas production. But Switzerland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Romania and the United States are also listed.
Although export laws in most of the above listed countries provide for control over supplies of arms and weapons technology that could effectively prevent companies from exporting, the problem is a political one. The list of importing countries that are most critically looked at are those who are considered to be potential aggressors towards the exporting country. Before Iraq invaded Kuwait, it was not viewed in this way, and the majority of export applications were passed without question. Moreover, companies exporting dual-use goods - products that have civil as well as military usage - could easily circumvent these controls. There are indications that at some levels the arming of Iraq was seen positively in the hope of defeating Iran. This kind of "proxy war" was mostly driven by United States foreign policy and exploited by German and other companies, knowing that their governments would follow the US line.
Nuclear Weapons Programme
Iraq's nuclear programme has been, according to UNSCOM and the IAEA, destroyed. Iraq was, however, with the help of many Western companies, very close to having the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. 7,000 technicians and 20,000
assistants worked on the programme, entitled "Petrochemical Project Three", at a cost of around $10 billion.
In order to produce the fissile material necessary, Iraq built up to 10,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium. Components and designs were delivered by German companies. According to the UN, however, the supply of nuclear components was not a question of isolated incidents, but rather a systematically established network of foreign know-how, materials and technology. Companies, such as the H+H Metallform did not only supply their own products, but helped Iraq to find other companies and experts. The amount of knowledge and training accumulated by the Iraqis in this period of time (1989 - 1991) allows them to maintain the theoretical capacity to rebuild nuclear weapons in the future, according to UN experts.
Iraq signed the NPT in 1969, ten years after initiating its civil nuclear programme. The first supplies came from the Soviet Union, but then Iraq turned to western Europe for its technology. In 1975, Iraq signed a cooperation agreement with France and a year later with Italy. Uranium was supplied by Portugal and Nigeria. Egypt, Pakistan and Brazil became important partners for uranium enrichment technology, which they had received from Germany. Then Iraq decided to buy directly - more than eleven tons of fuel rods were ordered from the Hanau company NUKEM. Fortunately, at the last minute the export licences were not granted for this deal.
The Israeli bombing of the Osirak research reactor in 1981 put back the Iraqi nuclear programme years. Iraq had its hands full with the war against Iran, during which time it concentrated on building-up its chemical and biological weapons programme (also with German and US assistance). From 1988 onwards, however, Iraq made substantial progress with German assistance, particularly in the field of uranium enrichment until the nuclear weapons programme was destroyed by allied bombs in 1991.
Iraq's nuclear weapons programme demonstrates clearly the dangers of artificially separating "civil" and "military" nuclear technology. The way to the bomb was paved by Iraq's nuclear energy programme and, but for the invasion of Kuwait, might have succeeded. All of the supplies to Iraq for its civil programme (mostly from the Soviet Union, France and Italy) were known to the IAEA and the fissile materials were covered by IAEA safeguards under the NPT. Only the enrichment plants remained unreported until after the 1991 Gulf War was over.
The Diplomatic Solution
The world sighed with relief when Kofi Annan came back to New York with an agreement under his belt. The US reaction, however, was similar to that of the last diplomatic solution brokered by the Russians, which was described by one journalist as like a child's reaction to finding that its Christmas present is a pair of sensible grey socks. Like the ending of a Hollywood film that indicates that a sequel is already being planned, time was not lost in introducing a resolution to the UN to secure their backing for a military strike should the agreement be broken. Despite disagreement about the interpretation of the wording of this resolution, the US has already made it clear that it now has the right to use military force.
Annan tried to help the US not to lose face by stating that the show of force had been helpful in securing a diplomatic solution. This was indeed useful to Clinton who claimed he had planned it all along. This brings us to the very core of the meaning of deterrence and its inherent risks. Using the threat of military force to deter depends upon the credibility of the will to carry it through. In the Cold War this went as far as planning to kill millions upon millions of innocent people and threaten the very existence of the human species as well as nature itself. Even if it was true that Clinton was only threatening to use force on Iraq to deter, his military planners were surely working out exactly how to carry out "a massive and decisive military strike".
The United States administration is planning on using military force. The question is only when. At the beginning of March, the defence ministry announced it would be vaccinating US troops against Anthrax (despite the suspicions that earlier vaccinations during the Gulf War were a possible cause of the Gulf War Syndrome). Simultaneously, the Presidential Office applied for an extra $1.361 billion for a military strike, raising the amount to $4.35 billion.
The Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
The transcript of the US Department of Defence Briefing on January 27 1998 clearly shows that that the United States did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq. When asked if the use of nuclear penetrating bombs had been ruled out, the DoD spokesman, Kenneth Bacon replied, "I don't think we've ruled anything in or out in this regard. Our position is that we would respond very aggressively."
Prior to this, a Presidential Decision Directive was issued codifying the expansion of roles for nuclear weapons to include nuclear reprisals against non-nuclear states who use weapons of mass destruction, or for the incineration of chemical and biological agents on the ground or in flight, as well as pre-emptive strikes against nuclear, chemical and biological installations and command and control centres. The US mission, as described by Bacon in the DoD briefing was "to get rid of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction." Although the option of achieving this through the inspections was still receiving lip service, the use of military force to achieve this goal was clearly being planned.
When asked if it was not difficult to drop a bomb on a chemical weapons plant without poisoning the atmosphere, Bacon replied, "That's certainly something that the planners would take into account, but without getting into specifics, I can't go beyond that now." This was meant to implicate that the US military was aware and dealing with this problem. One speculation was that the use of a "bunker-buster", a deep penetrating bomb would do the job, and that one such bomb had been developed which would purportedly cause the walls of the bunker to fall inwards on top of the chemical or biological weapons after penetration, so that no toxins would be released into the atmosphere. This device was named the "Wall-Eye Bomb". Also question of the use of high temperatures to incinerate the chemical or biological arsenal suggested the desired use of nuclear weapons.
Speculation about the use of the B61-11 nuclear bomb also helped to transfer the message to Iraq that the use of nuclear weapons was not ruled out. The deployment of the B2 bomber, designated to deliver the B61-11, was also openly discussed. It was reported that there were differing opinions on the potential performance of the bomber, which could be detrimental or beneficial to its marketing, according to its success or failure in an attack on Iraq. Only after Yeltsin blurted out a warning to Clinton that he "might get into a World War", did the US administration issue a statement that they had no intentions or plans of using nuclear weapons. This wording echoes, however, the wording used in the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation, where NATO declares it has no intention or plan to deploy nuclear weapons in new NATO member states, but still does not rule out the option of doing so. This can also be applied to the statement of the administration on Iraq. The recent test of the B61-11 in Alaska increases speculation on its use.
Stephen Schwartz, guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, puts forward a convincing case for believing that a policy of deliberate ambiguity on the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons was enacted during the recent round of the Gulf conflict. This was also the case during the 1991 Gulf War where messages of the same nature were issued, and subsequently these veiled threats have been used as an argument for the success of deterrence. Neither confirm nor deny has long been US official policy. Although off-the-record conversations imply that use was not really contemplated in the 1991 Gulf War, one can assume that the threat needs to be escalated to remain credible, hence the speculation over which nuclear weapon would be suitable to perform the mission during the recent conflict.
The danger of such an escalation of threat is clear from the Cold War. In order to assure credibility of deterrence, plans become increasingly real and deployment brings inherent risks. The threat has increased controversy with Russia, which is already reviewing its nuclear weapons policy in the light of NATO expansion. Moreover, the message to all other nations, including Iraq, remains clear: nuclear weapons confer power on a state which is decisive in a conflict even when not used, which conventional weapons do not. The correctness of this message is extremely debatable, especially as there is no concrete evidence that nuclear weapons actually deterred Saddam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction during the 1991 Gulf War, only hearsay.
Citizen's Inspections
During the conflict an idea emerged in several places in the world simultaneously. NGOs in Europe and America began discussing the idea of going to Iraq and inspecting Saddam's palaces themselves as Citizen's Verification Teams. The idea was to provide neutrality and build confidence. But it was recognised that such a mission required expert knowledge. Suggestions were made to find scientists among our ranks who could go, to be accompanied by lawyers, mediators, doctors and parliamentarians. One suggestion was to ask the whole Canberra Commission to go. In the end, the diplomatic solution overtook these ideas, but they still remain on the drawing board for the next round of this conflict.
The idea of Citizen's Inspections has been steadily growing for some time. The "Marshalls of International Law" who have inspected nuclear bases and command and control centres in Europe were inspired by the Advisory Opinion of the World Court. Professor Rotblat has often spoken of the need for societal verification after the elimination of nuclear weapons to prevent breakout. It should not, however, be left only up to the scientists to find the courage to become whistleblowers, citizen's must claim the right to access to military installations in order to verify that no weapons of mass destruction are being produced, tested or stored.
The Nuclear Weapons Abolition Days have been set up within the Abolition 2000 Network to lend a framework to inspections of sites where there is good reason to believe that actions are being prepared which contravene international law. Of course, at this time it is illegal to "trespass" on such installations in most countries, and these actions constitute civil disobedience. We could also work on a parallel line - openly offering the services of our experts to the UN as Non-Governmental Verification Teams - combined with the demand that all states suspected and known to have weapons of mass destruction be inspected.
This idea is still in its infancy and requires more thought. But one thing is for certain: the conflict has not ended and it will end in further and massive bloodshed. It is not just a case of stopping the US from bombing Iraq. It is also a question of taking away the perceived justification: the development in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. An enormous amount of mediation work has to be done here, not just with the most obvious conflict parties -the US and Iraq - but within the Middle East. Conflicts such as these should be referred by the United Nations to the World Court rather than being left in the hands of the Security Council. And most important of all - the sale of all arms to this region needs to stop.
References
Xanthe Hall is Co-Director of IPPNW Germany, Koertestraße 10, 10967 Berlin 61 Germany; tel +49-30 693 0244, fax 8166; email ippnw@oln.comlink.apc.org or: ippnw@vlberlin.comlink.de
|
|
|