International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

De-nuke NATO

Karina Wood

"The likely consequences of nuclear war have no politically, militarily or morally acceptable justification, and therefore the threat to use nuclear weapons is indefensible. — Sadly, the Cold War lives on in the minds of men who cannot let go the fears, the beliefs, the enmities of the Nuclear Age. They cling to deterrence, clutch its tattered promise to their breast, shake it wistfully at bygone adversaries and balefully at new or imagined ones. They are gripped still by its awful willingness not simply to tempt the apocalypse but to prepare its way."

General Lee Butler USAF, (ret.), former Commander-in-Chief, United States Strategic Air Command (1991-94)

ATO does not provide, in the long-term, a security system that will sustain peace in Europe. Expanding the NATO nuclear-armed "defensive alliance" to nuclear-armed Russia's borders is dangerous folly. Rather than a consolidation of democracy and the extension of "an area in which wars don't happen", as U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright would have it, expanding NATO eastward is a provocative, destabilizing act which is heightening nuclear tensions between the West and Russia.

Russia is desperate for Western financial assistance. The United States could be negotiating deep arms reductions in the Russian arsenal on a reciprocal basis for economic assistance. But instead of offering a 1990s Marshall Plan for Russia (which would be in the economic and political interests of the West, and would address the "loose nukes" danger), the United States has pushed NATO to embark upon a Marshall Plan for arms contractors in Central and Eastern Europe. In the face of this expansion, it is more urgent than ever that the United States consider the removal of its nuclear weapons from Europe: if, as NATO says, Russia is not the enemy, then withdrawing nuclear bombs from Europe would go a long way to defusing NATO-Russian tensions. It would be a sign of faith for Russia that could spark reciprocal acts of cooperative arms control, and by "calming the Bear," provide Central Europe with a far greater sense of security than inclusion in NATO currently offers them.

The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has shrunk dramatically, from over 6,000 of many types in the early 1980s to some 150 B-61 tactical nuclear bombs at 10 air bases in seven countries today: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the U.K. NATO's European nuclear arsenal also includes Britain's Trident II missiles, a maximum of 96 deployed on its three Vanguard submarines patrolling the North Atlantic. At the end of March, Britain eliminated the Royal Air Force's tactical nuclear bombs, a move the British government said was in line with NATO policies; however, the estimated 30 U.S. tactical B-61s at USAF Lakenheath remain. Over the past decade the Soviet Union, and then Russia, similarly consolidated a far-flung arsenal of tens of thousands of locations in Eastern Europe and fourteen republics to about ninety sites in Russia where 22,500 nuclear weapons are deployed.

While these dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons in Europe are certainly welcome, we must not be fooled by the arms control "numbers game" into thinking that NATO and Russia are consequently progressing along a natural trajectory to disarmament. The numbers of weapons are down; but in terms of nuclear military planning and operational procedures, nothing much has changed. Nine years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO and Russia retain illegal "first strike" nuclear policies; both the United States and Russia continue to keep roughly 5,000 of their strategic nuclear weapons on a "hair-trigger" alert, ready to be launched at a moment's notice; and both continue to adhere to an overall strategic concept known as mutual assured deterrence or MAD.

The Cold War nuclear arms race began because the United States was so alarmed by the Soviet Union's overwhelming conventional superiority that it felt military equity could only be achieved through the assertion of nuclear strength. Today, the tables are turned as Russia faces a "victorious" resurgent NATO that with its three new members will have an enormous and growing conventional military advantage over Russia of 5:1. Now, with its conventional military forces reduced to ineffectiveness - as demonstrated in Chechnya - and a rocky economy, many in the Russian government feel that Russia has no alternative but to increase reliance on its nuclear weapons. We have already seen evidence of this in Russia's recent abandonment of Gorbachev's pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of war, and in the Duma's intransigence over ratification of START II.

Destroying the European Security Architecture

Last September, the Fourth Freedom Forum led a "citizens' fact-finding mission" to Europe on NATO expansion. In Moscow they met with Sergey Barburin, leader of the anti-NATO block within the Russian Duma (with more than 250 members out of 450 deputies), who proclaimed that NATO expansion is "destroying the architecture of European security." He, and two other deputies from the Communist Party and Agrarian Party reported that the Duma had recently adopted a resolution condemning the previous agreement to withdraw Russian nuclear missiles from Belarus.

Earlier this year, Victor Mikhailov, then Russian Minister for Atomic Energy, proposed the construction of thousands of low-yield "mini-nukes," and the re-opening of production lines for a variety of ballistic missiles, as well as for redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons back into Belarus ^__ all as responses to NATO expansion. Mikailov also suggested Russia should consider withdrawing from the INF treaty and the CTBT, and cutting off new NATO members from Russian energy and other exports as a retaliation for expansion. On January 23, the Duma approved a resolution asking the Russian president and government to devise a program to counteract NATO expansion. The resolution described NATO enlargement as the "most serious military threat to our country since 1945" and charged that NATO member states "have not renounced the use of force as a method to resolve foreign-policy problems."

General Eugene Habiger, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently reported that Russia has begun production of its new SS-27 strategic missile and is building new submarines armed with multiple-warhead missiles and new bomber-launched nuclear cruise missiles. He said Russia is also building a new "Borey class" of strategic submarines that will be fielded around 2005 with a new SSX-28 missile. A new Russian air-launched cruise missile is also in the works. Meanwhile, the United States recently introduced a new nuclear bomb into its arsenal, the "bunker-busting" B-61 11, and is operating a $4.5 billion a-year experimental nuclear weapons program which will likely produce designs for more new nuclear warheads.

Cold War II ?

This disconcerting and depressing set of circumstances has moved General Lee Butler—who just four years ago as the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command was responsible for setting U.S. policy for deterring a nuclear war and, if deterrence failed, fighting such a war—to observe that, "our present policies, plans and postures governing nuclear weapons make us prisoners still to an age of intolerable danger." If NATO's expansion plans and NATO's nuclear posture continues unchecked and unchallenged, we are very likely to enter Cold War II.

Today, the U.S. is the only country that stations nuclear weapons outside its national borders, and NATO provides the nuclear umbrella that facilitates this. NATO's continued deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, even at reduced levels, along with its refusal to respect the International Court of Justice's unanimous call for the immediate initiation of comprehensive disarmament negotiations, is in direct violation of the pledge made by the nuclear weapons states at the time of the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995: to pursue with determination "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."

The Non-Aligned Movement of 113 non-nuclear weapons states, led by South Africa, is challenging NATO's nuclear posture at the 1998 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. These countries are requesting that NATO adjust its nuclear doctrine to better reflect the goals of the NPT: they want assurances for parties to the NPT that they will not be targeted by NATO's nuclear weapons, and that the nuclear-haves will begin disarmament in earnest. They point out how NATO and the NPT are fundamentally at odds. The purpose of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to those states which currently are non-nuclear, and to reduce and eventually eliminate the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states. But NATO insists that "nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in NATO strategy," and by extending its nuclear umbrella to three new members NATO is effectively engaging in an act of nuclear proliferation.

If NATO won't give up its nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states will grow increasingly frustrated by the blatant hypocrisy being displayed by countries who are signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and the NPT, and some may decide to acquire nuclear weapons. The NPT is in real danger of unraveling.

What to do ?

So what is to be done? I certainly don't have all the answers, but here are some suggestions:

• NGOs should strongly support the Non-Aligned Movement's effort to hold NATO accountable to its NPT commitments. We must use the NPT structure to lobby NATO states to give negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, to adopt a no first use policy and strengthen their commitment to disarmament in a meaningful way.
  
  
• NGOs in the NATO countries which host U.S. nuclear weapons should seek to pass resolutions or bills in their parliaments calling for the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from their soil.
  
  
• U.S. NGOs should work with critics of NATO expansion and arms control supporters in the Senate to develop legislation calling for a comprehensive re-examination of NATO's nuclear posture, including an independent study to evaluate prospects for the withdrawal of NATO's nuclear weapons from Europe. If we fail in our attempts to stop Senate ratification of NATO expansion, it may be possible to get a Senator to attach such a statement as a condition of ratification or an amendment. (Such a condition or amendment would be very unlikely to pass, but it would serve the purpose of bringing attention to the important issue of the role of NATO's nuclear weapons in European security.)
  
  
• European NGOs should continue and escalate the direct actions at nuclear weapons storage sites in NATO member states. Direct action brings media attention to the existence of the U.S. bases, and keeps the weapons' role and risks in the public consciousness.
  
  
• We must convince NATO member governments to utilize the newly established Nuclear Experts Group of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council as a forum for discussing disarmament measures. This body could become the perfect forum for U.S. and Russian nuclear planners to negotiate the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe in return for major arms control measures from Russia, such as taking its nuclear missiles off alert.
  
  
• We need to point out to our policy makers the contradictions in NATO's mission: Why does NATO need to be a nuclear-armed military alliance when its own officials state that NATO's main role and focus in the coming decades will be preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions, "fostering the spread of democracy", and the like? Cooperative peace-keeping/enforcement type missions have no use for a nuclear deterrent. NATO's nuclear weapons and its policy of first use actually jeopardize peace keeping, conflict prevention and democracy's growth in Europe by antagonizing Russia and undermining meaningful disarmament progress.
  
  
• We must advocate the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), not the NATO military alliance, as the vehicle most suited to forging a pan-European security system. We must publicize the fact that the nonviolent East European Revolution did not occur because NATO "won." The nonviolent overthrow of Soviet occupation in part occurred because the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (later OSCE) successfully forged confidence-building measures and promoted democracy and respect for human rights. The CSCE was formed not as an appendix to NATO, but as a mechanism to link NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. In this regard, CSCE was successful. The OSCE, which includes the United States and Russia in its 53 members, has a record of monitoring elections, providing negotiators for conflicts, and if the political will and resources were invested, could be an effective regional security organization.

We must certainly do everything we can to prevent NATO expansion, remembering that if one NATO member state fails to ratify the expansion, it cannot go forward. But whether or not NATO expands, NGOs should step up the call for the denuclearization of NATO as a step towards the creation of a European nuclear weapon-free zone, and the surest way to promote arms control cooperation between the West and Russia.

Please join me and many others on-line to discuss how to get to a nuclear weapon-free Europe by sending an e-mail message to Majordomo@igc.apc.org, leave the subject line blank, and in the message text write: subscribe start3-europenwfz@igc.apc.org <your email address>.

Karina Wood, Tour Coordinator "No to NATO Expansion Speakers Tour", Consultant to the Fourth Freedom Forum, 43 Nisbet St, 3rd Fl., Providence, RI 02906, tel +1-401 751-8172, fax -1476, email: kwood@igc.org.