International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

NATO Expansion, Nuclear Weapons and European Security

Jiri Matousek

Introduction

A decade has already elapsed from the end of the East-West confrontation and the Cold War. This era was marked by the nuclear arms race which escalated to mutual assured destruction (MAD) due to the accumulated multiple nuclear overkill. Some people have nearly forgotten that the paranoic paradigm of stability assured by nuclear threat and balance of forces was broken through by the Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev who started to act in the spirit of "New Thinking". This was soon reflected in many military-political initiatives, inter alia by adoption of a new clearly defensive doctrine by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1987, mainly through the option of the "No first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances" by the USSR. This commenced the profound political changes in the Soviet Union and Central Eastern Europe and at the same time the process of nuclear disarmament and dramatic reduction of conventional forces.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets surrendered their East European "buffer zone" shortly before the Soviet Union expired at the end of 1991. Gorbachev agreed to withdraw Soviet troops from this region, acquiesced to the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, and even permitted the reunification of Germany and the expansion of NATO into what was once the German Democratic Republic. Gorbachev also signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which provided for massive reductions in Europe's conventional forces, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which greatly reduced the continent's nuclear forces, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which made possible substantial reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States. In turn, Gorbachev expected the West to refrain from expanding NATO into the vacuum created by the Soviet military withdrawal. Rather than NATO, Gorbachev believed the peace of the region would become the responsibility of the Conference (now the Organisation) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to which most of the nations of the continent belong.¹

In the early 1990s, the world had once the unique opportunity to overcome the obsolete security system based on military political blocks and to create a quite new security architecture based on equality and universality, encompassing all European countries, as well as the transatlantic link, improving the ability to prevent conflicts and settle them peacefully by political means. The chance was there to create a new regional security organisation as envisaged by the UN Charter, under aegis of the United Nations. The core of it undoubtedly already exists in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).²

Instead, Europeans have been faced to the efforts not only to maintain the remaining obsolete tool of the past confrontation but even to strengthen it prior to the previously promised transformation. This means that the unique historical opportunity could be missed and instead of enhanced stability, new security concerns seem to emerge.

NATO and nuclear weapons

Besides the mentioned progress in nuclear disarmament and arms control, one of the most important achievements of the changed political environment of the 1990s is the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of July 8, 1996, declaring the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons to be generally contrary to international law.

NATO still insists in retaining nuclear weapons. Up to 200 US nuclear bombs are still deployed in seven European NATO member states, Britain and France possess their Eurostrategic, as well as operational and tactical nuclear weapons. What is more important, NATO refuses to refrain from its doctrine to use nuclear weapons first. Even though the ICJ asserted that it "cannot conclude definitely" whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at a stake", this doubtful area of uncertainty does not cover NATO nuclear strategy. Indeed, NATO threatens to use nuclear weapons even when no member state is threatened in its very survival.⁴ NATO nuclear forces serve much broader political purposes, as can be quoted from an important document on NATO strategy:⁵ "The nuclear forces of the Alliance continue to play a unique and essential role in Alliance strategy... A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common committment continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning, in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements".

NATO's nuclear strategy has not been changed since the ICJ advisory opinion. Moreover it seems that the growing NATO-ization of the European Union has contributed to the shift in the pro-nuclear weapon bias in a couple of countries that now comprise the European Union. In the late 1960s and early 1970s three approaches emerged. It was France which took the most pro-nuclear weapons stance. It was joined by Portugal, especially in its opposition to a comprehensive test ban. The NATO core group, composed of Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and until the late 1970s also Britain and Greece, although rejecting or abstaining on fewer General Assembly resolutions than France or Portugal, still exhibits a strong nuclear weapons bias consistent with NATO doctrine. Finally, there were six countries supporting almost all resolutions favouring nuclear disarmament, i.e. Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden and to a lesser extent also Denmark and Spain. By the 1990s, the alignments had changed dramatically. There are only two groups now - 12 nations that vote consistent with NATO line, and three others (Austria, Ireland and Sweden) that struggle to remain receptive to nuclear disarmament.⁶

As a result of proposed NATO expansion, the number of states, committed to the NATO nuclear strategy will be increased. No matter, whether NATO deploys nuclear assets in the new member states, it will increase the number of states relying on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence and it will extend NATO's system of nuclear sharing arrangements.

To the utmost sensitive questions of planned enlargement of NATO belongs the problem of deployment of nuclear weapons. The Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation states:⁷ "The member states of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so". NATO also stated that it does not intend to build or use a nuclear weapons infrastructure on the territory of its new members.

But in spite of it, some statements, like e.g. by M. Albright that the new member states would have the same rights as the old ones, can be understood only in terms of having the right to deploy offensive assets including nuclear weapons. Even the leading Czech politicians, like former minister of foreign affairs J. Zieleniec declared readiness to accept even nuclear weapons in the name of defence of "western values".²

Moreover, the Founding Act fails to provide an internationally bounding guarantee that NATO will not deploy nuclear weapons in the new member states. NATO unilaterally reserves the right to change its declared policy on nuclear deployments. It is intended that they will become full and equal members and thus eligible to fully participate in NATO nuclear sharing and decision-marking arrangements. Full membership status includes the right to ask for the deployment of US-nuclear weapons as well as an obligation to accept that US nuclear weapons can be deployed at least during wartime (Denmark, Norway).⁴

Participation of non-nuclear weapons states in NATO nuclear sharing includes the possibility that the control over nuclear arsenals in wartime will be transferred to the armed forces of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Peacetime storage of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NNWS and peacetime training of the use of nuclear weapons are possible, which is already the case for existing NATO member NNWS. It is evidence that e.g. in Norway where nuclear weapons should not be deployed in the peacetime, US nuclear weapons on aircraft and submarine carriers are actually present for about 200 days a year for "training purposes".⁸

Violation of the NPT

NATO nuclear sharing and decision making arrangements are perceived as a violation of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by many non-NATO NNWS. Agreement among the parties to the NPT as to whether this is in compliance with or in violation of the NATO countries' obligations under the NPT has never been reached. Nevertheless, during both the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 and the 1997 PrepCom for the Review Conference in 2000 the issue was again subject to controversy. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that Russian Federation has withdrawn all of its nuclear weapons from the territory of foreign countries.⁴

The seriousness of the NATO declaration on "no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons..." in the Founding Act⁷ as quoted above, is considerably weakened by NATO unwillingness to commit itself not to do so. Moreover, it appears quite disturbing as an unreasonable hangover from its past inebriation with the hypothetical (albeit unproven) "deterrent usefulness" of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The strict refusal by NATO of the proposal to establish a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in Central and Easten Europe significantly diminishes the credibility of NATO with regard to the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in this area, where till now no nuclear weapons have been deployed. The establishment of such NWFZ would sanction the status quo and it should be welcome to NATO because it would consolidate the exclusion of any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons (e.g. in Belarus or Ukraine).

At present, the nuclear component in European security is highly questioned. European Union members are in the process of developing their own security and defence identity. The Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) commits them to eventually frame "a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". This will put the future of the British and French nuclear arsenals onto Europe's agenda, which is not likely to happen soon. Great difficulties to achieve consensus are to be expected in the discussions on common defence, including its nuclear component, especially due to the countries with long traditions in neutrality like Austria, Sweden and Finland, not to speak about changing defence postures even in the traditional member states, including UK.

Possible consequences of the NATO enlargement

After the end of the Cold War and the disbandment of the WTO, three options were open to NATO:³

• NATO might have also decided to disband. This was perhaps the most logical outcome, under the circumstances: but, as the optimist would say, politics is seldom governed by logic alone (the pessimist would say that politics has nothing to do with logic). The strong vested interest of the NATO bureaucratic machinery in its selfreservation was probably the main reason why the option to disband was never really seriously considered.
  
  
• A second possibility for NATO was to avoid any substantive change, to wait and see. This is often the safest option. "If it ain't broke don't fix it". But such a course of action - or rather inaction - might have been interpreted as lack of recognition of the epochal changes. Indeed, much of the pressure for NATO enlargement came from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
  
  
• The third option was to enlarge. This is the choice that has now been made, with the decision by NATO in Madrid to accept, as a first step, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Under present circumstances, the issue of NATO enlargement seems now to focus more on how to do it than on whether or not to do it.

The crucial issue are the relations with Russia. The end of the Cold War has entailed a transformation of the relations between the Western world and Russia, from adversarial to non-antagonistic and perhaps even friendly and cooperative. This development has steered humankind away from a course leading towards self-annihilation. It is because of this danger that several wise persons oppose NATO enlargement: indeed, it is precisely because of the risk of antagonizing Russia, that the most senior American expert on Russia, George Kennan has dubbed the expansion of NATO "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era".⁹

Building new enemy images

In the Central-East European states, the reasons for entering NATO were from the beginning, i.e. from 1993, mainly ideological - to share common Western values and to be committed to defend them. Whereas the official documents, like the concisely formulated defence doctrine in then Czechoslovakia² clearly stated, that the state had no enemy, which was confirmed in the White book on the Defence of the Czech Republic in 1995, ¹⁰ the leading politicians, advocating for NATO membership, were continuosly evoking certain Russophobia misusing the sensitive population's resentments on the supression of the "Prague Spring" of 1968. It is argued with the instability in Russia, possible migration from the East, smuggling arms and drugs and the like. It seems that NATO as a defence community lost any enemy. Perestroika and current transformation and collapse of the USSR have changed this potential of actual adversary insofar, that it ceased to exist. It seems therefore that transforming NATO means to look for new defence targets. This implies, according to the present Czech political leadership, the defence against new Russia. The leading idea of counterbalance of the so called Western against Eastern values seems to be weak ideological justification of NATO membership. This is, on the other hand, a very dangerous idea of the new bipolarity.

This new enemy imaging can be seen in the TV clips in the Czech public television, as well as on the billboards with the face of L. Brezhnev, clearly offending the feelings of the older generations, bearing in mind 140 thousands of the Soviet soldiers who fell on the Czechoslovak territory liberating it during the World War II.

Also the enthusiastic slogan at the end of the speech of M. Albright during her visit in Prague last summer "We shall jointly defend the New Europe" (without indicating an adversary) belongs to such ideological arsenal, at least indirectly. For me personally, who remembers the dark years of Nazi-occupation, these words are more than familiar: Defending "New Europe" belonged to the propagandistic arsenals of Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's minister of propaganda.

New dividing line in Europe

Creating an expanding military fortress in Europe with a new dividing line some hundred kilometers east of the Cold War divide is the wrong legacy to leave at the end of the bloodiest century in the history. It will clearly divide Europe. For them, who will be inside, more security is promised in order to defend democracy and freedom, those, who remain behind will be considered most probably as the second order population of this continent, who did not yet reach the right to be defended. For me personally, it is extremely bitter that the new dividing line would proceed across the former Czechoslovakia, precisely on the same line of former borders of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and Kingdom of Hungary in medieval times.

Cold War redux

Excluding Russia and other former Soviet allies and former Soviet republics is alienating and will undoubtedly force them to look for other partners in order to restore balance of forces distorted due to NATO extension. First of all, Russia will seek for restoring balance of conventional arms and forces and to adopt legitimate measures for enhancing its security, if the NATO military machinery would approach to its borders. It is not excluded, it is rather probable that Russia will seek for other partners, mainly among independent states, former Soviet republics, but even "unfriendly friends" not to be isolated facing an enlarged NATO. NATO extension engineered through Russia's weakness rather than its consent has led Russia to begin strengthening relations with its neighbours, China and Iran. A possible Eurasian military alliance to counterbalance NATO could be created, launching something like a new Cold War, creating actual enemies.

Nuclear proliferation

As it was analysed above, new member states would be brought to the nuclear decision making table. While the NATO-Russia Founding Act⁷ speaks on "No plans, no intentions and no need" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, it does not contain any guarantee that they indeed will not be stationed there. Attracting more militaries to the decision-making is nuclear proliferation, making more nations dependent on nuclear arsenals. This is against every NATO member's legal committment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover even the non-deployment but only using the air bases on the territory of the new states for temporal landing of aircraft with nuclear payload should be assessed as actual proliferation. In the case of deployment of nuclear assets one can assume that they would be targeted and consequently, they themselves would become targets. This has never been taken into consideration by politicians of countries running under NATO umbrella. This means that there are actually two kinds of NATO expansion going on now. One is geographic - an eastward push towards Russia. But the other is doctrinal: NATO's nuclear posture is now shaping the policies of the European Union.⁶ This tackles also the NATO-newcomers.

Undermining disarmament

Advocates of the NATO enlargement argue that it is not directed against anybody and that it will not endanger Russia. Every realistic politician and citizens with common sense will agree with Mikhail Gorbachev that Russia's security concerns should be left to it.¹¹ Russian bitterness over NATO expansion is not only being used by ultra-nationalists who are exploiting a growing sense of isolationism and defeat. It is quite legitimate to think about Russian security from the perspective of democratic forces. Since NATO announced its intention to expand, Russia renounced its policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons in 1993. (At present only China has this option). Vis-a-vis to approaching the NATO war machinery, Russian Federation will undoubtedly restore the distorted balance in conventional forces. This will question the CFE Treaty. One can expect increasing military presence in the western part of Russia's territory. Russian Federation will accelerate the re-joining process of the CIS, when its change to a defence community is highly probable. Facing actual nuclear proliferation, as explained above, Russian Duma will hesitate to ratify the START II agreement. The visions to negotiate further deep reductions of nuclear warheads of the United States and Russia to, say, the year 2000 on each side as envisaged within the START III agreement will become far behind the horizon.

Increasing arms sales

Adopting new member states and bringing them to the same standards with the old Sixteen in the sense of compatibility and interoperability means to buy new military equipment items, not only weaponry but also command, control and communication technology and other subsidiary equipment corresponding to NATO standards. This seems to be one of the reasons of expanding NATO, profitable mainly for the US military industrial complex. That is the reason why the enlargement is supported even by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in the US: it can positively influence jobs in the defence industries. It is exactly, why the largest opposition exists in other NATO countries without prospects in the arms sale bonanza to Central and Eastern Europe. This argumenrt appears mainly in France where the enlargement is criticised as being not in the interests of NATO security but merely in the interests of the US weapon manufacturers.

Costs

There are various estimates, varying between USD 40 to 125 billion¹² over the next 10 years. For propagandistic reasons, e.g. in the Czech Republic, the costs are presented as only limited to the membership fee. This has been estimated recently by former Minister of Defence M. Vyborny, as being equal to six beers (which should be acceptable by Czechs). The US propagandists seem to be much better. In the official material bearing signatures of many outstanding US officials, including several former US presidents¹³ you can read that the price for Peace (which is the euphemically described NATO enlargement) is only one candy bar.

No matter how much will be the exact overall price for the NATO extension, it is to add the costs of the new round of the arms race in further times due to above mentioned consequences. This will again postpone the urgent global agenda connected with sustainable development, saving future of humankind and of planet Earth.

Alternatives to NATO enlargement

There is a very simple alternative to NATO enlargement. It is not to enlarge, and instead develop the relations to the rest of Europe including Russian Federation on the base of the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). As I can assess it, being personally involved in many activities within the PfP, this framework enables any political, military technological and military activities among NATO members and former WTO member states, as well as among traditional neutral or non-alligned states, who signed it. This can serve as an example of cooperation of NATO members with non-member states within PfP.

It is often argued that NATO membership is good for UN peace-keeping and humanitarian operations, and Bosnia is presented as an example. It is however quite the opposite. In some phase of this unhappy mission, NATO became, as a matter of fact, one of the belligerents, bombarding one of the fighting sides after unjustified suspicion of having hit the Sarajevo marketplace, which never has been proven.

NATO is sometimes presented as a security organisation. This is, of course, not true. NATO is, and remains, even after transformation (which should have been started before any extension) to be more political than military, nothing more than a defence community. It can never play the role of an Pan-European security architecture because it will most probably never encompass all European states.

The likely candidate for a democratic organisation, encompassing all European states, having also a transatlantic link, representing the overall decision-making security body for Europe is undoubtedly the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This is the core of the future security regional organisation, envisaged by the UN Charter, which can act under the aegis of UNO.

Only such organisation, based on equality and universality can be engaged in preventing conflicts, in settling them peacefully by only political means, and if necessary, to be used for peace-keeping and in the worst case also for peace-making.

The necessary shift from the intervention option and military solutions to the conflict prevention option requires drastic readjustments of the current disparity between budgets of NATO and OSCE.⁴

OSCE actions have already demonstrated that OSCE member states are able, without the help of NATO, to prevent conflicts from openly breaking out, and to allow democratic elections to take place. Early detection, early warning, negotiations, mediation, consultations, arbitration, sanctions, and follow-up procedures are important existing components of the OSCE mandate. The help of NGOs would be invaluable for all of these components to be adequately fulfilled.

References:

1. Powaski R.E.: Joining the march of folly. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 18-22, Jan/Feb 1998

2. Matousek J.: Risks and benefits of NATO expansion. Peace and Security, The IIP Research Quarterly, 29, June, 30-34 (1997)

3. Calogero F.: Secretary General's Report 1997, Pugwash Newsletter, 34, 230-239 (1997)

4. Schlaining Manifesto, Burg Schlaining, June 15, 1997 (Supplement to INESAP Bulletin No. 13)

5. NATO: The Alliance New Strategic Concept, Rome 1991

6. Bosch M.M.: Europeïs nuclear family. The Bull. Atomic Sci, 35-37, Jan/Feb 1998

7. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and Russian Federation, May 27, 1997

8. Alba kör: No to NATO Conference, Budapest, November 1997

9. Kennan G.: International Herald Tribune, 6 February 1997

10. The White Book on the Defence of the Czech Republic. MoD of the Czech Republic, Prague 1995

11. Gorbachev M.: Let's be serious: There's no good reason to enlarge NATO. International Herald Tribune, 18-19 January 1997

12. The Cost of Expanding the NATO Alliance. CBO Papers, Washington, D.C.: US Congressional Budget Office, March 1996

13. NATO Expansion, America's Insurance Policy. US Committee to Expand NATO, Washington, D.C.1997

Professor Jiri Matousek, PhD, DSc, Dipl. Eng., born 1930, toxicological and environmental chemist. Director, Institute for Chemistry and Technology of Environmental Protection, Faculty of Chemistry, Technical University Brno, Czech Republic, visiting professor, International Institute for Peace, Vienna, Austria (former Director, Czechoslovak NBC Defence R&D Establishment, expert of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva). Member, Executive Committee and Council, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES); member, Standing Committee on Disarmament, World Federation of Scientific Workers; vice-chairman, Czech Committee for European Security and Cooperation etc.

Email: matousek@fch.vutbr.cz.