International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

Nuclear Weapons are Obsolete

Alexey Yablokov

Adapted from Nezavisimoe Voennoce Obozrenie, a supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No. 31 1997.

The consequences of a civilian, military, or terrorist nuclear catastrophe would not leave a single safe corner on the entire planet. Our research shows that by the year 2000, up to 430,000 people will have died as a result of cancerous diseases caused by the development and testing of nuclear weapons, and the expected death toll in the more distant future is 2.4 million.

The health consequences of nuclear testing are worse than previously believed. Even small doses of radiation can cause damage to embryonic development, spontaneous abortion, premature birth, and an increase in the infant mortality rate in the period from one day to four weeks after birth. Nuclear technology also threatens the lives of up to 20 percent of all those professionally involved in its development because up to 20 percent of all people are sensitive to radiation and seven to ten percent are highly sensitive. Doses of radiation otherwise regarded as harmless are rather dangerous for such people

Development of the nuclear component of modern society (both weaponry and atomic energy) has changed the meaning of such moral concepts as good, evil, justice, and others. For instance, politicians and the military now regard as acceptable the death by radiation of large groups of non-combatants during military conflicts. Immediate victory in a nuclear war justifies their risking the future death and degradation of their own population as a result of global climatic changes or contamination from radioactive fallout.

In August 1986, the director-general of the IAEA declared that the atomic energy system could cope with one Chernobyl every year. Ten years later, the head of MINATOM (the Russian Ministry of the Atom) declared that "one Chernobyl is not enough" to topple human civilization. The international community was offered the option of signing the Vienna agreement for compensation in case of accidents at nuclear power plants. The maximum sum per accident that may be claimed as compensation is $50 million, a sum—as demonstrated by Chernobyl—hundreds of times smaller than the real damage caused by an explosion at a nuclear power plant.

This dehumanized thinking process was influenced by the ideology of nuclear scientists interested first and foremost in the development and use of atomic technology. Now we are searching for ways to return to fundamental, humane values. This process requires the turnover of at least one generation, i.e., 20 years.

The period of nuclear brinkmanship between the two superpowers witnessed the accumulation of nuclear arsenals hundreds of times larger than needed for the defeat of any aggression. The political conception of "nuclear deterrence" is devoid of any scientific content, including the idea of "first strike." This is true for Russia's contemporary military doctrine as well as for analogous foreign ones.

Another fashionable excuse is that there are countries with unstable political regimes that may acquire nuclear weapons. Let us suppose that North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, or Iraq would use nuclear warheads in regional conflicts. Would Russia, the US, or any other nuclear power be able to carry out a nuclear strike on the territory of one of these countries? This would mark the end of world civilization. Another unacceptable argument is the need to prevent or ward off an attack with chemical or biological weapons.

Historically speaking, nuclear weapons are obsolete as military or political instniments. Their role proved to be inconsistent: France and Britain have lost their empires, the US and China were shamefully defeated in Vietnam, and the same happened to the USSR in Afghanistan.

However, reality shows that nuclear weapons will remain in the arsenal of the major powers until 2015-2025. Until then, the arsenals need to be carefully serviced, maintained, and monitored. The liquidation of nuclear weapons can and should be implemented after this period. This in no way means the general disarmament of the countries that possess this type of weapon. Nuclear arms could be replaced by other weapons able to protect a state's political and economic interests.

Nuclear scientists and pro-nuclear politicians could not have forseen:

• that the countries possessing nuclear weapons and facilities would become hostage to their own nuclear potential;
  
  
• that unforeseeable non-military (moral, ethical, and ecological) imperatives against the use of nuclear weapons would appear;
  
  
• that military aggrandizement would be one of the reasons for the disintegration of one of the superpowcrs. The USSR collapsed at the height of its military potential and nuclear arsenal, a factor that contributed to its disintegration rather than preventing it;
  
  
• that the funds needed for the liquidation of nuclear weapons would equal those used for its creation.

Man will always strive to create tools that intimidate his enemies, and states will try to use these creations in international conflicts. If we want to preserve our civilization, we must invent the tools that will help us avoid conflicts—not win them.

The development of nuclear technology has given birth to the problem of nuclear terrorism and blackmail. In the 1970s, the US and USSR developed a miniature nuclear weapon (the "suitcase" version of the nuclear bomb), specially designed for behind-the-lines operations on enemy territory. Today, nuclear power plants and research reactors have become attractive targets for terrorists. One or a handful of men with a portable missile device may now threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

Even before the proliferation of high-precision weaponry, nuclear power plants became a highly efficient weapon themselves. The development of high-precision arms has increased this threat substantially. Today, a country does not need to be a nuclear power in order to trigger a nuclear explosion on enemy territory hundreds of times stronger than those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All it has to do is to sabotage a nuclear power plant.

Obviously, we should not blame the inventor and manufacturer of matches for fires. Matches may be used to set forests or houses on fire but they are no threat to the existence of the entire civilization. But nuclear "matches" are.

Problems related to the development of nuclear technology in general could be solved quickly by using the "admissible risk" approach, which has the potential to lay the groundwork for a scientific basis for the transition to a postindustrial civilization. Russian scientific thinking is lagging far behind in the development of this concept.

Alexey V. Yablokov served as a chairman of the special Presidential Commission on the radioactive dumping problem in 1992. Address: Center for Russian Environmental Policy, Vavilov str.26, Moscow, W-333, Russia,117808; tel/fax +(095) 952 - 30 07; email: anzus@glas.apc.org.