Model of a Road to an NWFW with Societal Verification
Stefan Björnson
The nuclear weapon states have in the past performed massive vertical proliferation in volume and technical development of their nuclear arsenals. The NPT has at the same time been by and largesuccessful in preventing horizontal proliferation to other states. In an NWFW both kinds of proliferation must be reversed and kept under control.This is a challenge for many types of social mechanisms, among them societal verification by scientists and engineers.
In the following diagram, an attempt is made at creating a model for a time sequence of events and trends which may lead to an NWFW. There are separate paths for curbing horizontal and vertical proliferation, respectively. For each path a number of enhancing/preventing events and trends are shown.
International treaties - and international law - are of decisive importance, but they must be promoted, backed up and kept in force bypublic opinion, international agencies, national laws - and utmost, by loyal cooperation from key personnel. Once on the path of reversing the vertical proliferation, there is a good chance the international community will continue from the test ban treaty to arms reductions (down to a few hundred) and ultimately to a treaty for abolitionof nuclear weapons.
Nationalistic and opportunistic politicians often play on paranoid feelings, 3promoting "defence", including nuclear weapons. There will always be an element of distrust in international politics, which counteracts arms reduction. Confidence building measures are important activities to prevent such distrust. A remaining source of insecurity is the risk that some dictator or terrorist group gets hold of a number of bombs, using these for blackmailing the rest of the world. In such case it is held to be important to have a convincing nuclear arsenal in storage under the control of responsible powers. This "rather safe than sorry" argument is based on the assumption that there will be legitimate targets for nuclear retaliation. The weakness of this argument is that terrorist groups do not offer any such targets and dictators tend to hide in bunkers while their cities are being bombed to ashes and gravel.
Important driving forces for horizontal proliferation are chain reactions of the China- India-Pakistan type, driven by latent regional conflicts. The issues today are rather regional than global. The conflict situation has also shifted from an east-west direction to a north-south one. The limiting of horizontal proliferation may be perceived as a form of neo-colonialism mapped onto the north-south dimension of collision of interests.
A key factor in nuclear disarmament is that the present nuclear powers must give up their nuclear weapons' monopoly by agreeing to disarmament. A worldorder based on a monopoly situation will not be tolerated for any longer stretch of time, as history has shown over and over in the past.
If horizontal proliferation is to be prevented, there must be a stronginternational consensus about it. The international community must have thewill and the means to take appropriate actions, like embargos, against breakout states. Societal verification can play an important role here, but is a high risk activity for theindividual who performs it. Ultimately the nuclear technology will be obsolete for horizontal proliferation and sustainability, if it is abolished by the nuclear powers.
Individual Risks Related to Societal Verification
Societal verification is a noble, but dangerous, activity. Those who have performed it, may stand out as some kind of outlaw heros in history, but they have often had to pay a very high price. There will also be a risk that the rest of the world does not share this moral conviction, making the whistle blower very lonely.
This diagram lists a number of different bases for societal verification and likely consequences for a whistle blower. It is likely that any such activity will be costly, unless it is supported by the codex of the organization on which a whistle is blown.
Curbing Proliferation Risks through Societal Verification in a Nuclear Weapon Free World
Under the assumption that all residual arsenals of nuclear weapons have been abolished, any planned military use (or credible threat) requires production of new weapons. Building effective and manageable nuclear weapons is a non-trivial task. Engineers and scientists in numbers counting at least up to a hundred would have to be involved. In this case too, the risk of detection is substantial.
Manufacture of new weapons' grade material from reprocessed plutonium through novel methods, like isotope separation, would likewise require cooperation from large numbers of scientists and engineers. In this situation there would be a strong international opinion against nuclear weapons. There would be inspection agencies and control bodies which watch over the former nuclear powers. A single whistle blower could bring down the full power of these institutions (and conventional military forces!) on a breakout or upstart nuclear weapon state. In the presence of strong international bodies which watch over an NWFWstatus worldwide, societal verification becomes an efficient tool to guarantee this.
