A Northeast Asia NWFZ:
A Realistic and Attainable Goal An Asia-Pacific Approach to the Nuclear Weapon Free World
Hiro Umebayashi
Introduction
When the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty was signed in Cairo on April 11 of this year, the entire land areas of the Southern Hemisphere, inhabited or uninhabited, were declared to be zones free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the NWFZ Treaties of Africa and Latin America, along with the Antarctic Treaty, have also turned two thirds of the vast ocean area of the Southern Hemisphere into a zone free of such weapons.
Although the African, Southeast Asian and Latin American NWFZs stretch some distance into the Northern Hemisphere, we can see a remarkable contrast between the developed south and the developing north in terms of the NWFZs.
All the existing NWFZ treaties prohibit the development, manufacture, possession, stockpiling, deployment, testing, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons anywhere within the zones. Therefore, expanding such zones is an effective measure to attain a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW). This is the case not only because the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is prohibited by the treaties, but also because nuclear weapon states are increasingly deprived of areas where they can use or threaten to use those weapons for their security interests. By this process, nuclear weapons are rendered less and less valuable tools.
However, the efforts to develop a new NWFZ in the Northern Hemisphere present a new kind of challenge. Most of the potential areas for new NWFZs would appear to involve as a party of the treaty one or more of the five declared nuclear weapon states and three so-called threshold states. These states — India, Pakistan and Israel — have not entered into any legally-binding arrangements to prohibit the development and production of nuclear weapons, such as the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons) safeguard. A South Asia NWFZ would involve India and Pakistan while a Middle East NWFZ would involve Israel.
Nuclear Situation in Northeast Asia
This same challenge pertains to the case of a Northeast Asia NWFZ. It appears that it would have to involve as key players within the treaty three declared nuclear weapon states — People's Republic of China, Russian Federation and the United States. The United States has no territorial area within the expected Northeast Asian NWFZ, but it has close military ties with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan and maintains military bases which have attracted much attention because of the suspected presence of the nuclear weapons.
As is evident from its recent nuclear diplomacy in the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) negotiation, China, a late comer to the nuclear club, has the intention of upgrading its nuclear capability. Its strategic nuclear forces in the eastern part of China are composed primarily of long range and intermediate range land-based ballistic missiles. In relation to the potential NWFZ, it is to be noted that crucial launching sites of China's only ICBMs (Dong Feng 5A) capable of hitting targets on the United States soil are believed to be located at Luoning, about 600 km from the coast of the Yellow Sea, and at Wuzhai, about 400 km from the coast of the Bo Hai[1]. In addition, Shanghai and Qingdao are key naval bases for China's one or two operational SSBNs, while its strategic bomber base is located deep inland. China is believed to have some tactical nuclear weapons such as artillery, rockets and ADMs (atomic demolition munitions). Since they are highly mobile, they will pose substantial difficulty under a NWFZ treaty.
Although ICBMs are the most dominant component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, Russia seems to have no launching site for such missiles in eastern Siberia and on the Pacific Coast area following the retirement of the SS-11s[2]. Russia's most crucial nuclear bases in this area are its Pacific Fleet bases at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Sovetskaya Gavan, and Vladivostok. The first one is the homeport of the nine currently active strategic nuclear submarines, Delta-V2(??), in its Pacific Fleet. Although Vladivostok is not a homeport for SSBNs, it is believed to be an indispensable ice-free port to support the Pacific nuclear fleet. It is also noted that Vladivostok is situated very close to the Korean Peninsula. The total number of nuclear warheads aboard the SSBNs of the Russian Pacific Fleet is estimated to be 432. There are also two air bases with possible nuclear missions in the Pacific region — Alekseyevka and Ukraina — but their current status in relation to a strategic bomber role is not clear. Russian land-based tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn as were those of the United States, but Russia maintains sea-launched cruise missiles (SS-N-21) and tactical gravity bombs and air missiles to be carried by tactical fighters and bombers.
Regarding the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States, all bomber and submarine forces, as well as ICBM forces, are based in the territory of the United States. However, logistical and communication support, such as refuelling by tanker aircraft and repair to escorting attack subs, are provided by forward deployed U.S. forces in Japan and South Korea. In 1992, the governments of the United States and the ROK officially announced that tactical nuclear weapons stored at Kunsan Air Base in the ROK had been removed from the ROK. In addition, the U.S. "Nuclear Posture Review" of 1994 eliminated the nuclear capability of all the U.S. surface ships including aircraft carriers. Therefore, the only tactical nuclear weapons that the U.S. forces would deploy in an emergency into the Northeast Asia region are the sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) aboard nuclear attack submarines and tactical bombs aboard F16 and F15 Air Force fighters, whose conventional squadrons are permanently deployed in South Korea and Japan. The United States justifies maintaining the option to use tactical nuclear weapons on the ground that it must be prepared for possible use of chemical or biological weapons by a potential adversary.
Because of the ingrained distrust fostered by the long-standing U.S. policy of "neither-confirm-nor-deny" (NCND) the presence of the nuclear weapons along with the associated manipulation of information by allied governments, people in the region, in particular the Japanese and Koreans, have found it difficult to believe that nuclear weapons have actually been removed from the region. Recently, two independent research groups, using U.S. Freedom of Information Act requests, revealed evidence of the absence of such weapons. Nautilus Institute of California obtained U.S. Army documents showing that the most important Army units in nuclear weapon operations in Korea had been deactivated[3]. The Peace Resources Cooperative of Yokohama, Japan, studied the command history of the USS Independence (the U.S. aircraft carrier homeported in Japan) and learned that the W-Division, known as the technical group which specifically handles nuclear weapons, had been disestablished on April 7, 1993 "as part of the new national policy with respect to deployment of special weapons aboard surface vessels"[4].
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the nuclear interests of the three declared nuclear states in this region differ from one another in many respects. From the strategic point of view, the denuclearization of Northeast Asia will impact most seriously upon China's offensive of Northeast Asia will impact most seriously upon China's offensive capability. China maintains its most important ICBM launching sites in this region and the naval bases on its Pacific coast are the sole gateway for its strategic missile submarines which China is apparently striving to modernize. In contrast, U.S. nuclear strategy will be affected very little by the establishment of the Northeastern NWFZ. Naturally this disparity will pose a serious difficulty in the negotiation of a Northeastern NWFZ.
Recent Proposals for a Northeast Asia NWFZ
Although there is a long history of the idea of the Northeast Asia NWFZ[5], it is only very recently that more or less feasible proposals have appeared that conform with the post-Cold War situation of the region. In Japan, a former diplomat and a former general have independently proposed NWFZ schemes centered on the Korean Peninsula.
Kumao Kaneko, former director of the Nuclear Energy Division of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently proposed a NWFZ structure in Northeast Asia[6], which is complemented by a safeguard and nuclear energy promotion mechanism, tentatively called "Asiatom" or "Pacificatom", for the "peaceful use" of atomic energy. Although I believe the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone should not be linked with the promotion of nuclear power plants, his proposal can be a good starting point for wider discussions.
Kumao Kaneko's proposal by him consists of a circular zone with a 2000-km radius from a center point at Panmunjom. It encircles the entirety of Japan, ROK, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Taiwan. Countries partially included within the zone are China, Mongolia, and Russia. The United States is also included as a relevant party to the NWFZ treaty for the same reasons mentioned earlier. Apparently the 2000-km radius primarily derives from a calculation to include all of Japan from the center of the Korean Peninsula. However, in relation to the nuclear situation set forth in the previous section, it is to be noted that Chinese ICBM launching sites, Luoning and Wuzhai, as well as major naval bases, Shanghai and Qingdao, are within the circle. For Russia, the disadvantage of the loss of the nuclear mission of Vladivostok will also be substantial. The disadvantage to the United States of the proposal is not strategic but tactical. It would have to abandon the option of tactical nuclear weapons use to deal with the claimed DPRK weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons, such as biological or chemical weapons. However as will be discussed later, this option has already been discarded by the United States during the nuclear negotiation between the United States and DPRK.
Apparently, a similar proposal of a circular Northeastern NWFZ was put on the table several months earlier during a panel led by John Endicott, Director, Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology. This information is from a report[7] written by Lt. General Toshiyuki Shikata, former Commander of the Northern Ground Self-Defense Force Japan. Shikata was one of five panel members from different states — ROK, Japan, China, Russia and the United States. In this proposal, the circular NWFZ scheme is almost identical with the aforementioned, but the panel's deliberations resulted in a unique idea, namely a limited NWFZ. Shikata explains the agreement among the panel members was only possible when "certain categories (of nuclear weapons) be excluded from inclusion during the initial stages of the Agreement, and that emphasis be placed on nuclear warheads applicable to non-strategic missiles". In other words, this is a proposal of a NWFZ limited to the non-strategic nuclear weapons. The panel's arrival of this position is very understandable in view of the strategic considerations outlined in the preceding paragraphs.
Although details of the rationale for their position are not available yet, one of the weaknesses of this initiative is probably the obscurity of the reasoning to draw a circle with a certain radius. In other words, what is the merit of removing the tactical nuclear weapons in the circle zone, especially since it would produce numerous difficulties which would not otherwise have to be faced?
A Trilateral Treaty with NSA Protocols
In the present author's view the major objectives of the Northeast Asia NWFZ can be summarized as follows:
- to prevent a foreseeable competitive escalation of nuclear development among Japan, the ROK and the DPRK, or between Japan and a reunified Korea. The controversial Japanese plutonium program raises suspicions about Japan's intention regarding future military use of those materials. This will encourage Korean leaders under some circumstances to develop their own nuclear capability, thereby contributing to Japanese perception of insecurity which could threaten to overturn Japan's traditional non-nuclear policy.
- to establish a mechanism to implement the provisions of the Northeast Asia NWFZ including verification, as the first step toward further confidence building in the region, in particular among nations with difficult historical background originating from the time of Japanese colonization and north-south division of the Korean Peninsula.
- to demonstrate a security framework independent of nuclear weapons in a region closely surrounded by nuclear weapon states. This will provide a very positive step to expand NWFZs in the Northern Hemisphere and eventually toward a nuclear weapon-free world (NWFW).
In the Northeast Asia a NWFZ could be founded on a very favorable current circumstance. Three key states — Japan, the ROK and the DPRK — have already openly declared policies that they will not go nuclear armed. In the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" signed on January 20, 1992, the ROK and the DPRK agreed that they "shall refrain from the testing, manufacture, production, acceptance, possession, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear weapons," and that they "shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes." Although the declaration fell into a serious crisis when Pyongyang expressed its withdrawal from "Non-Proliferation Treaty for Nuclear Weapons" (NPT), it is now going to be normalized through various channels of talks. Japan has the well-known "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" which state that Japan will not manufacture, possess nor allow the bringing-in of nuclear weapons. Also the "Atomic Energy Basic Law" of 1955 prohibits the military use of atomic energy. These declared positions can be the basis for a tri-lateral treaty for a Northeastern NWFZ among these three states.
However, Japan's "Principles" are just one part of its broader nuclear policy. The most recent "Japanese Defense Outline" issued in November of last year reiterated its previous policy that nuclear deterrence by U.S. nuclear forces is vital for the security of Japan. The rationale for this policy is that as long as nuclear weapons of neighboring countries exist, Japan needs a nuclear umbrella. This argument will be irrelevant when one or more protocols of the NWFZ treaty are signed by China, Russia and the United States. These protocols would provide for so-called negative security assurances (NSA) in which nuclear weapon states will not use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons against the states within the NWFZ under any circumstances.
In fact the United States has already guaranteed this assurance to the DPRK in their joint statements issued on June 11, 1993, and August 12, 1994, and in the final agreement signed on October 21, 1994.[8] China has been maintaining the unconditional NSA policy from the time it became a nuclear weapon state. The general positions of the United States and Russia on NSA are identical, but also conditional in that NSA would not apply in the case of an attack on the United States (Russia) or its allies by a state allied to a nuclear weapon state. It will be straightforward to make an arrangement by which these states will agree to sign the rd to make an arrangement by which these states will agree to sign the protocols.
Regarding the issue of inspection under the treaty, it is to be noted that the United States has hinted during negotiations with the DPRK that DPRK is welcome to inspect the U.S. Forces on bases in the ROK.3 This arrangement would be extended to the U.S. bases in Japan and naval vessels visiting ports within the NWFZ.
This scenario of a Trilateral Treaty with NSA Protocols will leave the direct nuclear disarmament objectives to be addressed by other mechanisms, but will meet, to a substantial degree, all the regional objectives of a Northeastern NWFZ mentioned above.
References
- Robert S. Norris et'al, "Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol V", Feb. 1994, Westview Press.
- Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Russian (C.I.S.) Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1995 — NRDC Nuclear Notebook", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996.
- Peter Hayes, "US Nuclear Weapons and Korea", Nautilus Bulletin, Feb. 1996, Nautilus Institute.
- Hiro Umebayashi, "W-Division of USS Independence Disbanded on Apr.7,1993", Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor (Japanese language), Apr.15, 1996, Pacific Campaign for Disarmament Security.
- See, for example, a paper by Peter Hayes, "Japan's Plutonium Overhang and Regional Insecurity", Working Paper No.136 of Peace Research Center, Australian National University, Sep. 1993.
- Kumao Kaneko, "Japan Needs No Umbrella", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996.
- Toshiyuki Shikata, "A Limited NWFZ Proposal in Northeast Asia", Securitarian (Japanese language) Apr. 1995.
- It is to be noted that the United States NSA to the DPRK was gradually consolidated during the sixteen-months negotiations. This history increases the significance of the final assurance. The first joint statement reads "The DPRK and the US have agreed to principles of: assurances against the threat and the use of force, including nuclear weapons" (June 11, 1993): the second joint statement reads "the following elements should be part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue: ...To help achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, the USA is prepared to provide the DPRK with assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the USA..." (August 12, 1994): the final Agreed Framework reads "The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S." (October 21, 1994).
