Present and Future Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones
Luis Masperi
Introduction
The indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 was a mixed bag. On the one hand, it reaffirmed opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons as a permanent principle of humankind. On the other hand, it left some ambiguity as to the right of select countries to posses such weapons forever. In addition, it failed to solve the problem posed by the few countries not party to the NPT which have nuclear-weapons potential and are in regions of conflict. Finally, the treaty maintains some dated expressions which no longer correspond to present situation.
Only recently did the Latin American Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) — formally older than NPT — become effective, and the same may be said of the ten-year old South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty). In addition, two new regional agreements have appeared: the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and that signed at Bangkok by the Southeast Asian countries. Thus, there appears to be a general recognition that progress in non-proliferation is better achieved through regional treaties, rather than trying to make the NPT completely universal or attempting to amend its defects.
In this article I will review the evolution and pros and cons of the regional treaties, in order that the lessons learned from these experiences may encourage regional agreements in other areas — especially zones of tension and conflict, and lead the declared nuclear-weapon powers to dismantle their arsenals, reaching in this way the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon free world.
Treaty of Tlatelolco
The Latin American treaty was opened for signature in 1967 and entered into force in 1968. It was the first agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons in an inhabited region of the world.
The treaty's origin lies in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which led the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust. It was clear to Latin American countries that they were in a zone of confrontation, and that such a crisis could be repeated. Led by Mexico, Latin governments pushed for the establishment of a regional treaty to avert this danger.
Though the initiative is certainly praise-worthy, the completion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco came only in 1995, when Cuba signed it after the recent ratification of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. By then, tension in the region had largely dissipated.
It is interesting to note that some countries which had/have no intention of becoming party to the NPT because of its discriminatory character agreed to sign Tlatelolco. At the time of negotiations, Argentina and Brazil had civilian nuclear energy development. Later both initiated secret uranium enrichment projects and, at least for the latter, some evidence of a nuclear-device purpose was revealed. Currently, among the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have nuclear power plants, and Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Peru nuclear research activity.
An important feature of Tlatelolco, which was repeated in subsequent regional agreements and which certainly attracted many parties, was the inclusion of negative security assurances (i.e., protection against nuclear attacks or threats by the declared nuclear powers). Such provision was not included in the NPT. Another positive feature, the Treaty covers vast areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans hundreds of kilometers off the coasts of Latin America.
A serious loophole of Tlatelolco, however, is that it allowed peaceful nuclear explosions, which the NPT does not. Only recently, following the 1991 bilateral Argentine-Brazil agreement in which they abandoned this possibility, has the Treaty been interpreted as barring any kind of nuclear explosion.
Latin American countries showed the permanence of their non-nuclear commitment by making the Treaty of Tlatelolco endure indefinitely, rather than for fixed periods, as the NPT did until 1995. Weakening the treaty, however, withdrawal is permitted under Tlatelolco, as in the NPT, after a three-month notice.
The treaty prohibits testing, manufacture, deployment and use of nuclear weapons, directly or by anyone else. Transit of nuclear weapons through the area of coverage seems to be excluded, but, since it is not explicitly mentioned, ambiguity and differing interpretations remain. Another difference with respect to the NPT is that special inspections may be done when requested by any party. These inspections will be performed by the IAEA.
The obligation of nuclear powers is contained in two additional protocols, which have been signed by the five declared nuclear states. Although the treaty explicitly denies the possibility of reservations, the statements by which some nuclear powers have signed the protocols dilute their commitments. For instance, concerning the requirement in Protocol I regarding denuclearization in Latin American territories under the de jure or de facto responsibility of nuclear powers, France reserved its right of self-defence and transit of nuclear weapons in French territories. Similarly, the United Kingdom did not recognize the legislation of parties regarding sea and transit of nuclear weapons. The United States interpreted the treaty to mean that each party has the right to grant or deny transit of nuclear weapons.
Concerning Protocol II on negative assurances, the Soviet Union denied the right to extend the region beyond the territory of the parties, and the United States and United Kingdom considered that their commitment would not hold in case of attack of any party allied to another nuclear power.
The Treaty of Rarotonga
The South Pacific Treaty was opened for signature in 1985 and entered into force in 1986. French nuclear testing in the region led to its establishment, and its effective completion this year is made possible by France's signature after the end of its tests. The treaty was pushed by two very determined non-nuclear states, Australia and New Zealand, and it must be noted that there are no nuclear power plants in the region.
The Treaty of Rarotonga has indefinite duration, like Tlatelolco, but in many ways the South Pacific ban has improved on the Latin American ban. First of all, peaceful nuclear explosions are forbidden. Secondly, the entry into force is simpler than for Tlatelolco, and withdrawal is possible only after 12 months' notice, rather than three. Even then, the treaty explicitly prevents testing and dumping radioactive waste at sea. Finally, Rarotonga strengthens the trade rules, prohibiting the provision of nuclear materials or equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state, unless covered by NPT safeguards.
On the other hand, the South Pacific treaty is more permissive on the temporary introduction of nuclear weapons by recognizing the sovereign right of parties to allow visits of foreign ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, or to permit transit in its airspace or navigation in its territorial sea of such vessels. Moreover, Rarotonga bans nuclear weapons only up to the twelve-mile territorial sea limit.
There are three additional protocols to this treaty, signed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States on March 25, 1996. Protocols I and II are equivalent to those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The first regards prohibitions on countries outside the zone of coverage for territories within the zone for which they are responsible. The second corresponds to the negative security assurances. In this case it is China that reserves the right to reconsider its commitment if other powers or parties violate the Treaty, and the Soviet Union has stated that the transit allowance contradicts the Treaty and that it would consider itself free in case of attack by a party supported by another nuclear power. The new Protocol III prohibits testing any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ).
Pelindaba Treaty
The African treaty was opened for signature in 1995, but its entry into force may depend on the ratification of its Arab parties, which will depend on the evolution of the situation in the Middle East. Even if the necessary number of ratifications is achieved, the effective completion of the treaty will come only when there is a perception that Israel is keen to abandon its presumed nuclear weapons.
The idea of an African NWFZ goes back to the 1960s, as a reaction against French tests in Algeria. Afterwards, the acquisition of some nuclear weapons by South Africa made impossible any improvement until this country was the first in the world to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Currently, South Africa is the only party with nuclear power plants, whereas Egypt, Algeria, Ghana, Libya and Zaire have research reactors.
In the definition of the zone there is a dispute over the sovereignty of Diego Garcia island, where the United States has a base for nuclear weapons-carrying aircraft. A reference in the agreement to the freedom of the seas is intended to preclude restrictions on the presence of nuclear weapons beyond the territorial sea limits of the parties.
While sharing the indefinite duration and withdrawal with 12 months' notice with the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Pelindaba Treaty has several interesting innovations. First, it also bans research on nuclear explosive devices (i.e., implosion technology, hydronuclear testing and computer simulations), though it is uncertain how these activities can be monitored. Second, it requires the destruction of any nuclear device that a party might have had previous to signing the Treaty. This currently affects only South Africa, but in a future Treaty might apply to Israel. Third, Pelindaba prohibits dumping nuclear waste not only at sea, but in the whole region, though presumably controlled repositories are allowed. Finally, the agreement prohibits conventional attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, which has important implications for future Middle East participation. The Pelindaba Treaty states support for peaceful nuclear activities, which Tlatelolco and Rarotonga do not mention.
As in Rarotonga, there is an explicit prohibition on testing any nuclear explosive devices, but the African treaty also permits visits of aircraft or ships carrying nuclear weapons.
There are three additional Protocols, similar to those in the Rarotonga Treaty. One may think that USA will not give willingly negative assurance to Libya.
Southeast Asian Treaty
The agreement was signed by ASEAN countries in Bangkok in 1995. The motivation for it was presumably to obtain negative security assurances, since the region is close to others of potential conflict, as well as to further regional homogenization under way.
This treaty is similar to Rarotonga: All parties must conclude an agreement with the IAEA within 18 months. Cambodia is the only country which has not yet concluded it. Unlike in the Treaty of Pelindaba, research on nuclear explosive devices is not expressly banned.
Regarding the additional Protocols, negative assurance is foreseen not only for parties, but for the whole zone. As in all of the above cases, this is a matter of dispute with the nuclear powers. Already, the United States has argued that this provision is not fair and has criticized the inclusion of the exclusive economic zones, extending the international norm of 12 miles from shore to 200 miles. China has objected to the inclusion in the zone of parts of the South China Sea, to which it and some ASEAN members have conflicting claims.
Conclusion
The examination of the existing regional treaties shows very different motivations: with Tlatelolco some countries did not want to become parties of NPT; Rarotonga was pushed by pacifist and ecological policies; Pelindaba required the integration of a former de facto nuclear state with others linked to close zones of conflict; and in Southeast Asia countries were seeking a homogenization for economic and political reasons. All of these features are useful for the future development of other NWFZ. One may foresee such zones in the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean peninsula and surrounding neighborhood and, perhaps, the European Union. The aim would be to eliminate the possible nuclear devices of threshold states, to avoid the nuclear weapon temptation of some economic powers, to reach the nuclear disarmament of European countries, and to put constraints to the remaining nuclear powers because of their geographical or political involvement in future NWFZ.
From the experiences of the existing NWFZ, the following conclusions emerge:
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A regional treaty is not possible when conflict inside the zone is too severe.
This means that peace negotiations must be further pursued before a Middle East NWFZ, suggested by Egypt and Iran in 1974, is likely to be achieved. Such an obstacle, however, does not exist for the establishment of a NWFZ within the European Union.
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It is not necessary to wait until the relationship among parties is completely friendly.
Bilateral contacts, starting with exchange visits in nuclear facilities, should be promoted between countries which had wars in the past and/or mistrust in the present (e.g., India and Pakistan, two threshold countries which are not willing to become parties to the NPT; and North and South Korea, in a region where NPT safeguards appear insufficient and where the Korean agreement of 1991 should be put in practice).
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A regional treaty may include particular features of the zone, and frequently parties trust more in their own inspectors.
For regions in conflict, countries will not prefer to depend on third parties when their security is concerned. Particularly for the Middle East, complex interconnected negotiations of mutual recognition and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons prohibition must be pursued, as proposed by Egypt in 1990. It is possible that, in this and other cases, inspectors from the countries of the zone should be added to those of the IAEA, following the example of Argentina and Brazil.
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The regional agreement may stimulate cooperation in other fields and have economic benefit.
This argument, always valid, should apply particularly to the situation of the European Union, in which non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon members co-exist, and where the recent series of French tests showed very little gain in security and much loss in internal coherence and external reputation.
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Negative security assurances and prohibitions on research in nuclear weapons should be included.
This would lead to a general no first use agreement, to invalidate the theory of deterrence against conventional weapons, and to point to the danger of research on new nuclear weapons without need of explosive tests.
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Nuclear powers are generally involved in NWFZ.
For a South Asia NWFZ, which seems to be accepted by Pakistan, a commitment of China would be necessary to gain agreement by India. For North East Asia, it would be essential to involve Japan as well as the two Koreas and to eliminate Chinese and Russian weapons deployed in the region. And similar assurances should be given by Russia to reach nuclear disarmament in Europe.
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Transit of ships or aircraft with nuclear weapons should be forbidden in NWFZ, and additional protocols should be signed without reservations.
Transit of nuclear weapons and reservations, currently allowed or tolerated, are contradictory to the basic principle of a NWFZ, where nuclear weapons are barred and where members wish to feel safe from nuclear menace from outside. Moreover, a mechanism for the verification of fulfilment of obligations of nuclear powers under the additional protocols should be envisaged.
If the above points were applied to build the new, above-mentioned NWFZ, nuclear weapons would be illegal in a great part of the world. Presumably there would be a stage when nuclear weapons would be in the hands of only three large countries: China, Russia and the United States. The first because of lack of an open society, the second due to persistent political unrest, and the third as a consequence of the role of world police explicitly or tacitly recognized by many other countries. The transition to or consolidation of democracy may lead the first two nuclear powers to abandon their arsenals; and a better international organization and safeguards system may convince the majority that the world is safer without any nuclear police.
